Rapid Economic Growth at Home Adds to Heat on Hu to Adjust Yuan

By ANDREW BROWNE
April 20, 2006; Page A1

BEIJING -- Adding to U.S. pressure on President Hu Jintao to let the yuan appreciate, China's growth at home is surging so quickly it risks overheating.

Driven by exports and rapid development, China's economic growth raced ahead by 10.2% in the first three months of this year, even faster than the blistering 9.9% pace registered for all of 2005.

The speed appears to have taken Mr. Hu by surprise. "We do not want, nor are we pursuing, over-rapid economic growth," he said Sunday. But it is getting harder for Beijing to hold the line as its trade surplus hits record highs and sucks in vast amounts of cash.

China's trade surplus swelled to $12 billion for the first two months of the year, up from $10.8 billion a year earlier. Isaac Meng, an economist at BNP Paribas in Beijing, said he expects China's surplus to hit $130 billion this year, $28 billion more than last year's record.

China spurns arguments by U.S. politicians that its massive trade surplus with the U.S. -- $202 billion last year, by Washington's calculations -- is the result of a steeply undervalued yuan. Since it raised the value of the yuan by 2.1% against the U.S. dollar last July, China has allowed the currency to gain only 1% or so more.

Yesterday in Seattle, Mr. Hu reiterated a pledge to gradually liberalize China's currency policy, but reaffirmed his commitment to keep its exchange rate "basically stable at an adaptive and equilibrium level" -- underlining a reluctance to move too precipitously on currency policy. (See related article¹.)

Still, the exchange-rate issue is likely to be high on the agenda during Mr. Hu's meeting with President Bush today. While few expect Beijing to engineer another one-off currency revaluation, there are increasing expectations that Chinese policy makers -- seeking to cool the economy at home -- could allow a faster pace of appreciation for the rest of this year.

Many Western economists agree with Beijing that further appreciation of the yuan wouldn't itself do much to improve the U.S. trade deficit. But some also say a powerful argument may be building to allow for a stronger yuan given the growth of China's economy. A stronger yuan could help slow the influx of currency into the country, both by making Chinese assets more expensive for foreign investors and by making Chinese exports less desirable to foreign buyers.

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Signs of possible overheating are everywhere here. Investment in factories, highways and other fixed assets jumped 27.7% in the first three months of this year over the same period a year earlier, according to state media. The broadest measure of money supply grew 18.8% in March from a year earlier, higher than the official 16% target.

Easy bank credit is flowing again after more than a year of austerity. Commercial banks already have dished out more than half their targeted loan total for the full year. Funds are so plentiful that banks are cutting loan rates as they scramble for new business.

"Banks are chasing us to lend money," said Chen Tongkao, chairman of Zhejiang Dongfang Shipbuilding Co. Mr. Chen said that last month the company secured a 200 million yuan ($25 million) loan from state-owned Agricultural Bank of China at 5% interest, a discount over the official "guidance rate" of 5.58% for a one-year loan. The money will go toward building an 800 million yuan production line to make oil and chemical tanks for export.

Increasingly, the concern is that China is drawing in so much cash that it will spur inflation. Economists say the flood could feed an investment bubble, raising the risk of bad bank loans and wasteful investment. If such a bubble popped, it could mean massive overcapacity that leads to collapsing prices and industrial bankruptcies -- which has happened to China in the past, most notably in the mid-90s.

A downturn likely would ricochet throughout U.S. and other Western businesses because they are invested in China to an unprecedented degree. Also vulnerable: a slew of venture capital and private equity investors who could see their record-setting investments collapse if there were a sudden turn in the economy, similar to the popping of the U.S. Internet bubble early this decade.

The best gauge of the problem facing Mr. Hu may be the buildup of China's foreign-exchange reserves, the currency reserves held by the central bank. These grew by $21.4 billion in March to reach $875.1 billion, making them the largest in the world. Before long, the reserves are likely to exceed $1 trillion -- almost half the size of the Chinese economy.

The reserves are so bloated because of Chinese central bank intervention to prevent the yuan from strengthening too quickly. The bank buys dollars as they flood in from exports, investments and speculative "hot money," and sells yuan. The resulting glut of yuan suppresses its value but also floods the economy with liquidity. Authorities try to mop up the excess cash by issuing yuan-denominated bonds that are bought by banks.

Still, with cash-rich banks rushing to lend as the reserves swell, there's a danger of a new investment bubble, inflation and an increase in the amount of bad loans. Last week, Premier Wen Jiabao held a cabinet meeting and called for "comprehensive measures to solve the problem of fast growth in bank lending," according to a report posted on the Chinese central bank's Web site.

Elsewhere in the world, central banks might consider raising interest rates to deter borrowing. But in China, higher rates could add to the problem by sucking in more "hot money" betting that Beijing will have to relent and allow the yuan to rise faster. Such flows have picked up again this year after tailing off last year, economists say.

Economists say they believe Chinese leaders are anxious to avoid hitting the brakes on growth this time. China is still exporting excess production built up during the previous investment boom, and killing domestic demand would likely unleash yet another wave of exports, adding to the country's already bloated trade surpluses.

Instead, Beijing also has been hoping to ease the economy's dependence on exports and investment by refocusing growth toward domestic consumption. A few weeks ago, Premier Wen unveiled a domestic stimulus program, including measures to abolish an agricultural tax, boost infrastructure spending and increase government investment in the country's health and education systems.

The central bank also is trying to reverse the huge currency inflows. Last week, it announced measures to allow Chinese individuals and ordinary companies to invest in overseas shares and bonds for the first time. Also, the bank said individuals will be able to exchange Chinese yuan for as much as $20,000 each year, up from $8,000. Companies involved in trade will be given more freedom to buy foreign currency.

Up to now, China has imposed severe restrictions on the use of foreign exchange. It is miserly with the amounts it allows students to take overseas, and even getting dollars to pay for a visa can be a hassle. Smaller companies trying to get foreign currency to purchase imports often run into a tangle of bureaucracy.

In relaxing its foreign-exchange policies, economists say, the government wants to hold less foreign exchange, and have companies and individuals hold more. But over the longer run, they say, demand for dollars to invest overseas could depress the value of the yuan relative to the U.S. currency.

Even in the short term, the relaxation moves are not likely to substantially shrink China's reserves, which are growing at a pace of some $200 billion each year, says Calla Wiemer, a China expert at the National University of Singapore. "That means pressure to appreciate [the yuan] will continue," she said.

China plays the lobbying game

By Michael Forsythe Bloomberg News
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 19, 2006

WASHINGTON China, which up to now has relied on U.S. presidents to keep Congress from derailing bilateral relations, is turning to lobbyists to burnish its image with increasingly assertive lawmakers.

Employees of Patton Boggs, Washington's biggest lobbying firm by revenue, made at least 116 contacts with lawmakers or their aides on behalf of China in the last half of 2005, according to disclosures made to the Justice Department. China's lobbying rose 74 percent from the year-earlier period; it spent just under $500,000 in the second half on lobbying, paying Patton Boggs $22,000 a month.

China is "becoming more knowledgeable about how all countries need to play the game in Washington," said Kenneth Lieberthal, who oversaw China policy for the National Security Council under former President Bill Clinton. "The Chinese are simply starting to hedge by working harder with Capitol Hill because the Hill has become a more active player," said Lieberthal, who teaches political science at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor.

As President Hu Jintao of China meets with President George W. Bush this week at the White House, U.S. lawmakers are challenging Bush on such issues as overseas investment in the United States, tariffs and currency policy. The United States is China's biggest export market, with two-way trade reaching $285 billion last year.

A Patton Boggs spokesman, Brian Hale, said the firm's China lobbyists declined to comment on their work.

In the past year, Congress scuttled a planned takeover of Unocal by China's Cnooc. Lawmakers including Senators Charles Schumer, a New York Democrat, and Lindsey Graham, a South Carolina Republican, have proposed legislation to put tariffs of 27.5 percent on Chinese goods unless China revalues its currency. The House last year passed legislation to let the president impose sanctions on European companies that sell arms to China.

Patton Boggs lobbyists have aimed most of their efforts at members of the Senate Foreign Affairs and Armed Services Committees, contacting offices of 13 of the 18 members of the Foreign Affairs panel from July to December 2005, according to the disclosures.

"In Congress, there has been an increase in interest in China," Zhou Wenzhong, China's ambassador to the United States, said in an interview. The lobbyists "know members and their staff better than we do, so they often help us to set up meetings. Sometimes they help us to follow what is going on in Congress."

In addition to Patton Boggs, the Chinese government retains other firms to influence Congress, including Jones Day.

Some of the contacts were for routine matters, such as the eight times Patton Boggs contacted aides to Senator Lincoln Chafee, a Rhode Island Republican. The calls were to set up and follow through on a Nov. 10 meeting between Chafee and Zhou, said a spokesman for Chafee, Stephen Hourahan.

Aides to the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, John Warner, a Virginia Republican, were contacted at least seven times, with Warner himself conferring about U.S.- China relations with a Patton Boggs lobbyist on Aug. 4.

"We do not recall anything specific about the meetings and phone calls, if in fact they occurred," said John Ullyot, Warner's spokesman. "Senator Warner and his staff are contacted hundreds of times a week by individuals or companies" with business before the Senate.

Dan Adelstein, an aide to Geoff Davis, a Kentucky Republican who serves on the House Armed Services Committee, was contacted four times in December by Patton Boggs. The lobbyists were seeking information about a defense funding bill.

China's lobbying is still overshadowed by other nations. China and its provinces spent $483,325 on lobbying in the second half of 2005, employing three firms.

By contrast, just one of the 12 firms retained by Taiwan, Barbour Griffiths & Rogers, gets $1.5 million a year from the government of the island, which China considers a rebellious province. Patton Boggs's contract with Trinidad & Tobago, a Caribbean country with less than a thousandth of China's population, is bigger than its China contract.

Still, with Bush's job approval ratings in public opinion polls sliding to the lowest of his presidency, China must look elsewhere to block some more extreme congressional proposals, Lieberthal said.

China has been improving its understanding of how Congress works since the early 1990s, when lawmakers would engage in annual debates over whether to approve "most-favored-nation" trading privileges for it, said John Frisbie, president of the Washington-based U.S.-China Business Council.

"They've come a long way since then," Frisbie said. "There is a greater understanding in China about Congress's role." The congressional move last month to scuttle the purchase of U.S. port facilities by DP World, the state- owned Dubai firm, was another reminder of the lawmakers' power, he said.

"Certainly, the Chinese have become more sophisticated in how they approach matters here in Washington," said Myron Brilliant, vice president for Asian affairs at the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, the nation's largest business group, and a registered lobbyist. "They understand what's going on in the Congress."

White House Shifts Into Survival Mode

By Dan Balz
Washington Post Staff Writer
Thursday, April 20, 2006; A01

In a White House known for both defiance and optimism, yesterday's senior staff changes represent a frank acknowledgment of the trouble in which President Bush now finds himself. They are also a signal of how starkly Bush's second-term ambitions have shifted after a year of persistent problems at home and abroad.

Longtime Bush confidant Karl Rove -- who had hoped to use his position of deputy chief of staff to usher in an expansive conservative agenda -- was relieved of his policy portfolio to concentrate on long-term strategy and planning for a November midterm election that looks increasingly bleak for Republicans.

Rove probably will remain one of the most influential voices in the White House, but his shift in responsibilities suggests that new White House Chief of Staff Joshua B. Bolten intends to operate a different White House than his predecessor, Andrew H. Card Jr., who resigned after more than five years at the helm.

Bolten's White House, say former administration officials and Republican strategists, is likely to have clearer lines of authority and less free-lancing by powerful officials. They also expect Bolten to play a more active and influential role in shaping domestic policy than did Card.

More significantly, they said, unlike Card, who took as his principal responsibility the management of the president, Bolten probably will operate more in the mold of chiefs of staffs in previous administrations, who saw their role as managing the entire White House and sought to oversee the entire federal government, as well.

Whether the changes will bring fundamental change in a troubled administration is another question. One of Bolten's biggest challenges, administration allies say, will be to find ways to open up the Oval Office to new ideas and to the opinions of people who are not longtime Bush confidants.

On that score, many people who know the administration best are privately dubious. Presidents, more than chiefs of staff, determine how White Houses operate, they said, noting that Bush has shown that he prefers a tight circle of advisers and does not welcome the advice of outsiders. As Bush put it on Monday, in asserting that he would not fire Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld, "I'm the decider, and I decide what's best."

Rove's return to a role that closely mirrors that which he played in Bush's first term demonstrates how much this White House has now shifted to survival mode -- and how far events have pushed the president from the grand ambitions with which he opened his second term just 15 months ago.

Then, with Rove as the animating force, the president sought to engineer Republican political dominance by remaking government with such far-reaching initiatives as his plan to remake the Social Security program. Today, Social Security stands as Exhibit A of what went wrong domestically in 2005.

Public disillusionment over Bush's policies in Iraq have left the country in a sour mood and Bush's presidency at low ebb, threatening the entire Bush-Rove project to create a durable Republican majority. While that goal remains central to those closest to Bush, the focus at the White House for the foreseeable future will be trying to revitalize this presidency quickly enough to avoid crippling GOP losses in November that could thrust Bush into instant lame-duck status.

Realigning the White House staff and bringing in new faces appear central to that effort. This week's changes include yesterday's resignation of White House press secretary Scott McClellan and appointment of Joel D. Kaplan as White House deputy chief of staff for policy, as well as Monday's announcement that U.S. trade representative and former House member Rob Portman will succeed Bolten as director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).

The domestic policy process has been hampered since Bolten went to OMB, and one Republican strategist close to White House said the new chief of staff appears bent on trying to prevent Rove and others from interfering in every aspect of the governing process.

Rove will retain the "gravitational force" of his Bush relationship and could "overpower" Bolten in showdowns because he knows the president and the inside game better, this official predicted. But he added that Bolten believed that the strategy to overhaul Social Security was sloppy and hampered by Rove's becoming too involved in every aspect of the campaign -- policy, politics and communications.

Former administration officials said that Rove, though known for his ability to juggle many roles, was overwhelmed by the sheer volume of his responsibilities when he was promoted to deputy chief of staff after the 2004 election.

In addition, he was engulfed in the CIA leak case for his role, and remains under investigation by a special prosecutor.

Bolten and Rove forged a congenial working relationship during Bush's first presidential campaign, when Rove was chief strategist and Bolten chief policy adviser. That carried over into the White House during the first term, until Bolten departed as deputy chief of staff to take over as OMB director. Administration allies say they hope that the new assignments can restore an operating arrangement that they believe worked well.

One former administration official, who asked not to be identified in order to speak freely about his former colleagues, called yesterday's shift in Rove's responsibilities a "huge" development. "This is putting back things where they belong," he said. "It's given Josh back policy. Joel [Kaplan] is a total Josh disciple, and he is very good in the policy world. It focuses Karl back on politics, which is what he needs to do."

But former Bush spokesman Ari Fleischer said Rove's losing the policy portfolio also is significant, because the policy job "is where ideas comes from, where creativity comes from, and that is where presidents rise and fall."

"I think this is another building block in bringing in other voices to reenergize and reinvigorate the West Wing," said Kenneth Duberstein, White House chief of staff to former president Ronald Reagan, who predicted Rove will remain one of Bush's most trusted aides.

Despite his power, Rove has not been immune from criticism. Inside the White House, some aides were unhappy that he had sent McClellan out to say inaccurately that Rove had no involvement in the CIA leak case. Outside allies feared that Rove was so invested in the policies he had helped to shape and sell to Bush that he lost his ability to see where the administration had gotten off track.

Mindful that Rove's changed responsibilities might be seen as a demotion, administration officials and allies offered a counterview, saying that, given his personal relationship with the president, he will continue to exercise wide influence on policy and politics while having new freedom to think more strategically about the administration.

Other changes are expected at the White House and perhaps in Bush's Cabinet. One will be a replacement for McClellan; another is likely to be a new domestic policy adviser. Criticisms of the legislative affairs and communications operations as well as the national economic council suggest the potential scope of changes. But one of the most important steps came yesterday. As one strategist who has worked closely with the administration put it, "I don't know how you change the White House without changing Karl's role."

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Rove Gives Up Policy Post in Shake-UpMcClellan Resigns; New Chief of Staff Moves Quickly to Change West Wing

By Peter Baker and Jim VandeHei
Washington Post Staff Writers
Thursday, April 20, 2006; A01

President Bush's new chief of staff accelerated his election-year White House shake-up yesterday as Deputy Chief of Staff Karl Rove surrendered the policy management duties he assumed last year and press secretary Scott McClellan resigned as the public face of an administration under fire.

Rove, who steered Bush to two national election victories, will retain his title but focus on broad strategy and politics, while Joel D. Kaplan takes over as deputy White House chief of staff running the day-to-day policy process. To replace McClellan, Republican strategists said the White House is considering Fox News radio host Tony Snow and former Iraq occupation spokesman Dan Senor.

The moves effectively diminished or eliminated the roles of the two presidential aides most familiar to the general public, as newly installed White House Chief of Staff Joshua B. Bolten seeks to rescue the remainder of Bush's presidency. Coupled with other changes already announced and still in the works, Bolten hopes to demonstrate to the public and the Republican-led Congress that it will no longer be business as usual in a White House afflicted by political defeats, an overseas war and shrinking public support.

At the same time, the changes made public so far mainly have moved around figures who have been inside the Bush orbit for years, and White House officials made clear yesterday that no major shifts in policy are envisioned. With midterm congressional elections looming, strategists said the main goal was to make public gestures that would restore faith in Bush's ability to lead.
"The decision isn't one looking back at past performance or judgment," said White House counselor Dan Bartlett. "It was one looking forward. Josh is reenergizing and rebuilding his staff for the next thousand days."

The reshuffling, the most significant of Bush's second term, got underway when the president appointed Bolten to replace Andrew H. Card Jr. as his chief aide. Bolten, who took over Friday afternoon, has moved quickly to restructure the West Wing. On Monday, he invited aides already thinking of leaving to submit resignations. On Tuesday, he installed U.S. Trade Representative Rob Portman to take over his job as director of the Office of Management and Budget.

Aides said no further moves will be announced this week but anticipate more next week, hoping that stretching them out over time will provide momentum. "People have been watching this TV series for a long time, and it helps to plug in some new characters from time to time," said Bush political adviser Mark McKinnon. "Gets folks to tune back in and take a fresh look."

Bolten is still eyeing the White House legislative affairs office in hopes of improving relations with congressional Republicans. Bolten has privately expressed criticism to colleagues about the operation of chief White House lobbyist Candida Wolf, and it remained uncertain whether she would stay. The White House has also been interested in finding a replacement for Treasury Secretary John W. Snow.

A senior White House official said a lot of staff members remain uncertain. Bolten's call for resignations, the official said, has a lot of aides who had not been contemplating departing now planning to spend this weekend considering it. Bolten has said he will keep Card's schedule and structure until the middle of next week, and then put his own in place.

The biggest changes so far came with Rove's shift and McClellan's departure. Rove has been the driving force of the Bush presidency from its inception, and last year he added the title of deputy chief of staff for policy to his portfolio. But some Republicans saw it as a poor fit as the operation's vision man occupied himself with the trains-on-time responsibilities of the new job.

Among people close to the White House and in Republican circles around Washington, there remained debate whether the move should be regarded as a demotion or reassignment. The answer will remain unknown -- perhaps even to Rove himself -- until Bolten's operation has more time to prove itself. But there was agreement that the move was a negative verdict on the status quo.

"He's the best thinker in our party, and in the last year he's been doing all the staffing memos and making sure the paperwork is done on time and all that," a senior administration official said.

By turning over the daily policy management to Kaplan, Rove will free himself up to concentrate more on the midterm elections, which are crucial to Bush's fortunes, but he will remain an influential voice in broader policy discussions, as well. "That will leave Karl more time to focus on truly strategic policy at a critical time for the presidency," White House spokesman Ken Lisaius said.

Rove, 55, who has been Bush's most important adviser for many years, told people he knew his shift might be seen as a demotion but agreed with Bolten that he was bogged down by esoteric subjects distracting him from strategy. A Republican close to Rove said the change was unrelated to the CIA leak case, in which Rove remains under investigation, but was meant to calm Republicans who fretted that the White House mishandled issues such as the Dubai port deal and Hurricane Katrina.

"They needed to have the optics that there's going to be a change -- a message-delivery change and a different approach to policy, particularly domestic policy," the Republican said. "That's all it is. There's not going to be any change in policy. It gets Washington talking about different things."

Democrats dismissed the move. "President Bush doesn't seem to understand that you can't just change the window dressing, you have to make changes in the Bush administration's policies, which have undermined America's security," said Democratic National Committee Chairman Howard Dean.

While Rove's shift was disclosed on paper, Bush walked McClellan onto the South Lawn yesterday morning before a trip to Alabama. "The White House is going through a period of transition," McClellan said. "Change can be helpful, and this is a good time and good position to help bring about change. I am ready to move on."

McClellan, 38, who has been at Bush's side since Texas and served as chief spokesman for the past two years and nine months, choked up momentarily. Turning to the president, he said, "I have given it my all, sir, and I've given you my all."

Bush responded with praise: "He handled his assignment with class, integrity. He really represents the best of his family, our state and our country. It's going to be hard to replace Scott."

In a moment of unfortunate symbolism for a troubled White House, Bush and McClellan then boarded Marine One to fly to Andrews Air Force Base -- only to have to disembark when the helicopter would not work. Instead, the president departed by motorcade.

McClellan had told colleagues as recently as last month that he intended to stay but told reporters aboard Air Force One yesterday that he began reconsidering when Card stepped down and informed Bush of his decision in an Oval Office meeting on Monday. "I didn't need much encouragement to make this decision," he said.

With endless patience, McClellan has absorbed months of battering at daily briefings over the president's second-term problems. Although he never expressed it publicly, McClellan's colleagues said he was frustrated that his credibility had been questioned after he relayed Rove's assertion in 2003 that Bush's top adviser had nothing to do with the leak of a CIA operative's identity -- a claim later discredited by grand jury testimony.

McClellan said he would stay for two or three weeks as the White House brings in a replacement. Republicans close to the White House identified three main candidates: Tony Snow, Senor and former Pentagon spokeswoman Victoria Clarke. Snow confirmed he is considering it, while Clarke said she would not.

Replacing Rove in the job of deputy chief of staff for policy will be Kaplan, who worked for Bolten in the first Bush campaign, in the White House and then at OMB as deputy director. Bolten considers Kaplan, 36, his right hand and was the only one with a speaking role at Kaplan's wedding this month, aside from Judge J. Michael Luttig of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit, who presided over the ceremony for his former clerk.

Kaplan, who rushed back to Washington from a Hawaii honeymoon Tuesday night, will be the third deputy along with Rove and Joseph W. Hagin, who plans to stay but will also give up policy duties, colleagues said. A Harvard Law graduate and former Marine, Kaplan also clerked for Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia.

WSJ: THE NUMBERS GUY

Fuzzy Math on Illegal Immigration

THE NUMBERS GUY

By CARL BIALIK

April 5, 2006

New York Democrat Charles Schumer said legislation is needed "to solve the problem of millions of foreigners who live here illegally and unprotected" as well as "to alleviate the problem of the millions more who enter illegally every year." He kept his estimate of the number of illegal immigrants vague because "no one knows for sure how many are really here," the National Journal reported. "Nor can anyone give a reliable estimate of how fast that unknown figure is growing each year."

A sound bite from last week? Nope. The year was 1985, Mr. Schumer was in the House of Representatives and debate was raging over how to address the growing number of illegal immigrants, then estimated at somewhere between 3 million and 12 million.

Twenty-one years later, several amnesties granted to undocumented immigrants have failed to keep the number of illegal immigrants from growing. And estimates of their numbers remain fuzzy and full of pitfalls, even as lawmakers toss them around in the latest round of debates over whether to offer guest-worker status to illegal immigrants.

At the core of the problem is the fact that undocumented immigrants don't generally come forward to be counted. The most widely quoted estimate of 11 million to 12 million is derived indirectly, using what's called a residual method: Researchers subtract the number of immigrants who were authorized to come to the U.S. from the number of foreign-born residents counted by the Census Bureau, then adjust the number using estimates of immigrants' deaths and migration, and of Census undercounting. Some critics say that estimate understates the degree of undercounting: Another estimate making the rounds holds that there are 20 million illegal immigrants.

That was the upper range Bear Stearns analysts Robert Justice and Betty Ng estimated last year, citing high growth rates in foreign remittances and in school enrollments in localities with high illegal-immigrant populations. The analysts added, "According to our discussions with illegal immigrants, they avoid responding to census questionnaires."

And there are still-higher estimates to be found online: The Web site of the "immigration crime-fighting" group American Resistance Foundation estimates there are more than 28 million illegal immigrants, based largely on border-patrol apprehension rates; however, there is little reliable data on how many border-crossers who are caught trying to enter a second time.

"No one really knows," says Bill Strassberger, a spokesman for the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, a branch of the Department of Homeland Security.

Of those citing the 20 million figure, Mr. Strassberger says that "the number seems to be agenda-driven." But if so, it's not always the same agenda doing the driving.

On CNN last Sunday, anchor Lou Dobbs, who has argued for tighter border controls, spoke of "the toll that 20 million illegal aliens take on the infrastructure of the United States and on local, state, and federal taxpayer budgets." (At other times during his recent broadcasts, Mr. Dobbs has cited a range between 11 million and 20 million. A CNN spokeswoman says Mr. Dobbs is relying on the Bear Stearns report for the higher number.)

But talk-show host Tony Snow, arguing that immigrants are a boon to the economy, wrote Monday, "The United States somehow has managed to absorb 10 million to 20 million illegal immigrants not only without turning into Animal Farm, but while cranking up the most impressive economic recovery in two decades."

In 2000, before it was folded into DHS, the Immigration and Naturalization Service used the residual method to estimate there were seven million illegal immigrants and their numbers were growing by 250,000 to 300,000 per year. Mr. Strassberger says that remains the government's best estimate, though he concedes it's out of date.

Following largely the same procedure that INS used, the Washington, D.C., think tank Pew Hispanic Center counted 11 million illegal immigrants last year, and between 11.5 million and 12 million last month; the group is the source for most lawmakers and reporters citing a number. (The Wall Street Journal generally has printed estimates of 11 million, or a range of 11 million to 12 million.)

But the residual method is by necessity complicated, and each step in its formula introduces uncertainty. Jeffrey Passel, a Pew senior research associate, walked me through the procedure (also outlined in Pew's latest report). The starting point is the Census Bureau's annual Current Population Survey report, which bases a count of foreign-born residents on interviews conducted with about 80,000 households. The Census intentionally seeks out a disproportionately large number of Hispanic households to get richer data. Interviewers, either by telephone or in person, ask where every member of each household was born. These figures are then extrapolated to the nation, adjusting for the larger sample of Hispanics. The latest estimate of foreign-born Americans to emerge from such calculations was roughly 36 million, Dr. Passel says.

Next, Pew subtracts the number of foreign-born Americans authorized to be in the country. Dr. Passel's team compiles annual numbers of green-card recipients, refugees and people granted asylum, a count that stretches back decades. But merely adding these numbers would be misleading, because some authorized immigrants decide to leave the country and others die. Dr. Passel assumes that immigrants of a certain age die at the same rate as the country's residents overall, and uses estimates from various studies on "outmigration," something he concedes is "hard to measure." (The outmigration numbers are also much bigger -- perhaps seven times as large -- as the number of deaths, because immigrants tend to be young.) Then the calculated total is subtracted from the total number of foreign-born residents, and the result is adjusted upwards by 10% to account for census undercounting of illegal immigrants. (That adjustment is based on one post-Census 2000 survey of undercounting among Mexican immigrants in the Los Angeles-area; other studies have yielded different estimates of undercounting.)

Dr. Passel and Robert Warren pioneered the residual method while working together at the Census Bureau in the 1980s. Dr. Warren then helped develop INS's methods for its 2000 estimate, so it's no surprise that the government's methods are similar to Pew's. Michael Hoefer, director of the office of immigration statistics, a branch of DHS, told me that the government uses the Census Bureau's American Community Survey instead of the Current Population Survey, which is based on a larger sample of households but is published later than the CPS. (Mr. Hoefer's office is working on a 2004 estimate to update the 2000 official figure of seven million.)

Also, Pew's count of illegal immigrants includes those considered "quasi-legal," meaning they're on their way to legal status, and awaiting asylum or in temporary protected status; INS's count doesn't, though the next round of government estimates might. That could mean a difference of about one million in the total count, Mr. Hoefer says.

Back in 1985, Dr. Passel told the National Journal, "The fatal flaw in virtually every study was that there's some assumption that you have to make in your estimation model for which there is absolutely no data." But he says now that estimation methods have improved, thanks to refinements of the residual-method technique, more-regular Census counts of the foreign-born population, and comparison of the numbers with Mexico population figures to see if the estimate of illegal immigrants from Mexico squares with a gap between expected and actual population counts south of the border.

However, there is still large uncertainty in the current estimates, due largely to Census undercounting and limited data about immigrants leaving the country. It's impossible to say how uncertain the estimates are; neither Pew nor the government publishes a margin of error, which is a standard component of most statistical estimates.

The variable numbers have provided material for Comedy Central's Stephen Colbert, who noted that on a recent Sunday political talk-show, Sen. Arlen Specter, a Pennsylvania Republican, referred to "11 million undocumented aliens," and just 30 minutes later on a different network, Massachusetts Democrat Ted Kennedy used the "12 million figure." Mr. Colbert's comment: "One million illegals snuck into this country in half an hour! That is alarming. At that rate the entire population of Mexico would be here in three days. Congress, get to work on that fence." Mr. Kennedy's spokesman cited the Pew report; a representative for Mr. Specter didn't return my call seeking comment. (Numbers Guy readers Allen Cantrell, Shauna Laughna and Robert Tamiso also spotted inconsistent immigration numbers and suggested this column topic.)

Not everyone agrees that the numbers debate matters. "As long as people concede that the number is large to begin with and is increasing, the number itself is irrelevant," Vernon Briggs, a professor of labor economics at Cornell who favors enforcing sanctions against employers of illegal immigrants, told me.

But if that were so, the numbers wouldn't be continually cited by lawmakers and the press, who would serve their constituents and audience better by acknowledging the uncertainty of these estimates.

* * *

Several readers wrote in about my column last week on the different naming schemes world-wide for large numbers, and the efforts of Swedish scientist Anders Thor and others to standardize things. Here are excerpts from letters:

Mr. Thor has a unique window of opportunity to rally the U.S. into switching to the European methods of measuring large numbers -- it would immediately reduce the U.S. budget deficit.

--Judy Sterling

I've been waiting for someone to write this for some time. I've lived in Spain and it always fascinated me how people would say Mil Milones -- this was rather common as well when speaking of money prior to the Peseta/Euro change over.

--Patrick J. Sullivan, CFA

I enjoyed your column. It reminded me of a consulting project I worked on several years ago in Bangladesh. The Bangladeshis used their customary units of lakh (10,000) and crore (10 million) in budgets and other reports involving large numbers. At the time their currency, the Taka, was worth about two cents, so there were plenty of big numbers. To make matters more confusing (to us Americans anyway), lakh and crore numbers have digits grouped by twos, instead of threes. When looking at lakhs or crores, you'd have to suppress all your instincts to come up with the right value. Reports from most international agencies followed American number conventions, but the convention wasn't always clear in some European sources. It made for plenty of confusion. My suggestion for clearing up this mess: Let's all switch to using scientific notation.

--Charles Hartel

I second Charles's suggestion, and expect it to happen soon after we all switch to the metric system. Those unfamiliar with the lakh-crore system, and the two-digit groupings, can learn more at Wikipedia.

I have to ask how you came up with the "28.5 trillion brackets per second" in the 90 hours to achieve the perfect NCAA bracket. I trust you are correct, but could you explain the method?

--Jason Maus

Here's my method: There were 32 first-round games, each of which could have two possible outcomes, so the number of ways to fill out the first round of the bracket is 2 to the 32nd power, or 4.3 billion (following the U.S. definition for billion, as explained in last week's column). For each of those permutations, there are two possible winners in each of the 16 second-round games, so you'd have to multiply 4.3 billion by 2 to the 16th power, or 65,536. Follow that logic through to the championship, and you'll find there are 2 to the 63rd power -- or 9.22 million trillion -- possible brackets. There are 324,000 seconds in 90 hours, so divide that into 9.22 million trillion and you get 28.5 trillion brackets per second.

WSJ: THE NUMBERS GUY

Measuring the Child-Porn Trade

THE NUMBERS GUY

By CARL BIALIK

April 18, 2006

Unlike, say, the soft-drink or airline industries, the child-pornography industry doesn't report its annual sales to the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Yet in a press release¹ ahead of a recent House of Representatives hearing aimed at curbing the industry, Texas Republican Joe Barton said, "Child pornography is apparently a multibillion … my staff analysis says $20 billion-a-year business. Twenty billion dollars." Some press reports said the figure applied only to the industry's online segment. The New York Times reported², "the sexual exploitation of children on the Internet is a $20 billion industry that continues to expand in the United States and abroad," citing witnesses at the hearing. (The Online Journal's Real Time column³ also quoted the estimate from the hearing.)

My efforts this week to track down the number's source -- and free-lance journalist Daniel Radosh's similar quest⁴ on his blog -- yielded lots of dead ends. It turns out it can be easier to enter a big number into the Congressional record, and national press coverage, than to locate its origin. (Numbers Guy reader Brian Flanagan suggested I look into the estimate.)

What was Rep. Barton's staff analysis? A spokesman for the House Energy and Commerce Committee told me the source of the number was the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, a group that advocates for the protection of children. When I first talked with that group's president, Ernie Allen, he told me that Standard Chartered bank, which has worked with the NCMEC to cut off funding to child-porn traffickers, wanted a quantitative analysis of the problem, so it asked for a measurement from consulting firm McKinsey & Co.

Mr. Allen faxed me an NCMEC paper that cites the McKinsey study in placing the child-porn industry at $6 billion in 1999, and $20 billion in 2004.

But a McKinsey spokesman painted a different picture for me: "The number was not calculated or generated by McKinsey," he wrote in an email. Instead, for a pro bono analysis for Standard Chartered, he said, McKinsey used a number that appeared in a report⁵ last year by End Child Prostitution, Child Pornography and Trafficking of Children for Sexual Purposes, an international advocacy group.

But the trail didn't end there: That report, in turn, attributed the number to the Federal Bureau of Investigation, as did a report⁶ last year from the Council of Europe, a Strasbourg, France-based human-rights watchdog. Both of those reports noted that estimates range widely, from $3 billion to $20 billion.

FBI spokesman Paul Bresson told me in an email, "The FBI has not stated the $20 billion figure... . I have asked many people who would know for sure if we have attached the $20 billion number to this problem. I have scoured our Web site, too. Nothing!"

I went back to the NCMEC Monday and shared what I found. In an email response, spokeswoman Joann Donnellan said, "If it is determined that this ends up not being a reliable statistic, NCMEC will stop citing McKinsey as the source and will also stop citing a specific number. Rather, NCMEC will revert to what it has said previously… that commercial child pornography is a multi-billion dollar industry."

This isn't the first number from the NCMEC that struck me as questionable. The group provided the estimate that one in five children is sexually solicited online, which appeared in public-service ads⁷ distributed by the Ad Council. The stat has received a fresh round of publicity thanks to donated air time⁸ from MySpace, a site popular with teens. As I wrote⁹ last year, the "one in five" estimate was based on research that was five years old which only covered children who spent time online. The survey also used a broad definition of sexual solicitation. Yet the stat persists. The NCMEC told me¹⁰ last July it hoped to have new research by the end of last year. Now, spokeswoman Tina Schwartz says the group expects new research to be released in the next couple of months.

* * *

As Congress debates whether to pass new laws specifically outlawing online gambling, a recent poll appears to show that the public is strongly against the legislative effort: Almost 80% of Americans oppose a ban, according to the survey.

The poll was conducted by well-known polling firm Zogby International on behalf of an online gambling trade group. As I've written¹¹ in the past, such sponsored research warrants extra scrutiny from readers, though the fact that the poll was commissioned by a special-interest group isn't by itself a reason to dismiss it.

Still, in this case, it appears that the sponsor of the poll influenced the way it was conducted, particularly in the way the questions were phrased. Here's one question: "Many gambling experts believe that Internet gambling will continue no matter what the government does to try to stop it. Do you agree or disagree that the federal government should allocate government resources and spend taxpayer money trying to stop adult Americans from gambling online?" Some 77% of respondents disagreed.

Here's another question: "More than 80% of Americans believe that gambling is a question of personal choice that should not be interfered with by the government. Do you agree or disagree that the federal government should stop adult Americans from gambling with licensed and regulated online sports books and casinos based in other countries?" You probably won't be surprised to learn that after being told that most Americans don't want the government to interfere, some 71% of the respondents to this question signaled they, too, were against a government ban.

The results of the poll were posted on the gambling trade group's Web site¹² and emailed to journalists.

The gambling questions "were fair and balanced, and gave the respondent appropriate choices," Fritz Wenzel, spokesman for Zogby International, told me in an email. (Zogby does many political polls separate from interest-group-backed research, including polling on the 2004 presidential race and 2006 gubernatorial and Senate races for the Online Journal.)

Polling experts disagreed when I showed them the poll. Cliff Zukin, president of the American Association for Public Opinion Research, a professional association of pollsters, told me the questions are "loaded and biased." Prof. Zukin added that if any of his students at Rutgers University wrote such questions, "I would fail them."

Robert Blumenfeld, an El Paso, Texas-based attorney for the Antiguan Offshore Gaming Association¹³, told me the trade group paid "less than $10,000" for the poll. The Antiguan group, which represents more than a dozen online casinos, drafted the questions with guidance from Zogby, Mr. Blumenfeld said. He disagreed with the suggestion that the phrasing of the questions might have influenced the results, but said the group would conduct further polling. "We're willing to put the question in a way that can't be subject to any kind of criticism," Mr. Blumenfeld said.

Mr. Blumenfeld said the group is using the results of the poll in its lobbying efforts to fight an online gambling ban.

It's not unusual for pollsters to conduct polls for hire. Many pollsters make their reputations with political polling, and make their money with sponsored polling. Still, Zogby's poll didn't meet certain standards¹⁴ set by the polling professional association headed by Prof. Zukin, which say, among other things, that pollsters should ask unbiased questions.

Zogby International and its chief executive, John Zogby, are well known in the polling world. Yet Mr. Zogby has at times lent his firm's credibility to polls conducted for sponsors and filled with leading questions, as a New Yorker profile¹⁵ in 2004 noted. One poll funded by People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals asked respondents if they would stop eating meat or dairy products "if you knew that within days of birth, chickens have their beaks seared off with a hot blade to keep them from pecking each other in their overly crowded cages?"

Other Zogby polls addressing gambling have had conflicting results. A poll¹⁶ conducted by Zogby on behalf of the New York Council on Problem Gambling, in 2004, found that 67% of respondents said that expanding gambling by the State of New York will definitely or probably increase the number of people with gambling problems.

The Zogby poll wasn't the only recent survey on online gambling to include what I'd consider leading questions. A Harris Interactive online poll¹⁷, conducted in February and mentioned in several news outlets (including the Online Journal) found -- among other things -- that 27% of respondents strongly agreed with the statement "since there is no effective way to regulate or control Internet gambling, it should remain illegal," and 27% of respondents somewhat agreed.

The phrasing of that question seems to make an assumption (the impossibility of regulation) that could have influenced responses. Humphrey Taylor, chairman of the Harris Poll, told me that the question was deliberately designed to "see how different arguments played." He said he wouldn't use the response to that particular question, which he called "projective," to determine whether people support legalizing online gambling. "In any release we do, we are fair and balanced, but any single projective question may not be," Mr. Taylor said, adding that the poll wasn't sponsored.

* * *

Several readers wrote in about my column¹⁸ last week on the number of illegal immigrants in the U.S. Here's an excerpt from one letter:

As a result of my own experience attempting to estimate the number of workers employed in California seasonal agricultural work during my Ph.D. research, I feel qualified to doubt the validity of any estimation method based on the U.S. census of population. While attempting to use census data from rural California counties to estimate the accuracy of two different state employment service reports on agricultural employment, I encountered discrepancies among the three sources of as much as 300%, with the census data always being the lowest. Conversations with friends in the urban Chicano community confirmed my suspicion that illegal residents were effectively avoiding enumeration. Perhaps the data collection has improved, but it's doubtful that people who want to avoid government scrutiny will make themselves available.

--Sue Hayes, professor of economics, Sonoma State University

Several readers also wrote in about my comment that scientific notation is likely to be adopted soon after the U.S. adopts the metric system:

We've lost enough dollars and lives because of continuing confusion between our systems of inches vs. millimeters and pints vs. liters, but the idea of mass re-education of the entire American public and mass retooling of manufacturing is frightening.

--Pearl Ladenheim

I would like to suggest a column on the status of metric conversion in the U.S. Is there hope or are we going to continue to bury our heads in a kiloton of sand (which is 20,000 pounds or 10,000 kilograms which, in turn, is 22,000 lbs)?

--Richard J. Behling

And finally, I got this letter about an Associated Press article¹⁹ on a Malaysian man who received a $218 trillion phone bill.

Of course it's amusing that the man received an absurdly high phone bill. But the really funny part, in my opinion, is the AP journalist's analysis: "It wasn't clear whether the bill was a mistake, or if [the] phone line was used illegally." $218 trillion?!? Hmm... I think it's pretty clear.

--Ray Weaver

日本資源戰略全面重新佈局，受中國需求遽增影響

　　日本經濟產業省資源能源廳將對金屬資源保障政策進行20年來的首次修正，並於22日透露新方針。經產省將以確保數位家電等日本尖端技術必須的鉑、銦等稀有金屬的穩定供應，作為政府的核心任務。新政策將寫入預定於5月完成的「國家能源新戰略」，擴大各種稀有金屬的儲備。　　受到中國經濟高速成長，造成對稀有金屬的需求量暴增，日本擔心這會導致全球性的供應短缺，影響其產業競爭力。鑑於產業界強烈要求將稀有金屬作為石油一樣的戰略物資加以確保，日本政府決定重新部署資源戰略。

　　被認為最有可能出現短缺的是鉑、銦及稀土類三種資源。鉑應用於汽車的廢氣排放淨化裝置、燃料電池；銦應用於液晶電視的液晶面板；稀土類則是混合動力車不可欠缺的材料。

在上述產品的國際競爭中，日本企業均處於優勢地位。一旦出現資源供給中斷，將導致產品停產，對日本經濟造成嚴重打擊。
（2006/3/23）

A Study in Diplomacy

Chinese, Japanese Friendship Offers Glimpse Into DifficultyNations Face Getting Along

By SEBASTIAN MOFFETT in Tokyo and JAMES T. AREDDY in Shanghai
March 21, 2006; Page B1

Growing up in Japan, Asayo Iizuka was fascinated by China. So the 22-year-old jumped at the opportunity to study at Shanghai's Fudan University, hoping to expand her knowledge and make Chinese friends.

There she met Chen Li, a 20-year-old economics student at Fudan, who hated Japan. When she was growing up, Ms. Chen's family had told her the Imperial Japanese Army had killed her great-grandfather.

So, at first, a friendship didn't seem possible. "I don't really like the Japanese," she informed Ms. Iizuka early on.

Yet the two women have stayed in touch and each continues to try to change the other's point of view. In the process, they confronted, on a personal level, some of the major issues threatening relations between Asia's two economic giants at a time when slow-growth Japan is finding opportunities in fast-expanding China.

"For 4,000 years China was the top country in Asia, but in the past 150 years, Japan has been more powerful," Ms. Iizuka says. "Now they are equal, but they don't know each other well enough to acknowledge each other."

Asayo Iizuka in Tokyo

Even as old wounds linger, China, including Hong Kong, has become Japan's biggest trading partner. About 99,000 Japanese live in China, more than any other country besides the U.S. Both governments are working to nurture better relations among the younger generation. Japan plans this year to set up a fund of 10 billion yen ($86 million) to pay for 1,100 Chinese high-school students to study in Japan annually for about 10 days and an additional 150 for several months to a year. A current government-affiliated study program enrolls 100 Chinese students in Japanese high schools each year.

"The economic relationship is robust and growing," said Jeff Kingston, director of Asian studies at Temple University Japan. "But I don't think that can continue indefinitely while government relations are in the deep freeze."

In China, memories are still strong of the Sino-Japanese war from 1937 to 1945, when the Imperial Army killed at least 10 million Chinese, according to standard estimates. The Chinese complain that Japanese school textbooks skim over the war and object to visits by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi to the controversial Yasukuni war shrine in central Tokyo that is dedicated to the 2.5 million people who died fighting for Japan, most of them during Japan's war with China and World War II.

In protest, Beijing has refused to schedule formal summit meetings with Mr. Koizumi and is opposing Japan's bid for a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. Thousands of Chinese participated in anti-Japanese demonstrations last spring.


Ms. Iizuka's fascination with China began when she studied the Chinese language in high school. She loved China's ethnic variety and thousands of years of history, and knew the language would help her career. While studying law and politics at a Tokyo university, she went in 2003 to spend a year at Fudan -- the top university in Shanghai.

That winter, a South Korean friend introduced the two women. The students exchanged phone numbers. But Ms. Chen talked little with Ms. Iizuka.

Ms. Chen had disliked Japan since she was a child growing up mostly near Shanghai. From age 7, schoolteachers took her class to see patriotic films; some were about heroic Chinese children risking their lives to resist evil Japanese soldiers during Japan's World War II occupation of China.


Chen Li in Shanghai

In high school, Ms. Chen took part in day-long hunger strikes against Japan. Now, she boycotts Japanese goods, and two years ago bought a digital camera made by a South Korean manufacturer. Buying Japanese products is "a bit like losing face," she said. "We were beaten by them, but now we have to accept their products?"

Ms. Chen bumped into Ms. Iizuka on campus after a winter break. Ms. Chen noticed that Ms. Iizuka seemed different from Japanese students who stuck together and dressed fashionably. Ms. Iizuka dressed down and wore floppy hats, a casual look Ms. Chen found approachable. "She was nice," Ms. Chen recalled. "I thought maybe I should be more open."

The two women found they had plenty in common. They both liked the late Hong Kong movie star Leslie Cheung. Ms. Iizuka treated Ms. Chen to her first Japanese meal, laughing when Ms. Chen flinched at the taste of miso -- bean paste -- soup.

Ms. Chen was beginning to have doubts about the accuracy of some of the information she had about Japan. Ms. Iizuka, meanwhile, felt a special mission to talk about China-Japan relations. In 2002, before her year at Fudan, she had taken a crowded evening train in Manchuria, a former Japanese colony in northeastern China. Fearing for her safety, she told fellow passengers she was Korean.

She later regretted telling a lie and vowed to be more open with the Chinese she met. She had heard about anti-Japanese feeling before she visited China and felt she needed to make a stronger effort to understand Japan's past wrongs. She also felt some Chinese anti-Japan sentiment came from skewed information. For instance, Japan is China's top foreign-aid donor, but China's state-controlled press rarely reports about the financial assistance.

Yet both women held on tightly to certain beliefs. Ms. Iizuka and Ms. Chen had fiery discussions, both in person and over email, over Mr. Koizumi's recent visits to the Yasukuni war shrine.

Though the prime minister has apologized for Japan's invasion of China and said his visits are to pray for the souls of regular soldiers, these apologies ring hollow in China because the shrine honors 14 Class A war criminals -- those tried for "crimes against peace," because they led Japan's war in Asia.

Ms. Chen said she was offended by Mr. Koizumi's annual visits. Ms. Iizuka responded that visitors honor relatives killed in action. "They're thinking of their own families," she recalled saying. Mr. Koizumi prays for peace, not for war criminals, she added. Ms. Chen argued that visits by a prime minister are different because "he stands for the country's opinion."

Ms. Chen retained her core feelings about Japan. When anti-Japanese sentiment bubbled up last spring, she joined one of the demonstrations in China. Ms. Iizuka said she was disappointed that her friend had participated, and she wished the Chinese wouldn't blame her generation for past problems. "It's natural for them to criticize Japan's past," she said. "But I can't accept it when they throw this at the Japanese of today. The Japanese of today have done nothing wrong."

Despite the differences in opinion, the two women have remained close. Last fall, Ms. Iizuka visited Shanghai, and they chatted like old friends over lunch in a rooftop restaurant, recalling their past arguments. Ms. Iizuka, who will soon start a job as a wire-service reporter, dreams of working in China one day. Ms. Chen said conversations with Ms. Iizuka have made her less radical. "If I dislike Japan," she said, "it doesn't mean I dislike all Japanese people."

Avon Calling, Again

MONDAY, MARCH 13, 2006
By JACQUELINE DOHERTY

AFTER A YEAR OF MISERY, AVON PRODUCTS is giving itself a makeover. The iconic marketer of make-up and skin-care products is slashing management layers, bolstering its overseas presence, spending more on advertising and focusing on lower-priced items. Success could reinvigorate its moribund revenue growth and send its shares, now 29, climbing 20% in the next year or so.

"It's not a stock for the faint of heart," says Diana Joseph, a portfolio manager with Chicago-based Dearborn Partners, who began nibbling at the shares for clients and her own account earlier this year. But "there is a reasonable probability the company will regroup, and it is a business with high margins and high cash flow," she adds.

If Avon's restructuring goes well, the shares (ticker: AVP) could rise to 35 in the next 12-to-14 months, Joseph figures. Along the way, investors will pocket a 2.4% dividend yield.

As the stock's 30% slide in the past 12 months suggests, Avon fans are few these days. Six analysts rate the shares Hold, while four are telling clients to sell. Growth investors largely have fled the name by now, and have been replaced by value funds such as Davis Selected American Shares (SLASX) and Oakmark Equity & Income (OAKBX), presumably drawn by the company's strong cash flow and historically low price/earnings ratio of 17 times expected earnings.

Attitudes toward Avon, which is based in New York, have changed notably since we penned a skeptical piece on the company more than two years ago ("A Thing of Beauty?" Jan. 19, 2004). At the time, much of Wall Street was bullish, although we thought investors were paying too much for a company whose U.S. growth was slowing. Our caution was premature -- Avon subsequently rallied to 46 from 33 -- but it wasn't misguided. By last fall, Avon had fallen to 24.
Citigroup analyst Wendy Nicholson, a growling bear in January 2004, upgraded her recommendation to Buy from Hold last fall, and currently has a $32 target on the shares. "Long-term, Avon will grow earnings twice as fast as the Standard & Poor's 500," she maintains.

To justify buying Avon shares today, you have to believe the company's restructuring will bear fruit. That's because last year's results were nothing short of ugly. After boosting revenues by 10% in 2003 and 13% in 2004, Avon suddenly posted a 5% increase, to $8.2 billion in 2005. Net income was flat, at $848 million, or $1.81 a share from operations. The year ended on a particularly poor note, with fourth-quarter net falling 37%, to $183 million. Restructuring charges dented results and will continue to depress earnings this year, although analysts are estimating operating earnings per share of $1.67 in 2007, which should mark the start of a rebound.

Avon's U.S. sales kick in roughly a quarter of total sales and a fifth of operating profit.

Consequently, the company has relied on robust growth overseas. Last year, however, even foreign markets were disappointing. Sales in Central and Eastern Europe rose by 15%, well below the 47% increase they clocked in 2002. In addition, Pacific-region sales contracted by 0.3% overall, and those in China fell 20%, compared with a 42% increase in 2004.

To some degree, Avon shot itself in the foot in '05, by slashing U.S. advertising spending 50%. But much of the drag came from events outside its control. Higher oil prices and rising interest rates squeezed spending by middle- and low-income consumers. And global competition has intensified, with industry giants such as Procter & Gamble (PG) and L'Or?al (LRLCF) putting lots of research and advertising dollars behind products in the $15-to-$25 retail price range. In the past few years, they have made it much easier to find high-quality skin-care items at the local drugstore, striking at the core of Avon's market. Avon's Anew skin-care line, meanwhile, fetches more than $30 a jar.

The solution: Introduce more products, bolster offerings at lower prices, such as the Solutions line of skin products, and boost advertising spending. This quarter, Avon is introducing Anew Clinical Eyelift, with a gel for the upper eyelid and a cream for below the eye, for $28. In the second quarter, the company will unveil Ageless Results, a skin cream based in part on Anew technology, that will sell for $12 to $15 per item. Also ahead: an instant-dry nail polish that will retail for $8. Avon hopes to bring new products to market faster than in the past, owing to a $100 million research facility it opened in Suffern, N.Y., last year.

IN A RECENT PRESENTATION, Avon CEO Andrea Jung, 47, said the company will reverse its ad-spending cuts in the U.S.; television viewers already have seen the results. U.S. TV advertising, which shrank to 10 weeks in 2005 from 21 weeks in 2004, will jump to an estimated 47 weeks this year. On a worldwide basis, ad spending will rise 50% this year, and double by 2008. Jung and other Avon executives declined to speak with Barron's.

With newer products and more advertising, Avon hopes to wean itself from price discounting. Last year, the company generated 80% of its sales from discounted products, up from 65% five years earlier.

Avon also hopes the buzz created by its redoubled efforts will energize its sales force of 4.8 million representatives, mostly women, around the world. Jung implied that she was studying compensation levels to ensure that the company offers competitive packages. As most "Avon ladies" are paid by commission, it's possible she'll have to alter compensation formulas, resulting in higher costs, if lower-priced products begin to comprise a larger percentage of sales.

The company also may need to appease some current and former Avon ladies, who are attempting to gain class-action status for a suit they filed several years ago in Superior Court in Los Angeles, contending that they received and were billed for products they never ordered. We detailed their allegations a year and a half ago ("It's Not Pretty," Oct. 11, 2004). The company contends these are individual customer-service issues.

NO REORGANIZATION IS WITHOUT RISK. William Pecoriello, a Morgan Stanley analyst, worries that instead of generating incremental sales, customers will buy the new, lower-priced products instead of higher-priced merchandise. Pecoriello, who has an Equal Weight rating on the stock and a $34 price target, also notes that Avon's 100% increase in U.S. ad spending this year will return only to 2004 levels.

The company's "share of voice," or the amount of spending it does relative to competitors, is likely to be down in 2006, compared with its level in 2004, as other personal-care companies have been boosting ad outlays.

To pay for new-product development and increased advertising outlays, Avon plans to cut 20% to 30% of its middle- and senior-management positions by this summer. Thursday, the company said that Susan J. Kropf, president and chief operating officer, will retire after 35 years with the company, and won't be replaced. While these cuts show Avon means business, they could disrupt the company's operations, says Morgan Stanley's Pecoriello.

Despite the cuts, Avon is establishing business units for China and Eastern Europe, to complement North America, Western Europe, Latin America and Asia Pacific. Theoretically, the result will be a flatter organization more in touch with representatives and customers.
In all, Avon forecasts savings of $300 million annually, half from management changes. Funds will be reinvested in the business, with half directed to advertising and half to research and development, sales-force enhancement and such.

"This is a multiyear plan that will touch every aspect of this company," Jung said in a recent presentation. Success could bring long-term revenue growth in the mid-single digits, as measured in local currencies, and operating margins should improve in 2007. Avon's operating margins peaked at 15.9% in 2004, and look headed to 11% this year.

Citigroup's Nicholson believes that the restructuring will allow Avon to generate 11%-to-12% earnings growth in 2007 and beyond. She's expecting flat-to-single-digit revenue gains in the U.S. and developed Europe, and 10% revenue growth in emerging markets, the source of more than half the company's sales.

In the past 10 years, Avon's price-earnings multiple has ranged from a 43% discount to a 53% premium to that of the S&P 500. If Jung & Co. deliver, Nicholson says, the stock's P/E could expand to a 35% premium, versus a 21% premium now.

Several developments could enhance the upside. Avon recently received permission to have a direct-sales operation in China, although approval came much later than expected. Until now, the company has had about 7,000 small shops in China. About 5,500 are franchised, and the remainder are company-owned.

AS AVON DEVELOPS A DIRECT-SALES FORCE in that country, it is likely that some of these shops will close, others will shift to the direct-sales model and still others will become salons, says Morgan Stanley's Pecoriello. In anticipation, the stores dramatically reduced their inventories last year, and sales declined 20%, from $220 million. China sales are expected to climb sharply in the future.

"China could be a $1 billion market for them," Pecoriello observes. "If you take a five-year view of China, there's a pretty big opportunity for them." Much depends, he adds, on the company's business model in China.

The Bottom Line

Avon Products hit a speed bump last year, and its shares fell to 24 from 46. They're now around 29, but could rally 20% as the company's makeover produces results.

Investors also tend to overlook the fact that Avon is a cash cow. Even with last year's disappointing results, the company generated $895.5 million of operating cash flow. Nicholson expects future cash flow to average more than $700 million a year.

The company's strong cash flow and balance sheet give it flexibility to pay a dividend and buy back shares while restructuring. Avon had $590 million of debt, net of cash, at year's end. It repurchased $728 million of stock in 2005 and increased its dividend 6%. In 2006, Nicholson believes that the cosmetic maker could repurchase up to $400 million of stock. That would contribute roughly 4% to growth in earnings per share for the year.

Avon's restructuring has been a long time coming, and like any makeover, could take longer than expected to complete. For shareholders, however, the result could be a beautiful thing.

Chinese IPOs Stick Close to Home

Not Many Firms Make DebutIn U.S. Amid Lawsuit Fears,Costs, Strict Regulations
By MICHELLE TSAI and LYNN COWANMarch 20, 2006; Page C4

The world's biggest initial public offering of stock and the U.S.'s best IPO debut last year came from two different companies with one thing in common: China.

But even as investors watch China's expanding economy with interest, they aren't seeing many new Chinese stocks listing on U.S. exchanges, and the ones that do are small fry compared with what trades in Hong Kong.

Since Beijing Internet-search engine Baidu.com Inc. went public on the Nasdaq Stock Market in August, gaining 354% on its first day, four Chinese companies have listed their stocks on American exchanges, according to market tracker Dealogic.

The largest global IPO last year was China Construction Bank Corp.'s $9.2 billion deal in October, listed in Hong Kong. The largest U.S. listing, for containership owner Seaspan Corp., raised $600 million.

Since 2004, when 10 U.S.-listed Chinese IPOs raised a total of $3.93 billion, both the number and size of listings have declined, according to Dealogic. The downturn comes despite solid trading gains for several Chinese companies that had their debuts in the U.S., including Suntech Power Holdings Co. Ltd. and Focus Media Holding Ltd., both of which have at least doubled from their offer prices.

A number of factors make Chinese companies favor Hong Kong over the U.S. The U.S. requirements are considered more onerous, and the threat of investor litigation higher. The cost of complying with Sarbanes-Oxley financial-reporting standards -- easily $1.5 million to $2 million a year -- also stands out, said David Liu, managing director at Jefferies Broadview.
Hong Kong presents an easier transition for Chinese founders who worry about communicating with investors and regulators in a foreign language. "They understand Hong Kong may not be the best market in terms of valuation, but at least it's a market they understand," said Vincent Chan, managing director of venture-capital firm Jafco Investment (Asia Pacific) Ltd.

Asia-based investors often can best appreciate investment theses for localized industries such as manufacturing, shipping and retail, according to Peter Tsou, vice chairman of Asia at Deutsche Bank AG.

Chinese companies listed on U.S. exchanges can struggle for research coverage because their market capitalizations are often less than $500 million. Investment banks usually cover companies whose offerings they underwrite, but foreign issuers tend to have greater difficulties.
"You're listing in a completely different country that has nothing to do with your business or your customers or your home market," said Vince Feng, managing director of private-equity firm General Atlantic LLC.

Elsewhere in the IPO market:

On deck for this week is the IPO of coffee-and-doughnut chain Tim Hortons Inc., which is as ubiquitous in Canada as Starbucks Corp. is in the U.S. Restaurant IPOs have performed well this year, and Tim Hortons has strong same-store sales and restaurant growth, so bankers are expecting a good debut on the New York Stock Exchange.

U.S. Policy Toward China

by Kenneth Lieberthal March 2001

Kenneth Lieberthal is professor of political science and William Davidson Professor of Business Administration at the University of Michigan. He was a special assistant to President Clinton and senior director for Asia on the National Security Council, and was a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution from November to December 2000.

ABSTRACT

The Bush administration's China policy must be part of a larger Asian strategy that keeps America fully engaged, maintains the region's strength and dynamism in an era of globalization, and encourages China's own constructive engagement in the region. This would provide both the best prospect for encouraging China's internal reform and external cooperation and for creating the conditions to cope with the consequences should China ultimately seek to confront the United States across the region.


POLICY BRIEF #72

The new administration is making clear that it seeks to make China less central to America's Asia policy, shifting increasing attention to Japan. This approach will very likely prove to be more nuanced than fundamental. Both the Japanese and Chinese relationships have long required and will continue to demand a great deal of attention. No administration can downplay either without quickly producing problems that bring that country back centrally onto America's agenda.

Unfortunately, nearly a dozen years after the Tiananmen Square massacre, too much of the discussion in America about U.S.-China relations remains emotional, deeply enmeshed in domestic politics, and misleadingly simplistic. Many critics do not appreciate the fundamental reality that an effective approach to China vastly reduces the costs to the United States of pursuing its vital regional interests in Asia. Every country in that region looks at America's China policy as a key test of the American wisdom and staying power in Asia.

China's America policy is by no means wholly benign, and the United States should, therefore, adopt a hard-nosed view of its own interests. The key question is how best to pursue those interests. For nearly thirty years, Republican and Democratic administrations—despite disagreements on many particulars—have based their overall policy on six strategic judgements, or premises. The Bush administration should address those premises and, if it accepts them, develop its particular policy mix based on the imperatives of this underlying strategic framework.

America's China Policy: Six Premises

America has long sought a modernizing, reform-minded China that acts cooperatively with the United States and behaves constructively both in the region and globally. The following six core premises have undergirded the effort to advance this outcome:

Premise #1: The United States and Asia benefit from the type of stability that comes from China's meeting the needs and demands of its people. Major governmental breakdown in the People's Republic of China (PRC) would produce tragedy at home and severe problems for the region and the United States.

China has been one of the most rapidly changing societies in the world over the past two decades. Yet the country faces massive social, economic, and political challenges that genuinely threaten its overall stability. All of these problems will worsen during the next few years as China deals with the twin tasks of implementing accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and managing its political succession. The premise that avoiding massive Chinese political breakdown is in America's interest is not an endorsement of the status quo in China. In fact, China must rapidly reform its political system to make it more diverse, responsive, and efficient if it is to avoid major political instability in the coming period of extraordinarily rapid change. That is why it is important for America to work with Beijing and to constantly prod China's leaders to adopt the liberalizing reforms they have resisted and which are crucial to the future success of the country.

Premise #2: Market-based economic development?and the associated formation of a middle class and increased integration with the outside world?will, over the long run, produce liberalizing effects in China.

This has demonstrably been the case over the past two decades. Anyone who visited China at the start of its economic reforms in the late 1970s and returned today would marvel at the enormous changes in lifestyle, individual choice, access to information, and growth of a non-governmental public sphere. China's WTO entry will be the biggest influence on this ongoing process in the coming years. But the short-term effects of WTO implementation may instead be increased social unrest and political repression in order to maintain control. Premise #2, therefore, posits a long-term perspective that must be able to withstand short-term setbacks that periodically capture the headlines.

Premise #3: America has a fundamental interest in China's accepting international norms and rules. The United States makes the greatest progress when Beijing officially adopts these norms and rules and when it works with China to achieve rigorous implementation.

America has achieved considerable progress with this approach in areas such as nonproliferation. Less than full compliance on implementation should not negate this basic premise as long as the process moves substantially forward. Recent history in spheres such as human rights has provided evidence that public condemnation combined with sanctions alone too often enables Beijing to counter American criticism with complaints about foreign bullying and interference. Such patriotic rhetoric resonates among the Chinese population and transforms rejection of international norms and standards into an affirmation of national pride. The result sometimes inhibits real progress.

Premise #4: The United States has a strong national interest in having China believe that we are not inescapably hostile.

Beijing worries a great deal about sustaining its economic growth, maintaining domestic stability, and ensuring territorial integrity, and it fears America may want to undermine all three. In sharp contrast to the 1980s, non-governmental public opinion surveys in the PRC indicate that America is now widely viewed as the country least friendly to China. On both sides, words and actions affect each country's perceptions of the other's attitudes and intentions. Adopting rhetoric that regards China as an enemy can help to make it one.

Premise #5: Diplomatically, the United States must pursue a "one China" policy.

The diplomatic premise that there is one China and that Taiwan is a part of it is fundamental to the U.S. relationship with the PRC. This premise requires some well-known restraints on American diplomacy, but the United States has successfully pursued this approach in a way that is compatible with its interests and values. Ignoring these restraints would engender conflict that would severely harm Taiwan and undermine America's ability to successfully pursue policies that are built on the first four premises.

Premise #6: Maintaining peace and prosperity in Asia is in America's core economic and security interests, and active U.S. engagement in the region is vital to pursuing that goal.

China is already active both economically and diplomatically throughout Asia. The United States can benefit from and should encourage China's constructive engagement but must be fully prepared and firm if Chinese actions challenge Asian peace and prosperity or the American role in Asia.

Policy Recommendations for the New President

In its first months in office, the Bush administration will have to address such specific issues as how to handle a China-specific resolution at the United Nations Human Rights Commission meeting in Geneva. Even as it grapples with such issues, the administration should also consider fundamental initiatives that give operational substance to the above strategic policy premises. The most important of these are:

Introduce the possibility of a weaker, disorganized China into the policy debate.

To date, American public discussion of China policy has focused overwhelmingly on two alternatives resulting from the inevitable rise of China: a strong, antagonistic China (the "China threat"), and a successful, cooperative China (a "constructive strategic partner"). These alternatives are too narrow because a "rising China" is not the only possibility.

Current challenges may overwhelm the capacities of the Chinese system and produce fundamental instability. This possibility looms especially large over the next four years. Instability would reduce the government's ability to control proliferation, attack pollution, sustain economic growth, fight transnational crime, slow the spread of HIV/AIDS, and control the movement of people across the country's borders. There is, in sum, as great a "threat" to U.S. interests from a weak and unstable China as there is from a strong and antagonistic China. Indeed, an unstable China might even be more inclined to adopt an anti-American posture in order to mobilize domestic support.

The new administration's foreign policy officials should, therefore, explicitly address America's interest in China successfully coping with major domestic challenges, along with its interest in China not becoming a powerful antagonist to the United States throughout Asia. Grasping the potential for a failing as well as a rising China means that America's China policy should attempt to reduce the chances of China's failure as well as the possibility that China will view the United States in a belligerent fashion.

Provide assistance to increase China's capacities and willingness to manage those issues where Chinese success can have beneficial transnational consequences.

There are many areas in which the United States relies on effective Chinese efforts to help address transnational issues that have a Chinese component. These include such issues as promoting environmental protection, controlling proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, implementing trade regime obligations, and countering transnational crimes such as terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and illegal smuggling of people. Currently, U.S. law and politics prohibit or constrain cooperation in many of these areas.

In those areas where China's success is fully compatible with America's interests, the Bush administration should seek the legal and political changes necessary for America to provide appropriate technical and related assistance. Past practice strongly suggests that the most effective way to deal with China on such issues is to:

* Initiate and support discussions among U.S. and Chinese specialists to develop Chinese counterparts who appreciate the problem and understand international experience and norms in dealing with it.
* Seek agreements that commit the Chinese government to specific goals and methods.
* Bolster those agreements with offers of technical and other assistance, as appropriate. Encourage the relevant American agencies to establish cooperative ties with their Chinese counterparts to handle the issues.
* Rigorously monitor Chinese performance and provide the Chinese government, where possible, with information on compliance failures while holding it to its obligations on implementation.
* Encourage, where practicable, Chinese participation in multilateral agreements in these spheres so as to achieve desired results while taking some of the burden off the U.S.-China relationship.

This approach requires patience, persistence, strength and sensitivity. It is far more difficult domestically than simply identifying Chinese failings and applying sanctions to compel better behavior. But its potential benefits are substantial. They include: 1) improved Chinese technical abilities to deal with problems where Chinese failures affect American and other interests, recognizing that some of the problems that concern us reflect weaknesses in the Chinese system rather than insidious efforts by the Chinese government; 2) creation of constituencies in China that favor compliance with international norms and standards; 3) ongoing American and international involvement in monitoring and improving implementation; 4) increased trust and reduced threat perceptions. American assistance in addressing serious Chinese problems weakens those in China who portray the United States as an implacable enemy bent on containing and undermining China. A broad approach can thus move China's capacities and perspectives in directions that meet American interests.

Regularize high-level consultations.

Beijing and Washington should regularize both annual summit meetings and a high-level strategic dialogue. Summit meetings provide opportunities to move issues forward, to have the top leaders better understand each other, and to set the tone for the relationship. Every summit creates incentives to break bureaucratic logjams in order to achieve agreements. Presidential meetings, for example, played key roles in achieving the WTO accession agreement in 1999 and the progress on missile proliferation controls made public in November 2000. President Bush should meet with President Jiang no later than the October 2001 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Leadership Meeting in Shanghai and should be in contact with him before that.

A strategic dialogue between senior officials from both countries should focus on global and regional developments and on the policy implications of those analyses. This dialogue should force key people on both sides to think through the place of U.S.-China relations in a broader context and to articulate underlying concerns. Held regularly, this dialogue will also vastly improve communication between key individuals at high levels, and can be crucial for crisis management as well as for broader mutual understanding. If discussion of trade motivated the U.S.-China dialogue during 1999-2000, strategic dialogue should motivate relations in the new administration. This strategic dialogue can make the very real differences between both nations over issues such as national and theater missile defense, Asian regional initiatives, and policies toward South and Central Asia more manageable.

Retain the "one China" policy and take steps to reduce the prospects for a cross-Strait missile/anti-missile arms race.

No issue holds greater potential danger for China, Taiwan, the United States, and East Asia than does the cross-Strait imbroglio. Yet there is little prospect of imminent political progress across the Taiwan Strait, largely because of the internal political dynamics in both Beijing and Taipei. American policy has long been based on three pillars: "one China," peaceful resolution, and cross-Strait dialogue. Although every American administration has sought to keep both sides from taking the fateful steps that could lead to conflict, developments over the past decade have nevertheless led to increased militarization and decreased trust in cross-Strait relations.

In view of the danger of the underlying situation, the new administration should try to reduce tensions and advance cross-Strait ties in a way that does not threaten Taiwan's freedom, prosperity, and security. Any cross-Strait resolution will require two steps: a China-Taiwan negotiation that cannot be coerced and will likely take decades, and a final agreement to form a loose formal association on terms that fully preserve the ability of the people of Taiwan to freely determine their domestic political and economic systems. The hard reality is that, given the Mainland's size and Taiwan's location, Taiwan will likely never attain long-lasting security without reaching a negotiated overall formal relationship with the Mainland.

The U.S. administration cannot tell either side what to do and should not become an active mediator across the Strait. But the Bush administration should pursue an active cross-Strait policy designed to reduce tensions, increase mutual trust, and encourage the resumption of cross-Strait dialogue. An important step is to continuously explain one side's views and concerns to the other, while always stressing America's insistence on peaceful resolution and a "one China" policy. This type of effort proved important during the tense aftermath of the March 2000 election in Taiwan and should be intensified. Because the cross-Strait issue arouses strong emotions on all sides and has become enmeshed in domestic political battles in each capital, the administration must also take special care to explain to Congress and the American public the rationale behind its strategy to nurture a peaceful resolution.

The Arms Issue

Militarily, the Bush administration faces a fast-approaching deadline on its biggest immediate issue with regard to arms sales to Taiwan. Each year, the administration uses a meeting in April to tell the Taiwan government the items that have been approved for possible purchase by Taiwan. This year, an April deadline means that the new administration will have to determine its position on this issue almost as quickly as Congress confirms its pertinent policymakers.

Taiwan wants some weapons systems—such as Aegis destroyers and PAC-3 anti-missile batteries—that Beijing has clearly indicated would cross red lines because in Beijing's view they are natural stepping stones to anti-missile defenses that are organically linked to U.S. systems. This would, Beijing argues, effectively reconstitute the U.S.-Taiwan defense treaty that the United States abrogated as part of the 1979 agreement to shift recognition from Taiwan to the PRC.

Should the administration sell these systems, Beijing would likely react very sharply so as to "teach" the Bush administration that it must take PRC concerns seriously. The resulting frictions could reduce the chances of cross-Strait dialogue and move U.S.-China relations onto a more confrontational path. But simple refusal to sell any of these systems might be perceived in Taiwan as a vote of no confidence.

China currently is able to launch several hundred ground-based missiles at Taiwan. This number is grossly inadequate (if armed with conventional weapons) to significantly degrade Taiwan's military capability, especially if Taiwan adopts prudent measures of passive defense. But the PRC's missiles can cause substantial disruption and produce political shock waves. Because such missiles are less expensive to field than are offsetting anti-missile defenses, China can, with some effort, effectively retain its current capacity to strike Taiwan with missiles.

Rather than blindly march down a path of escalating missile and anti-missile capabilities on both sides, the Bush administration should, by itself or through Taiwan, approach Beijing to seek an agreement in which China stops increasing its missile threat to Taiwan (via restraints in production and/or deployment) in exchange for Taiwan's eschewing additions to its current modest anti-missile capability. Appropriate mutual verifications would have to be built into any such agreement. Necessarily, any agreement on mutual restraint would take time to negotiate. In the interim, the administration should encourage each side to have its specialists begin studying the complex issue of potential confidence-building measures in the security realm, because both sides will eventually have to address this issue. It should also carefully evaluate the wisdom of declining to authorize sales of the controversial systems to Taiwan this year with a view to promoting a verifiable cross-Strait agreement on missile and theater missile defense restraint before the April 2002 round of Taiwan arms sales. This would require a strategy to assure that Taiwan sincerely seeks such an agreement and that the PRC knows that failure to reach one would likely end the restraint on sales shown in 2001.

Adopt Asian regional policies that contribute to the outcomes America seeks regarding China.

U.S. policies toward the region as a whole will have considerable bearing on relations with the PRC. It is in America's diplomatic, economic, and military interests to remain fully engaged in Asia, working with the countries in the region to confront the challenges that stem from a variety of sources, including globalization and China's activities. Moreover, America's overall posture in Asia will substantially affect China's perceptions and incentives. U.S. policies toward the region should, therefore:

* Maintain and strengthen America's existing alliances, even while making specific adjustments in the size and composition of forces to meet changing security needs.
* Increase regional capacities to address issues such as peacekeeping, disaster relief, counter-narcotics, and counter-terrorism. These capacities should be developed in a way that complements America's existing alliances, with China having appropriate opportunities to play a constructive role in the initiatives.
* Quickly renew and intensify trilateral consultation with both the Republic of Korea and Japan to address the dynamic changes occurring on the Korean peninsula. Strong U.S.-Korea-Japan coordination is critical for moving North Korea further along a path toward cooperation. As appropriate, consultations with Russia and China should intensify as a part of this effort.
* Strongly encourage structural economic reforms in pertinent countries to provide the basis for sustained regional economic growth in a globalized world.
* Support increased regional consultation and the development of regional institutions on the basis that these welcome full U.S. participation.

A Strategic Approach to China

Regardless of the balance the Bush administration seeks regarding the relative focus on China versus Japan, a strategic, active China policy will be necessary to the administration's overall success in Asia. The administration must seize the initiative early to frame the discussion of China policy if it wants to obtain the necessary political room to implement a nuanced, long-term approach. Early steps, both in articulating the policy framework and in dealing with cross-Strait issues such as arms sales, will significantly influence the record of the U.S.-China relationship throughout the Bush presidency.

China's Premier Continues to Push Market Changes

By KATHY CHEN and SHAI OSTER
March 14, 2006; Page A8

BEIJING – Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao urged China to press ahead with market changes despite the many difficulties ahead, amid growing questions from critics about such a policy's costs.

Speaking at a rare news conference at the close of the national legislature's annual meeting today, Mr. Wen -- who has cultivated an image as a populist leader -- directed his exhortations to Chinese people watching the event, which was broadcast live on national television.

"We've taken the first step in our modernization drive, but the future road is longer and more arduous," he said. "We must consistently and unwaveringly press ahead on the road of reform, ... to retrogress or backpedal offers no way out."

While few are predicting any major rollback of China's market system, problems arising amid the transition from a centrally planned economy -- such as corruption, a growing wealth gap and the loss of state assets -- are sparking criticism from some academics and policy makers. Unrest is growing among farmers and others who have been left behind. Debate over how China should proceed with market changes was fierce among delegates during the 10-day session.

Nearly 3,000 delegates of the traditionally rubber-stamp National People's Congress approved in nearly unanimous votes Mr. Wen's work report setting priorities for the year and the country's five-year economic-development plan up to 2010. Mr. Wen's report set a target for economic expansion of 8% for 2006, less than last year's 9.9% but a figure that economists predict China will easily surpass.

Reflecting top leaders' shifting priorities, both Mr. Wen's report and the plan emphasized policies aimed at achieving more balanced, efficient development following a quarter century of economic expansion that has left a legacy of pollution and a yawning wealth gap.

Mr. Wen told reporters that helping increase farmers' production and livelihoods could help promote domestic demand and consumption, putting economic expansion on more solid ground. China's expansion has been largely driven by investments.

Mr. Wen fired a warning at Taiwan President Chen Shui-bian, who suspended operations of a unification agency among other moves seen by Beijing as an effort to seek independence. Mr. Wen described such moves as "extremely dangerous and deceptive"; Beijing views Taiwan as part of the mainland and opposes any efforts by the island to split from China. The Chinese premier held out an olive branch, saying China was willing to hold talks with any parties in Taiwan, including Mr. Chen's Democratic Progressive Party, as long as they abided by the one-China policy.

In an apparent sign of disapproval of rampant corruption, work reports from the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate, or prosecutor's office, were approved by lower voting totals than in the past. Traditionally, such voting has been viewed as a protest against the judiciary's failure to crack down on corruption.

Discontent about this and other issues such as the forced seizure of farmland without adequate compensation have quickly escalated into large-scale, violent protests. A top Chinese police official said the number of public protests nationwide soared to 74,000 in 2004 from 10,000 in 1994. The growing income gap between the wealthy coastal areas and less-developed inland, where the majority of China's 800 million farmers live, is stoking discontent.

Among measures approved today by the legislature to narrow the income gap were free education for every rural child and the abolition of a 2,600-year-old agricultural tax. The government has pledged to invest more in rural health care.

近半數民眾看好下屆首相由安倍晉三擔任

　 　下屆日本首相依舊是安倍晉三最受民眾歡迎。根據日本『讀賣新聞』調查，今年9月首相小泉純一郎下台後，有43％的民眾認為安倍晉三可以接替小泉職位。與 第二名的福田康夫的10％相差數十個百分點，第三名的則是常大放厥詞、甚至連美國主要媒體都在批判的外相麻生太郎（6％）。

　　至於繼任首相該做什麼，認為小泉市場經濟優先的改革路線「需要修正」的人有49％，認為「要繼續下去」的僅有26％，這代表儘管日本民眾支持小泉改 革，但改革所造成的負面影響，例如貧富差距懸殊等問題也令民眾擔憂。

　　至於繼任首相是否要參拜靖國神社，贊成者有50％，反對者有43％，自民黨內有69％表示贊成。（2006/2/14）

支持女天皇？民主黨竟意見分裂

　 　 承認女天皇的皇室典範修正案引起執政黨內爭議，但一直對女天皇持贊成態度的民主黨，居然黨內也掀起論爭無法達成共識。民主黨代表前原誠司4日表示黨內要立 即形成共識後，國會對策委員長野田佳彥就批評「不可過急」。對照自民黨內對女天皇的意見對立，更凸顯出日本統治菁英對「萬世一系」男性天皇制度的廣泛支 持，與日本民意形成明顯的對比。

　　由於日本八成民意贊同女天皇，因此常被認為與小泉純一郎很類似的民主黨代表前原誠司果然也支持女天皇。他強調：「不能重演郵政法案的失敗。」對於忤逆 民意表示戒慎。但民主黨反對派野田佳彥認為：「執政黨已經因此而混亂了，民主黨內不該步上同一條路。」

　　一個女人能不能當一直都是男人擔任象徵職位的天皇，對日本政壇居然有這麼大的「破壞力」，也真是世界異聞一件。

自從秋篠宮妃紀子懷孕的消息傳出後，政壇認為催生女天皇的「皇室典範」修正案可以暫緩提出，而推動該法案最力的日本首相小泉純一郎，也在8日表示「要慎重 採取行動。」使得媒體紛紛解讀小泉是在暗示皇室典範可以不改了。

　　對此，小泉在9日上午立刻做出澄清表示：「人們誤解我對於推動修正案非常迫切，但事實不是這樣。與其把天皇制當成政治鬥爭的工具還不如謹慎以對比較 好。」並表示：「如果不修正皇室典範的話，要維持天皇制會產生困難。」

　　日本民眾有8成贊同女性天皇，但自民黨政治菁英多數反對女天皇，認為女性無法傳承125代天皇的Y染色體，將斷絕天皇血統的純粹性，崩解萬世一系的天 皇制。小泉的從政風格對於迎合大眾頗為重視，而且從政以來跳票的記錄還算是不多，因此對於皇室典範的推動，傾向會堅持原本的立場。

近年因日本皇室沒有男嗣皇孫出生，政府幾乎被迫要修改規範皇位繼承的「皇室典範」，以允許女性繼位天皇，而這又引起堅持男性繼承的保守派強烈反對，雙方掀 起攻防且頻頻在媒體發表主張。現在二皇子妃再傳出懷孕消息後，瞬間匯集了全日本及國際間的注目，中國大陸、韓國、英國甚至電視媒體也加以報導了。不過，相 對的，皇太子妃雅子的處境該會如何呢？解套？還是壓力更大、更落寞？

　　雅子在嫁給太子前在日本外務省工作，因貌美、外語佳而前途似錦，後來被皇太子看上，嫁入皇室，原本應該是“美夢成真”，登上不知羨煞多少女性的高位， 偏偏造化弄人，和太子經過多年的努力，僅生下一個女兒愛子，沒有為日本生下可繼承皇位的男嗣，承受莫大的壓力，數度傳出患了精神上的疾病，需要調養。政壇 也為要不要修改「皇室典範」爭執不休，如今二皇子妃生了第二個女兒11年後，又傳懷孕消息，搶盡媒體、政壇焦點，雅子恐怕是更尷尬了。

　　二皇子文仁（秋篠宮）結婚較早，第一個女兒已經14歲了，其繼位天皇排在皇太子德仁之後，居第二位，從小較沒有像皇太子那麼受矚目，之前曾批評太子為 雅子辯護的發言，這回如果紀子果真拼出個男嗣，文仁地位顯然會大大提高，即使當不了天皇，也很可能會是天皇的爸爸。

　　關於號稱亞洲最先進國家日本的皇位繼承問題和紀子懷孕所可能產生的關鍵變化，正是現代宮廷爭位與新舊觀念衝擊的寫實劇，這對觀念較新、男女較平等、早 出現女皇的西方國家來說，或許會有點詫異吧！

日本切斷台灣與中國大陸的策略

台灣日本綜合研究所所長　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　許介鱗

世界上最不希望台灣與中國大陸統一的是日本

　　冷戰結束後，特別是911恐怖攻擊後，日本顯然比美國更不希望中國統一。因為日本視台灣海峽為其「海上生命線」，日本所需的能源從波斯灣經印度洋、麻六甲海峽、台灣海峽才運到日本，所以日本時時刻刻不忘台灣海峽對日本的戰略地位和價值。

　　依1972年中日建交公約，日本不能反對一個中國，但最不希望中國統一。因為如果台灣與大陸實現統一，台灣海峽就成為中國的內海，於是在西太平洋的中國包圍網，從北方的阿留申群島、日本列島、琉球群島到台灣澎湖群島、巴士海峽的防衛連鎖線將出現破綻，中國變成面向浩瀚的太平洋，反過來控制了台灣海峽和巴士海峽，也就控制了日本在東亞的海上通道。日本目前趁台灣與中國大陸的對立，佔據著爭執中的釣魚島以及附近海域，如果台灣與大陸實現統一，日本獨吞釣魚島海域「漁業資源」、「油藏資源」的企圖恐怕不易如願。

日本念念不忘殖民統治台灣50年

　　台灣從1895年到1945年的50年期間是日本的殖民地，日本從戰略上與殖產上經營台灣，很是稱心得意。台灣的富饒物產，灌溉了日本工業化的發展，台灣「土人」的犧牲奉獻，真讓日本人念念不忘。在二戰末期，日本在台實施「陸軍特別志願兵」，第一次要1千名就有台灣人42萬名餘應徵，第二次也只要1千名，更有60萬名餘應徵；「海軍特別志願兵」要3千名志願兵，有31萬名餘應徵。台灣人如此爭先要捐軀奉獻給天皇陛下，在自願書上簽名，用小刀切破手指蓋血印稱為「血判」，還到天皇居住的宮城門前的二重橋，向皇居行三鞠躬禮，並高喊「天皇陛下萬歲」。這樣「忠君愛國」的台灣人，日本怎麼捨得拋棄呢？因而戰後也有種種謀略。

謀略一：日本秘密令「白團」阻止共軍侵台

　　戰後，台灣、澎湖列島等日本殖民地，根據開羅宣言、波茨坦宣言、日本投降文書的國際協定，由中華民國接收而完成接收程序。但是國共內戰漸趨激烈，當1949年蔣軍兵敗如山倒，共軍要渡海統一台灣時，日本就暗中密派「白團」協助蔣軍。白團是以「報恩」與「反共」為藉口秘密協助蔣軍，但骨子裡暗藏著日本切斷台灣與大陸的策略。由舊日本軍人所秘密組成的白團，在台灣面臨共軍進攻的重大危機（1949?52年）時，以日本慣用的欺敵戰術，技巧性地防衛住台灣的外島，阻止共軍進攻台灣。此日本軍事顧問團，從1949年11月起在台15年之久，除了防禦共軍來襲之外，並將日據時期台灣的戰時體制，轉移為國府時代的「反共堡壘」體制，在切斷台灣與中國大陸扮演著軍事上「影武者」的角色。怎麼說這是日本切斷台灣與中國大陸的謀略呢？戰後日本受盟軍(GHQ) 托管，白團援助蔣軍的軍事活動，在國際上屬於違法行為，如果沒有日本政府暗中掩護，舊日本軍人的國際違法性，怎麼能瞞天過海？

謀略二：吉田茂的「台灣歸屬未定」謀略

　　 1951年9月，排除中國參加的對日「多邊和約」在舊金山簽字，和約第二條規定：「日本放棄對台灣和澎湖群島的一切權利、權限以及請求權」，但不說要歸還給中國。吉田首相的策略是，日本戰敗不得已「放棄」舊殖民地台灣，但不明言其歸屬，這樣可以留下將來染指的餘地。吉田茂的著作『世界與日本』對台灣的地位再次強調「日本政府只放棄領土權，至於其歸屬尚未決定」。吉田茂「台灣歸屬尚未決定」的設計，成為台灣籍的國際法學者主張「台灣地位未定論」的根據。

　　1972年日本與中國建交，復交的三原則是：第一、日本承認中華人民共和國政府為唯一合法政府，採取一個中國的原則；第二、台灣是中國的一省，台灣問題是中國的內政問題；第三、從前的「中日和約」是非法的，必須廢除。日本為保留面子，將第三點改為「中日和約」已失去意義而失效。因此，1952年的中日合約自1972年失效。台灣籍的國際法學者，依據1951年中日合約的國際條約，從國際法來論「台灣地位未定論」，就這樣被日本任意拋棄了。

謀略三：操縱李登輝的謀略

　　 1988年台灣籍的李登輝就任總統，1989年派財政部長郭婉容前往北京參加亞銀年會；1990 年成立「國家統一委員會」以及「海峽交流基金會」；1991年派密使鄭淑敏到中國與汪道涵面談；1992 年李再派密使蘇志誠赴中國與曾慶紅面談；1993年兩岸辜汪會談在新加坡舉行，李當初似乎傾向統一。

　　日本看李登輝與中國大陸越走越近，就開始展開操縱李登輝的反中國謀略。

　　1994年8月，亞運評議會放風聲10月在廣島舉行亞運會，給李登輝邀請函，因中國反對，日本不給簽證；1995 年11月在大阪召開亞太經合會，也以中國反對為理由，日本政府決定不讓李登輝出席；1997 年11月京都大學創立100周年紀念典禮，日本又以中國反對為理由不讓李登輝訪日。這樣，一而再，再而三地，日本一方面操縱媒體故意放風聲，透露李登輝要訪日的新聞，激起中國外交部發表堅決反對的立場，最後日本政府決定拒絕李登輝訪日。

　　李登輝是一個戇直的人，經過媒體一再操作，把不能訪日的不滿全歸罪給中共，而激起仇視中國之心，認為一切都是中共打壓，而不察日本的反中國切斷台灣的謀略。實際上，日本是一個主權獨立的國家，要不要讓李登輝到日本，完全由日本政府依「國家利益」和權謀決定。

　　2000年陳水扁當選總統之後，日本各黨派政治人物、右派學者、新聞記者等，絡繹不絕的訪問總統府，不斷灌輸中共威脅、台灣安全的論調，努力繼續切斷台灣與大陸的關係。但是陳水扁可能沒有李登輝那樣戇直，他什麼時候改變風向，日本真是沒有把握。

甲午戰爭與馬關條約：中日命運的決定戰

台灣大學政治學研究所研究生　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　李佳怡

壹、前言

　　發生在1894年的甲午戰爭是中日兩國在近代史的第一次戰爭，也是對中國、日本、朝鮮及台灣都具有深遠影響的一場戰役，日本稱此次戰爭為「日清戰爭」，並冠之以「聖戰」之名，而戰敗的中國則稱此次戰爭為「不義之戰」。

在這場戰爭之後，不僅清廷的腐敗無能完全暴露，國際地位一落千丈，招致了其後國際列強的加深侵略；一八九五年的馬關條約也使得台灣割讓給日本，造成了直到一九四五年的五十年之久之統治；日本則因此搭上列強末班車，成為亞洲唯一晉身國際列強的一個國家，並從台灣掠奪了諸多資源和利益。

而這場戰爭發生的前因雖然是源於朝鮮殖民地的問題，但結果卻是由台灣支付最慘痛的代價。以下將要探討甲午戰爭的來龍去脈以及馬關條約簽訂的過程及戰爭的影響。

貳、福澤諭吉對朝鮮的謀略

甲午戰爭的導火線是朝鮮問題，而日本對於朝鮮的謀略早在甲午戰爭前數十年就已展開，其中的領導人物是福澤諭吉。

福澤諭吉是日本近代最具代表性的啟蒙思想家，他的思想簡言之就是「文明開化」，文明開化指的是除了引進西方的技術之外，還要吸收西方的民主精神。但西方的民主是來自列強的殖民地爭奪戰和殖民地經營的結果，所以若探求「文明開化」的真正精神，可以發現，一方面是包含著輸入外國資源和輸出本國商品以增加國家財富的「殖產興業」論；另一方面則是在「富國」的過程中若出現原料資源地或商品販賣的爭端時，就訴諸於戰艦大砲的「強兵」手段，故也稱之「富國強兵論」。

在明治維新之前，福澤諭吉曾三次遊歷西洋，三次出訪都是搭乘軍艦，而使他體會到了西方的「船堅砲利」，並認識到西方「文明開化」的真正精髓所在。在福澤諭吉眼中，所謂的「文明開化」是與「野蠻未開」的概念成對比，而且對照到當時的中國和日本，福澤諭吉認為「支那人在思想上貧困，而日本人則思想豐富者也」 [1] ，也就是論斷日本比較接近文明的階段。

福澤諭吉並將這種概念應用到對朝鮮的「開國」。因為法國、英國、俄國、德國、美國等西洋列強曾嘗試強迫朝鮮「開國」未成功，直到日本於一八七五年乘江華島事件 [2] 時以軍艦逼逼近朝鮮首府京城，迫使朝鮮開放「和親」貿易之路。福澤諭吉認為，英國由鴉片戰爭迫使中國開放，在中國戰最優越的地位；而美國以柏里率領艦隊強迫日本開國，也在日本佔首座，所以依此類推，日本和朝鮮的關係中，日本也應佔首座。除此之外，福澤諭吉還認為要從首座一躍為「首魁盟主」，並強制朝鮮「文明開化」。

福澤諭吉的野心不只僅在朝鮮身上，還對中國也虎視眈眈。他預料中國遲早也會像波蘭一樣被分割，而日本應加入列強陣營，割取中國的福建省之一半和台灣。這種來自西洋式的弱肉強食的史觀，構成了他著名的「脫亞論」，也就是認為日本應脫離亞洲國家的隊伍，而和西方列強同進退，必須依西洋人接待朝鮮支那的方式來對待他們 [3] 。

福澤諭吉傳播思想的方式主要靠「慶應義塾」（今慶應大學的前身）和『時事新報』。慶應義塾設立的目的是要教育學生，並誘導朝鮮青年入義塾洗腦。時事新報則在一八八二年創刊，用以鼓吹文明開化思想，福澤諭吉並不斷在該報發表時論，主張日本應採取「殖產興業」和「富國強兵」的政策。一直到一八九八年福澤諭吉罹患腦溢血死亡的十六年間，他都利用此報紙來宣傳其文明開化之理念，也為甲午戰爭的開打埋下了伏筆。

在戰爭發生後，福澤諭吉也進行宣傳和洗腦之工作，一八九四年十一月，發生「旅順大屠殺」，婦女、幼童被日本軍害死約六萬人，國際媒體『世界日報』、『時代雜誌』都有報導，但『時事新報』載明：「旅順殺戮乃無稽之談。」一八九五年十月又發生日軍殺害閔妃事件，日本駐韓公使三浦梧棲中將，策謀日本訓練隊和守備隊四百多名，侵入京城景福宮、慘殺閔妃，經美國報紙披漏。福澤指派慶應義塾教師林?藏撰寫「朝鮮王妃傳」，再指派該校教師工藤精一翻譯為英文，投書至美國各報，表示閔妃為陰險、忌妒、殘忍之人，中傷其為一妖婦，以掩蓋日方的惡行。

以上總總都顯示了福澤諭吉思想和宣傳戰之成功，但成功的背後是福澤諭吉的日本優越心態和殘忍的個性所操縱的。

參、金玉均的倚日思想

福澤諭吉除了利用教育和媒體來除播思想外，也在朝鮮培養從事謀略的官員。

最初，他透過僧侶和朝鮮「開化派」青年金玉均搭上線，金玉均當時是朝鮮官僚中的菁英，並與朝鮮國王相當親近。一八八二年，金玉均到東京和福澤諭吉會面，金玉均希望能得到日本的幫助，以推動朝鮮的改革，福澤諭吉則企圖讓朝鮮斷絕與中國的宗主關係，故兩者一拍即合。
金玉均將回國前，朝鮮遇上京城之變（也就是壬午之變 [4] ），朝鮮士兵殺死日本的軍事教官，襲擊日本大使館，金玉均據報後立刻搭乘軍艦回朝鮮。之後朝鮮政府派修信使（實為謝罪使）赴日，金玉均為特使顧問，也在該年再度赴日，他不僅向日本借款，並派遣數十名朝鮮青年到日本留學，並拜託福澤諭吉照顧監督，這些留學生後來就成了福澤諭吉對朝鮮謀略的各種角色。

在京城之變後，金玉均的「獨立黨」勢力薄弱，唯一的依靠是日本，故金玉均一心一意想依靠日本推動朝鮮的改革運動。在一八八三年，金玉均攜帶朝鮮國王的委任狀赴日，希望借款三百萬日圓，但日本政府態度突然改變，最後借款案告吹，使得金玉均氣餒地回國。
而在朝鮮，守舊派的閔妃一族又重新掌權，故福澤派去的謀略青年都無法順利活動，只有井上角五郎繼續居留京城，最後成功進入朝鮮的「外衙門」（即外交部），並發行政府官報『漢城旬報』，作為對朝鮮的宣傳工具。

一八八四年中法戰爭爆發，日本即宣傳這是一場文明對野蠻的戰爭─中國乃「東洋的波蘭」，正處於瓜分狀態，日本應乘機在朝鮮擴大勢力。另一方面，由於福澤諭吉等人的勸告，日本當局又轉而支持金玉均等人的「獨立黨」，並發行「支那帝國分割圖」和「北京夢枕」 [5] 漫畫，從日本散佈至朝鮮，令朝鮮上下人心動搖。

不久之後，金玉均的獨立黨依靠日本援助，決定實行政變以奪取政權。在一八八四年十二月四日，他們趁郵局落成祝賀宴會之際展開行動，殺害閔妃派大臣六人，此事件史稱「甲申事變」。然而此事件終究失敗，獨立黨人士逃出京城，金玉均、朴泳孝等亡命日本，並改名換姓，寄居在福澤諭吉家。

為了處理此事件，日本和韓國在一八八五訂立「漢城條約」，朝鮮付十三萬?賠償金和謝罪。李鴻章與伊藤博文則於天津簽訂中日「天津條約」，中日兩國均自朝鮮撤兵，並規定：「將來朝鮮如有事，中日兩國或一國要派兵，應先互行文知照；及其事定，仍即撤回，不再留防。」
中日天津條約成立後，朴泳孝等獨立黨人士領悟到日本的背信忘義，即離開日本而遠度美國，只有金玉均一人仍留在日本，一直冀望日本的援助。但是日本政府卻想壓迫金玉均，把他放逐到北海道和小笠原島，金玉均才終於了解日本的不仁不義，而想投靠李鴻章之子李經芳。在一八九四年三月金玉均密渡上海之際，卻遭閔妃派所遣的刺客暗殺，屍體送回朝鮮被分屍示眾，以悲慘結局作終。

從一八八四年甲申事變後的十年間，福澤諭吉就不斷利用金玉均亡命日本一事，在『時事新報』撰寫文宣，表示日本應同情朝鮮的「獨立黨」，並援助朝鮮獨立，制裁清國的舉動。當金玉鈞被暗殺和屍體被凌遲的消息傳到日本後，日本國民的感情立刻被煽動到了極點。所以在金玉均死後三個月，日本當局就斷然對清國開戰了。

肆、朝鮮觀點─日方發動的戰爭

　甲午戰爭在朝鮮人看來，是日本人主導發動的戰爭。根據『朝鮮史』的記述，甲午戰爭和經濟爭奪有關。

在一八八○年代，日本取得了朝鮮沿海的漁業權，又利用貿易和產業，將經濟侵略擴大到朝鮮各地。而日本人雖然可以在本國銀行的協助下輕易打敗朝鮮的競爭對手，但卻必須和在袁世凱保護下的中國商人競爭。中國商人比起日本人更會做生意，所以在商業上較為成功。從一八八○到九○年代，中國在朝鮮對外貿易中所佔的比例，逐漸趕上日本。

這個狀態得日本大為不滿，因為日本正面臨迅速工業化的階段，並積極從事軍事膨脹主義的野心計畫，所以渴望從海外市場賺取外幣以作為工業化的基金，故必須採取各種手段。正當那時，興起東學黨的叛亂，日本就抓住此決好的下手機會。

東學黨的叛亂，起因於稅制和土地分配的不平等。大院君為了減輕農民的痛苦，抑制地方官吏和地主的強奪，並擴大稅收。但是所得的利益卻被他野心的營建計畫和貨幣貶值所抵消，使得一般老百姓還是要靠高利貸過活。而日本對朝鮮「開國」後，這種情況又更加惡化。經濟惡化導致的結果，是產生組織良好的武裝盜賊集團，以及各地方擁而起的造反。

大院君的孤立主義和壓迫天主教政策等保守主義的革命觀，刺激了提倡排外和改革的東學黨。在一八九○年代經濟危機加深中，許多民眾認為此一新興宗教是唯一可以解救身心的一個途徑，因此一八九二年東學黨的叛亂展開，很快地就擴大到各個地方。

東學黨叛亂成功後，朝鮮政府向中國討救兵。中國依照天津條約的規定，將出兵之事告知日本，並於一八九四年六月派遣小艦隊到牙山灣。日本得知此消息後，也以保護公使館為藉口出動軍艦，登陸仁川。中國受此挑釁，也大量派兵至朝鮮，從此兩國都派遣大量軍隊。朝鮮政府認為亂事已平定，兩國的派兵已失去正當理由，因此表示抗議。於是，中國提議互相撤兵。

然而，日本認為正是將中國勢力從朝鮮驅逐的好機會，自信如果訴諸戰爭也一定勝過中國，因此拒絕撤兵，並以「改革朝鮮內政」為由繼續送軍隊至朝鮮去。袁世凱察覺事態緊迫，變裝逃出京城。

日本始終不願對朝鮮撤兵，朝鮮政府仍絕望地抗議，並拒絕日本所要求的毀棄和中國的貿易，因此日本就公然地展開對朝鮮的支配和對中國的戰爭。七月二十三日深夜，日軍佔領京城的皇宮，將朝鮮國王置於其支配下。國王不得以任命大院君為國政總裁，閔妃和其同黨均被驅逐，親中勢力就此告終。

七月二十五日，日本艦隊在黃海附近的牙山灣，偷襲中國艦隊，並將之擊沉或驅逐。從京城南下的日軍，亦擊敗中國的軍隊，並佔領牙山和公州。到了八月一日，日本天皇才向中國宣戰，中日戰爭遂在日軍一連串迅速的勝利之下展開序幕。

伍、中國觀點─設下圈套的戰爭

　從朝鮮人的立場來看，第一次中日戰爭是由日本主導而發動的戰爭；而從中國方面的文獻和客觀史實來看，這是一場日本設下圈套的戰爭。除了福澤諭吉早已展開的思想宣傳，尚有其他史實可以證明日本佈下哪些圈套。

　一八九五年五月三十一日，東學黨的農民佔領全州，朝鮮政府以國王的密令，向中國駐韓代表袁世凱提出出兵援助的請求。六月一日，日本公使館書記拜訪袁世凱，催促中國出兵。六月三日，日本代理公使再拜訪袁世凱，暗示性地催促中國出兵。根據袁世凱發給李鴻章的電報，有提到一小段話：

「日本公署使臣山村來晤談，他的意思也是盼望中迅速代為戡亂，並詢問中國允許了沒有。……山村與凱是老朋友，察其語意，只重視商民的保護，好似沒有其他意思。」
　　從這段話中可以看出，中國是中了日本假裝「重在商民」而「無他意」的圈套，而日本就抓住此千載難逢的機會，導向中日戰爭之路。
　
中國方面依據袁世凱的報告，李鴻章在六月四日才發出派兵朝鮮的指令，然而日本早在六月二日的內閣會議，就已決定派兵朝鮮，並在六月五日在參謀本部設置大本營，而中日兩國互相照會出兵則是六月七日。中國因為過於粗心只專注於東學黨的鎮壓，而忽略了日本設置大本營的大規模行動。相反地，日本則利用一切情報機關來探察中國的一舉一動，例如開戰前駐日公使和李鴻章之間的電報，以及戰後馬關講和會議時，中國代表李鴻章和北京政府之間的電報，日本都可以解讀密碼而對內容瞭若指掌。
　
除此之外，有更多的情報工作早在先前就已展開。荒尾精 [6] 是一個例子，他是日本參謀本部派至中國的第一號諜報員，一八八九年他提出「復命書」，力呈對中國要表面和好、內部浸透。一八九○年設立「日情貿易研究所」，畢業學生為戰爭時通譯。這種情報工作的目的不僅在於提供其所蒐集的情資給參謀本部，並且是為了顛覆清廷，確保日本在中國的支配權。而參謀本部以大陸作戰為目的編成軍團，以打敗北洋艦隊為目標來建設海軍，事實證明在甲午戰爭中果然成功。

此外，日本的戰爭準備也比外界想像中早，從一八八五年後，日本的態度就從防衛轉至攻擊，一八八七年完成清國爭討策，一八九二年完成對清戰爭準備，一八九四年四月九日參謀本部次長川上操六視察清國，五月二十日參謀本部伊知地少佐渡韓查究東學黨亂之情勢，五月二十七日川上參謀次長與玄洋社社長平岡浩太郎會面，六月五日，開設大本營。

　　日本設下圈套從事戰爭而戰勝的結果，戰利品為賠償金二億兩和遼東半島、台灣的割讓。賠償金補償日方的軍費尚綽綽有餘，而遼東半島是對中國大陸擴張的跳板，台灣是支配中國沿海貿易、也是南洋飛躍的基地。雖然遼東半島的佔有遭法、俄、德國三國干涉而不得不放棄，但是台灣的佔據成為日本經營殖民地的實驗台。根據「台灣民主國」的成立和其後的武裝抗日鬥爭史，可以知道台灣民眾並未把日本當作「亞洲的解放軍歡迎」。

陸、陸奧宗光的一元外交

　　 這場戰爭是日本外向陸奧宗光和首相伊藤博文首次合作進行的第一次中日戰爭，除了三國干涉還遼的失策之外，被認為是最傑出的一元外交。一元外交的好處，就是外交和軍事能一元地統合，互相輔助去爭取「國家利益」。日本方面盛讚陸奧宗光的鬼才和謀略，但是他也有思慮不足之處。

　首先，日本出兵朝鮮，在外交上尚紛議未決，可是軍事上卻早已派兵迅速進入京城。也就是在外交上假裝被動而讓中國主動，軍事上卻先發制人，這種外交「被動」軍事「先機」的策略，在甲午戰爭中獲得壓倒性的勝利。但從反面來說，這變成日本政府允許軍部不受指揮而「獨自先行」的開端，所以導致了其後日本軍國主義不受控制而走的情況。

　其次，陸奧宗光將混成旅團的總兵力集中在京城，並以此為後盾，將外交從被動的立場轉換為主動，並用日本的單獨行動，來斷然實行朝鮮的「內政改革」這種強硬外交，以排除中國的存在，不是從形式上而是實質上來推翻中國和朝鮮的宗主關係。但他在外交上採行的這種「內政改革」的詭計，其後成為日本對他國的「內政干涉」的濫觴。

第三，陸奧宗光的「智謀外交」，是竭盡詭詐權變的計謀，欺騙歐美列強的智謀。又所謂「鬼才外交」，是以武力的威壓為手段迫使中韓兩國低姿態屈服的本領。因此陸奧的外交本質，是對歐美列強以低姿態窺伺其顏色，對亞洲鄰邦以高姿態作威作福的外交。像是三國干涉還遼時，陸奧所堅持的態度為「對三國終於非全部讓步不可，但對清國則一步也不可退讓。」如此尊重歐美而蔑視亞洲的態度，影響深遠，並遺留至戰後，至今沒有本質上的改變。

　第四，陸奧宗光也有智謀窮短的時候，像旅順大屠殺事件傳到之後，陸奧和福澤諭吉在『時事新報』刊載「旅順殺戮乃無稽之談」一樣，作成辯明書，令送各國。在他送給駐美公使向美國人辯解的電文綱要中提到：「被殺者的多數，並不是無辜的百姓，而是脫下軍服的清兵也。」顯示陸奧僅想掩蓋世間耳目以避事實的可恥態度。如此，日本的殘暴行為因為當局者不追究責任，反而為其辯護的結果，助長了日本軍人對殘暴行為喪失是非感，造成其後第二次中日戰爭中「南京大屠殺」等野蠻行為。

　最後，日本人對陸奧宗光的唯一不滿，是未能預料三國干涉，而屈服退還遼東半島。陸奧也對此耿耿於懷，並寫『蹇蹇錄』辯解，在文中他暗示他並不是不能預料三國干涉，而是因為日本軍人和國民的好戰性格和割地欲，才決定割取遼東半島，等於是言明責任在彼不在我，是一種責任轉嫁術。但是，陸奧宗光和伊藤博文攜手合作的戰爭指導方針，在日軍佔領旅順和大連之前，都一心一意的命令進軍遼東半島，並以其割取為目標。同樣地，對台灣割取也是一方面拒絕李鴻章的停戰提議，一方面在講和談判當中，命令日軍比志島之對佔領澎湖，為割取「南進根據地」的台灣先行佈置。假設干涉還遼是日本陸奧和伊藤所事先預料的話，那麼日本退還「北進根據地」遼東半島，則是當局者合演的一齣戲，目的在迫使日本國民協力於擴張軍備，並促進日本懷抱著捲土重來的侵略欲望。這在之後十年的日俄戰爭、旅順和大連的租借，以及日本對中國東北鐵路和煤礦權的獲取，就可證明日本之陰謀。

柒、甲午戰爭的影響

　甲午戰爭對中日兩國都帶來極大影響，對中國而言無疑影響是負面的，對日本來講雖然表面上是獲利者，但是也有損失，所以以下將討論甲午戰爭的幾點影響。

　第一，甲午戰爭是帝國主義的候選國─中國與日本的命運決定戰，戰勝國日本加入了帝國主義陣營的末班車，成為亞洲唯一晉升帝國主義之國家；戰敗國中國轉為半殖民地的地位，變成列強爭奪利權的一塊肥肉。日本在一八九八年五月得到的賠償有：軍費賠償二億兩、威海衛守備軍費三年份一百五十萬兩、遼東半島退還補償三千萬兩，合計二億三千一百五十萬兩（英鎊三千八百○八萬餘）。中國在甲午戰爭時歲計不到一億兩，戰費和募集內債都不成，只好向英德借外債六百六十三萬餘英鎊。戰敗後對對巨額的賠償更形無力，只好再更依賴外債 [7] 。

　第二，甲午戰後日本以鉅額賠償金作為戰後經營，在戰後經營期，編入歲入一般會計的賠償金是二億?餘，約為歲入總額的10%。賠償金的一半以特別會計處理，過半投入擴軍費用，也若干使用在「殖產興業」方面。一八九五年十月的財政計畫，七年間的軍艦、武器海外支付預定額一億七千三百四十九萬?。一八九八年四月，井上馨藏相繼續支付預算中支付外國二億二千六百六十八萬?。日本為軍艦武器的購入費用年年增大，大半以在倫敦的賠償金為結匯支付。日本政府為此，向清廷交涉賠償金在倫敦以英鎊接受，經半年交涉得清廷同意。日本即以此黃金為基準的英鎊賠款，建立金本位制，從此加入歐美列強的金融體系，這等於是以犧牲中國民眾的前提下建構的。

　第三，甲午戰爭的賠款除了使日本除了工業化、擴張軍備，並建立金本位制之外，在市場與關稅方面日本也獲得極大好處。中國市場從此開放，對日實行最惠國待遇，中國的貨物稅限於5%，日本則均課稅20%以上。且獲取台灣讓日本得到了米糖的好處，因為米糖為日本工業化所缺，半糖進口佔總額10%以上外匯，且可以平抑物價，並擴大稅基間接稅：消費稅及專賣稅。所以甲午戰爭其實是幫助日本現代化，助長了日國內輕工業 [8] 的發展，造成日本第一次產業革命 [9] 。

　第四，中國則自此墮入半殖民地位，五年之內面臨被瓜分命運。包括：俄國租旅順、大連，德國佔領膠州灣，法國佔領廣州灣，英國佔領威海衛及九龍半島。日本則因為三國干涉還遼而進入對俄十年準備戰爭，一九○二年英日同盟成立，打破「滿韓交換」 [10] ，一九○四年對俄宣戰，最後因日俄戰爭成功而取得滿州。

　第五，所謂「塞翁失馬，焉知非福」，日本固然在戰後得到以上好處，但是也有對其不利的影響。甲午戰爭對日本最直接的不良影響，是封閉了日本的立憲主義向民生主義發展的道路。日本在一八八九年公佈了大日本帝國憲法，一九八○年實行第一次眾議院選舉，到一八九四年對中國開戰的四年間，代表市民利益的政黨，在議會提倡「節儉經費，休養民力」，以預算案的審議牽制政府的作為。然而，甲午戰爭爆發後，一向為民喉舌批評政府的議會突然安靜下來，從來以「責任內閣」、「財政改革」、「藩閥打倒」為口號而自負的政黨，突然轉變成為「打倒支那人」、「攻取萬里長城」的鬧哄哄聲音。一八九五年秋天，自由黨改變態度與伊藤博文合作，同意政府的擴張軍備和增加稅收，因為，蠶食中國並成為東亞的支配者，已成為日本全體的至上目標了。

　 第六，日本走向民主主義的道路，因為甲午戰爭的勝利而遭封鎖；相反地，日本軍國主義的風潮，隨著戰爭勝利而成為一大勢力。尤其是戰利品台灣的據有，使得軍部有機會超過政治的範疇，而進入政治的領域。一八九五年的台灣總督武官制，是軍人在外地實施專制政治的開端，隨後朝鮮的合併、到「偽滿洲國」的成立，隨著殖民地不斷擴大，軍部可以在這些日本國內立憲主義或議會主義管轄不到的地區，完全獨裁統治。

　最後，甲午戰爭的結束，雖然為日本政府帶來財富和發展，替軍部帶來擴張和活躍的地盤，但是一般國民的生活並沒有轉好，反而更加窮苦。因為在不斷膨脹的國家財富中，軍費佔了很大的比例。戰爭的確可以促進日本資本主義的發展，但是在軍國主義底下，日本的資本主義化只肥了依靠政府保護而成長的財閥，一般國民仍然貧困不堪。
捌、結論

　甲午戰爭是個日本設下圈套的戰爭，從福澤諭吉早在十多年前就進行的思想教育、文宣洗腦和情報工作，及其對朝鮮青年金玉均的利用，至陸奧宗光藉由東學黨之亂來展開對中國的戰爭，都顯示中國早踏入了日本的佈局當中，成為一顆被操弄的棋子而仍不自知。而中日兩國的命運都因此大幅被扭轉，最無辜的是表面上雖獨立但從此被日本控制的朝鮮，和被割讓與日本受軍人欺壓的台灣。

　然而歷史總是有正反兩面，在日本處心積慮侵略中國、擴張亞洲的同時，自己也走上一條極為危險的軍國主義道路，導致之後的第二次世界大戰嘗到敗果。所以若從這一個面向來看，日本只為了自己的私利，而對亞洲鄰國蠶食鯨吞的行為，終究使自己自食惡果。


《參考書目》
許介鱗，1987，『近代日本論』，台北：故鄉出版社。
1958，『福澤諭吉全集』，岩波書店。《注釋》
[1] 「文明論之概略」，『福澤諭吉全集』，第四卷，二五頁。
[2] 當時當政朝鮮國王李熙還年幼，由其生父李?應攝政，是為「大院君」。李?應為人守舊排外，尤其對明治維新後的日本相當怨惡，竟下令「與日本交涉者，處死刑」。同一年，有艘名叫「雲揚號」的日艦，停泊在朝鮮江華島沿海附近進行海域測量，朝鮮人對此艦發炮攻擊。雲揚號不甘示弱，全力應戰，並以強大的火力反擊，摧毀對方砲台，攻陷永宗城。日本並逼迫朝鮮與其訂立「日韓江華條約」（1876年），在此情勢下，身為朝鮮宗主國的清政府，並沒有做出任何回應，所以雙方等於約定認朝鮮為獨立自主國。這事件被稱為「江華島事件」。
[3] 「脫亞論」，『福澤諭吉全集』，第八卷，四四○頁。
[4] 在此事件後，清廷將閔妃派視為親中國的政權，加強中國對朝鮮的宗主權，並派袁世凱駐朝鮮增加控制，使親日派勢力大為後退。
[5] 由福澤諭吉的外甥金泉秀太郎執筆，福澤並在此漫畫上題字，揶揄中國高枕臥夢，不理會列強的分割。
[6] 一八八二年陸軍士官學校畢業，一八八五年至參謀本部服務，一八八六年被派至上海，偽裝商人，偵查中國事情、地誌，一八九六年十月三十日死於台北。
[7] 其中對供給借款最積極的是提倡三國干涉還遼的俄國。
[8] 以製絲和棉工業最盛。
[9] 第二次產業革命則是在日俄戰爭時，這時擴大了造船、製鋼及機械工業。
[10] 即1903年雙方約定之「俄取滿，日取韓」。

日本也是一個「政、商、黑」勾結的國家

台灣日本綜合研究所所長　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　許介鱗

日本的呆帳知多少？

　　在日本，金融機構的呆帳稱為不良債權，不良債權問題是日本經濟低迷的主要根源。日本全國所有銀行的不良債權分為兩大類：2003年依銀行法由銀行發表的「風險管理債權」34兆8490億日圓和依金融再生法公布的「開示債權」35兆3390億日圓；到04年「風險管理債權」下降為26兆2040億日圓，「開示債權」下降為26兆5940億日圓，05年「風險管理債權」再減至17兆5390億日圓，「開示債權」也再減至17兆9270億日圓。這是以公資金來救濟金融機構。日本政府說，這是為了防止金融危機、為了金融機構的健全化，而注入公資金給金融機構的。但是公資金本來是人民的稅金，拿公資金來消化不良債權，也就是拿人民的稅金替金融機構解決難題。

　　日本修改證券交易法，取消銀行業務與證券業務的牆壁，讓市民可以到銀行購買股票，這樣也就可以將銀行呆帳轉嫁到一般市民的荷包。日本政府向來是用郵政儲蓄、國債等，捲走國民的錢財，現在又從銀行窗口推銷股票，捲走市民的資產。日本的個人資產大部分是老年人持有，他們多數缺乏金融知識；銀行員說存款沒有利息，買股票比較合算，這樣他們就上當了。

銀行和黑道怎麼發生關係？

　　銀行和黑道發生關係，都跟公共工程的建設有關。日本的關西國際機場、道路公團都是以郵政儲金的錢來建設的。以建神戶機場為例，神戶市政府在初期挖土時沒有預算，而是以借款來支付，接下來運土傾倒的卡車，以及用船運土，即由黑道「山口組」來運。讓黑道包辦基本工程都有回扣，政治人物拿回扣，連社民黨都有分。這個「政、商、黑」結構的形成，就是在沒有預算，也不必經過審查，政府以借款來建機場，這樣銀行也就和黑道和政治人物搭上關係。

　　本來日本的相互銀行和信用組合跟黑道和政治人物較有關係，其他的都市銀行、信用金庫、地方銀行，基本上都是比較撇清與黑道的關係。但是到了竹下登政權時代，一方面開始引進消費稅，另一方面又分配給全國各市町村1億日圓的「故鄉創生資金」，從此平和相互銀行開始與黑道掛勾，黑道的「山口組」開始進出自民黨主流派內部來。日本泡沫經濟的發生，起因於平和相互銀行和住友銀行的合併，這時大部分融資都流到黑道方面去，而變成不良債權。

「政、商、黑」的三角關係

　　日本銀行的呆帳，有大半的錢流到黑社會變成黑錢，這些黑錢像長了腳似的，又走進上層的政治人物、官僚以及支持他們的特定企業，這就是「政、商、黑」的結構。

　　首先，政治人物和建設業者共謀提出種種建設計畫，然後將此建設情報，暗地傳給有黑道關係的不動產業者去搶購土地。在這期間，官方開始編列預算。一旦決定如建道路之類的計畫，金錢就往來於「政商黑」的三角關係之間，所有相關人士都可以得到利潤。商人是以賺錢為本，獲利就送給政治人物回扣和選票，編預算的官員退休後，企業為其安排顧問職回報，本來潛伏於地下的黑勢力，居間活躍分得金錢也越滾越大，日本連續發生金融犯罪、貪污瀆職事件，甚令善良的市民側目。

銀行合併的巧妙設計

　　日本市場從前在原則上是沒有以時價（市場價格）發行增資的，都是由正在成長賺錢的公司增資。現在由不賺錢而差不多快要倒閉的公司以時價發行增資，根本是以增資的名目、相互持股的方法提高市場價值來牟利。譬如：銀行與銀行合併，自然增加貨幣量，公司的增資是以相互持股的方式互相引進對方的錢進來，這是稱為「信用創造」（credit creation）的一種變錢魔術；從前1股50日圓、紅利10％，現在可以發行1000日圓了。這樣貨幣增加，公司也因增資相互持股，使錢大量進入口袋，償還過去向銀行的借款。銀行失去貸款的對象，即跟黑道和不動產業勾結，給貸款炒地皮或炒股票，遂演變成泡沫經濟；而現在的企業合併，就是在掩蓋倒閉的絕招。

「總會屋」是居中操盤的黑道

　　銀行的合併，給了黑道進入金融體系的機會。日本的大公司股東大會稱為「總會」，這時就會有所謂的「總會屋」黑道居中操盤，這是日本的特殊慣習，由「總會屋」以少數股權出席股東大會鬧場，以暴力敲詐股東來決定一切。第一勸業銀行與三菱銀行合併時，也是銀行上層拜託「總會屋」（黑道）出來擺平的。在全日本擁有170家商店的大型連鎖企業「伊藤榮堂」，也曾以重金收買黑道作職業股東，來解決股東大會上的爭議。東京迪士尼樂園的土地取得，也是靠黑道「松葉會」在背後運作的結果。

　　因此，日本「政、商、黑」勾結而成的竊財集團，使得政府可用人民的稅金填補銀行的呆帳，銀行將借款銷帳而放棄債權，也就等於將黑道(暴力團)的借款消除，另一方面又很巧妙地隱藏政治人物、官僚、奸商與黑道勾結盜取人民錢財的不法行為。

中日外交情報戰導致日本駐華人員自殺？

日本『讀賣新聞』27日報導，去年5月在上海的日本總領事館任職的男性館員，因不願意透露給中國方面日本的外交機密，因而在總領事館內自殺並留下遺書。由 於是去年5月的事情，到今天才暴露出來，時間點又在日本政府公佈日本民眾反中情感上昇之後，頗令人質疑背後的政治操作與動機。

　　據報導，外務省承認有此事，並表示考量到遺族的想法，不提供詳細資訊。而政府消息人士表示，這位自殺的館員是負責通信技術的電信官，遺書中表示他的中 國友人希望他提供領事館內成員姓名，以及出入境時的飛機班次，最後表示「自己不會賣國」。顯示情報並未外流給中國的情報人員。（2005/12/27）


上海總領事館員自殺日本政府低調，保守派媒體卻消息靈通

日本媒體報導日本駐上海總領事館館員自殺事件，是因為中國情報人員脅迫他洩露外交機密導致他走上絕路上吊身亡。日本內閣官房長官安倍晉三27日承認有館員 自殺一事，並表示：「如果這起事件真如媒體報導那樣，我們必會採取適當措施，包括向當事國提出抗議在內。」中國外交部發言人秦剛對此回答說﹕「關於這個問 題，其實已經依據調查有了定論，日本媒體的一些說法是沒有根據的。」中日雙方都沒有對此事多提。

　　不過保守派媒體『讀賣新聞』與偏右的八卦媒體『週刊文春』，卻鉅細靡遺的報導，這是一名中國情報人員以他與虹橋地區的卡拉OK俱樂部女公關關係不尋常 為由來脅迫他。『週刊文春』指出，中國情報機構想要知曉日本駐上海總領事杉本信行傳回東京報告的內容，據了解，杉本信行與駐在地政壇人物及共黨幹部關係良 好，並引述消息來源是日本政府高層人士。日本政府表面低調不願多談，私底下卻把事件內容外洩得清清楚楚。

　　但奇怪的是，日媒體證實日本政府在27日晚間向中國政府就此事提出抗議。偏偏這起事件是去年5月發生的，不論是媒體、爆料的政府高層人士、與日本政 府，動作慢了何止半拍，顯示這起事件的政治操作並不高明，其動機很有可能是小泉政府為了替中日關係的低迷找到脫罪的藉口，即指稱是中國的不友善所導致的。

　　日本時事通信社28日報導外務省曾在去年5月事件發生後，向中國政府提出抗議，當時外務省未向外發表該消息，因此媒體都沒有報導此事。如果此事屬實， 更顯得日本政府昨天的抗議文是多此一舉。（2005/12/28）


諜對諜，日自殺外交人員牽扯出中方要釣魚台情報？

日本媒體近日持續延燒去年5月日本駐上海總領事館男性電信官（負責電訊傳輸，譯碼、解碼等工作）自殺的消息。繼先前說該員被大陸「公安」強索情報之後， 『讀賣新聞』今天更繪聲繪影的報導，是中方與電信官接觸的人員強迫要求有關（中國也聲稱擁有主權而現在由日本佔據的）日本政府的沖繩縣尖閣諸島（釣魚台列 嶼）對策、總領事館人員名單及出身、總領事館與外務省運送機密文件的飛機航班等。中國大陸對此事，除了日前外交部發言人回答記者提問時說，「日本媒體報導 與事實不符，沒有根據」之外，尚沒有進一部的回應。

　　然而，這件事情的處理日本政府涉外機構的表現非常“詭異”。譬如：事件發生在前前任川口順子主持外務省時代，川口任內沒出聲，經過保守右派、愛跟中國 對抗的町村外相也沒爆出來，那麼為何現在又頻頻向媒體放話、透露消息，又說前後透過外交管道向中國抗議過四次了。現在辯說是應該館員「家屬要求」及「私人 因素」沒公佈，感覺起來就像藉口。

　　說中方要「日本政府的沖繩縣尖閣諸島（釣魚台列嶼）對策」也很奇怪：日本的駐上海總領事館與外務省之間怎麼會傳送涉及這方面的資料，或者說非大使館而 是總領事館保有政府涉及政治、軍事乃至漁權的全套對策，即使有，合理的情況應該是日本駐上海總領事館蒐集中方政府與民間保釣團體活動的情報，中國反情報單 位想了解日方知道多少、管道來源等還差不多。

　　自殺館員留有書封遺書，至少有兩封是給同事、說明原委的。而官房長官安倍晉三近日的發言好像是現在才知道真相似的，這是牽涉到外交人員性命的事，依日 本人做事的性格，一定會做詳細的調查並往上呈報（03年11月底，日本兩名外交官在伊拉克的路途上遭射殺，日本官員、媒體便大批前往了解、報導），也是右 翼反中國急先鋒的安倍豈會不知？

　　日本官方對該館員到底幹了什麼見不得人的事，會那麼容易被人“要脅”，也避重就輕，說得不清不楚。況且，日本外交人員訓練嚴格、經驗傳承明確，怎麼這 麼輕易就被人逮到把柄？真是很多地方疑點重重，迄今皆是日方片面的說辭。（2005/12/29）


中國對日本在總領事館員自殺事件上大做文章表示憤

日本媒體近來針對駐上海總領事館館員在一年多前自殺的事件大做文章，日政府也藉此機會對中國表示抗議。對此，中國外交部發言人秦剛29日表示這起事件早就 有定論，中日雙方已確定是一宗自殺案，事隔一年半後日方重提此事，甚至將死者的自殺與中方官員聯繫起來，是「別有用心」。秦剛表示：「中方對日本政府刻意 詆毀中國形象，表示強烈憤慨。」

　　因日本八卦媒體『文藝春秋』與『讀賣新聞』的報導，以及其他媒體的跟進，此一消息在日本越炒越旺。日本『產經新聞』甚至指出「舊蘇聯和中國等共產圈勢 力」，經常向日本外交官打主意做間諜活動，儼然冷戰思維重現。中國政府對此已經做出兩次澄清，這次已經到了憤慨的程度，並駁斥日本媒體報導毫無根據。 （2005/12/03)

Bush's Asia Strategy

November 19, 2005; Page A6

President Bush has been forging a new coalition of the willing in Asia as he makes the rounds of Kyoto, Pusan, Beijing and Ulan Bator. For the edification of the Chinese, primarily, he has made clear that the U.S. has close friends in the region and plans to protect its interests there.

This does not presage a Cold War between the U.S. and China, but it does reflect a Bush policy of organizing U.S. allies in Asia to resist any ambitions China might have for regional hegemony. The president has had warm one-on-one meetings with the leaders of South Korea, Indonesia and Malaysia at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit in Pusan, demonstrating that the U.S. values their friendship. His side trip to Mongolia on Monday will be a pointed reminder to its big neighbors, China and Russia, that Mongolia welcomed U.S. help in establishing democratic government and merits U.S. protection.

His main diplomatic effort centered on Japan, where on Wednesday he emphasized that country's close political, economic and security ties with the U.S. and his friendship with Prime Minister Junichero Koizumi. Speaking to a business group in Kyoto, the President had pointed words for China: "We encourage China to continue down the road to reform and openness -- because the freer China is at home, the greater the welcome it will receive abroad."

That word "welcome" carries a world of meaning at a time when China's outpouring of low-cost manufactured goods is stirring protectionist complaints around the world. The President reminded Beijing that sales to the U.S. have greatly aided China's economic growth and that the U.S. supported Chinese entry into the World Trade Organization. A fraying of the trade relationship has been reflected in a deal that forced China to limit certain textile exports to the U.S.

Mr. Bush will air further trade grievances this weekend in his meeting with Chinese President Hu Jintao in Beijing. Some are legitimate, for example the failure of China to police the theft of intellectual property and local authorities' nasty habit of resolving commercial disputes with foreigners by clapping them in jail, as they did last year with Los Angeles businessman David Ji. Other U.S. complaints are spurious, especially the U.S. claim that China is unfairly tilting the trade balance by keeping the dollar value of the yuan artificially low.

It is true that the yuan peg to the dollar over the last decade greatly aided China's development. It's true as well that the modification China made last summer, repegging to a "basket" of currencies, made the yuan only a tad more expensive in the conduct of trade. But if a reliable currency has drawn direct investment into China by the Japanese, Americans, Taiwanese and Europeans, what is wrong with that? The world economy works best when rich countries are spending to build up the productive capacity of poor ones. It has raised millions of Chinese out of poverty.

China, however, would get fewer complaints about its huge trade surpluses if it displayed a firm intention of making the yuan fully convertible. Then the Chinese people could play a greater role in the recycling of dollars back into the market and China would fall naturally onto the path of more balanced economic development. Currently, the central bank parks many of the dollars China earns into U.S. Treasury securities, which does little for the Chinese people and not incidentally helps finance the free spending ways of the U.S. Congress.

China is hesitant because making the yuan convertible would constitute a large grant of economic freedom to the Chinese people, something the Chinese Communist Party is reluctant to do. If the Chinese could buy dollars freely with yuan, who knows what ideas they might get into their heads? Beijing worries as well about how this might inflict more competition on Chinese banks, damaging their continuing ability to serve the ends of the party and government.

Mr. Bush was of course talking about more than economic freedom in Kyoto. He was suggesting that the democratic world will retain its suspicions of China until the party loosens its tight grip on the behavior of the Chinese people: "As the people of China grow in prosperity, their demands for political freedom will grow as well. . . . By meeting the legitimate demands of its citizens for freedom and openness, China's leaders can help their country grow into a modern, prosperous and confident nation."

In short, Mr. Bush on this swing through Asia has been sending the message that the U.S. wishes China well but that Beijing will not earn trust from the world until it takes steps to grant its people their rights of free expression and the protection of law. It was a reminder that, while China is pressing its claim to great power status, it won't be accepted by the world's democracies until it makes democratic reforms. Mr. Bush clearly wanted to emphasize that Asia has strong democracies that are more inclined to side with the U.S. than China in any face-off.

Iraq War Debate Eclipses All Other Issues

GOP Flounders as Bush's Popularity Falls; Democrats Struggle for a Voice

By Jonathan Weisman and Charles Babington
Washington Post Staff Writers
Sunday, November 20, 2005; A01

After largely avoiding the subject since the 2003 invasion of Iraq, lawmakers are suddenly confronting the issue of President Bush's handling of the war. The start hasn't been pretty.

Political stunts by both parties have created an air of acrimony that is infecting the parties' entire agendas. The bitterness reached a new high -- or low -- on Friday when House Republicans forced a late-night vote on a resolution for immediate withdrawal of U.S. forces.

The resolution failed, 403 to 3, but only after members nearly came to blows when a GOP newcomer suggested a veteran Democratic military hawk was a coward.

"Iraq is now a cloud over everything," said Stuart Rothenberg, a nonpartisan political analyst specializing in Congress. "It's the 800-pound gorilla in the room."

"I feel like every morning, I wake up, get a concrete block and have to walk around with it all day," said first-term Sen. Jim DeMint (R-S.C.), who came to the Senate with an ambitious agenda to overhaul Social Security and the tax code. "We can't even address the issues."

After simmering on Congress's back burner for months, the Iraq war debate has eclipsed every other issue in the capital, slowing progress on some matters while stopping it on others. The GOP-led House and Senate are struggling to pass major tax legislation, an extension of the USA Patriot Act and a broad budget-cutting bill. Bush's top 2005 domestic agenda item -- revamping Social Security -- has sunk from sight, and more recently his bipartisan panel on tax reform barely made a ripple when it issued recommendations.

GOP leaders view items such as the Patriot Act and the budget as too vital to fail in the end, but every endeavor is now made more difficult by the fracturing over Iraq -- and just when the 2006 congressional elections begin to loom. Republicans have lost their anchor of the past five years -- Bush's popularity -- while Democrats are struggling to find their voice on the war. Both sides cannot dally for long, said Peter D. Hart, a Democratic pollster.

"Iraq is now the dominant issue that is affecting voters, and it's affecting Bush's ratings," Hart said. "The public has reached a firm, fixed position on Iraq, and it's not going to change: This is not going to come to a successful conclusion, so how do we figure out how to get out of Iraq?"

Until recently, only Democrats seemed to struggle to find their voice on Iraq, while Republicans were virtually united in backing Bush's policies. But when the 2,000th U.S. military death there coincided with troubling revelations about prewar intelligence and Bush's plunging approval ratings, Republican cohesion began to fray.

Political developments in Iraq, such as the adoption of a new constitution, cannot overcome the impression left by the daily reports of suicide bombers and the milestone of 2,000 deaths among U.S. servicemen, pollsters and political analysts say.

Public opinion has, in turn, emboldened Democrats to sharpen their attacks, and it has freed some Republicans -- especially Northeastern moderates -- to chart a new political course that separates them from the White House but wreaks havoc with the GOP's legislative agenda.

"The central new development is the decomposition of the president's support in Congress," said Ross K. Baker, a Rutgers University congressional expert. "I think there is a very acute realization on the part of Republicans that they no longer can hitch their careers to his popularity. That, combined with the new aggressiveness by the Democrats, means you're seeing basically a Bush agenda that is largely being derailed."

Politicians tried to calm the waters roiled by Friday's House maneuvering. GOP leaders had seized upon an impassioned call Thursday by Rep. John P. Murtha (D-Pa.) for the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Iraq, hoping to put Democrats on the spot by rushing a resolution to the floor calling on the administration to bring the troops home now. The ensuing bitter debate brought out calls for calm even before it was over.

"Today's debate in the House of Representatives shows the need for bipartisanship on the war in Iraq, instead of more political posturing," Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman John W. Warner (R-Va.), said in a statement Friday night hailing the bipartisan Senate vote earlier in the week that called on the administration to share more information on the war's progress and to make 2006 a year of significant transition away from U.S. military action.

Rep. Mike Pence (R-Ind.) said yesterday that the result of the debate was positive, an unambiguous, bipartisan show of resolve for the war effort. Only three Democrats, Reps. Jose E. Serrano (N.Y.), Cynthia McKinney (Ga.) and Robert Wexler (Fla.), voted for the withdrawal resolution. But Pence too noted the acrimony of the discourse. "We cannot do democracy without a heavy dose of civility," he said.

The acrimony, and the all-encompassing nature of the war debate, are having a broad impact. Bush's recent globe-trotting, in Latin America and Asia, has produced more stories on dissent over Iraq than on free trade, economic cooperation and China's move toward democracy.

When Bush's bipartisan panel on tax reform issued its recent recommendations to simplify the tax code, proposals to eliminate deductions for home mortgage interest and state and local taxes might have been expected to create an uproar. Instead, the panel's report barely made a peep.

The president's plan to trim promised Social Security benefits and add private investment accounts disappeared. When Senate Finance Committee Chairman Charles E. Grassley (R-Iowa) said any reform plan is dead until 2009, the comments were hardly noted.

Other high-profile legislative priorities have been slowed by a lack of attention from the preoccupied leadership. Congressional aides released details last week from a compromise reached over the extension of the Patriot Act, the controversial anti-terrorism law passed weeks after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. But the deal was not acted on quickly, and in ensuing days, provisions of the compromise attracted enough negative attention that a planned vote on the measure was delayed until at least next month.

House Republicans took weeks to garner enough votes to pass a five-year, $50 billion budget-cutting measure full of high-priority policy changes Bush has requested for welfare, Medicaid, agriculture supports and other entitlement programs. The Iraq-induced plunge in Bush's popularity emboldened moderates to oppose the most conservative parts of the bill.

On Friday, after the measure passed by two votes, Republican leaders hoped to highlight the victory at a "get out of town" rally. But they swamped their message by hastily putting the Iraq pullout resolution to a vote. That move also precluded an expected vote on a five-year, $56 billion measure to extend some of Bush's most prized, first-term tax cuts.

Rothenberg says such confusion does not bode well for the political fortunes of the beleaguered GOP. "The public doesn't like mess," he said. "When they realize things are messy, they get frustrated, and they arrive at the general conclusion that you blame the people you figure are in charge."

Transcript: President Bush Holds Press Conference With Prime Minister Koizumi

Wednesday, November 16, 2005; 8:14 AM

PRESS CONFERENCE HELD IN KYOTO, JAPAN. AS RELEASED BY THE WHITE HOUSE

NOVEMBER 15, 2005

SPEAKERS: GEORGE W. BUSH, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

JUNICHIRO KOIZUMI, PRIME MINISTER OF JAPAN

[*]

KOIZUMI (THROUGH TRANSLATOR): First I would like to express our sincere welcome to the visit of the President and Mrs. Bush. We are very happy to have excellent weather today, and I'm very happy that President and Mrs. Bush enjoyed the beauty of this ancient city of Kyoto.

Before this meeting, the President and myself had the pleasure of taking a pleasant walk through Golden Pavilion Temple. This is a wonderful environment where we can confirm the importance of our bilateral relations. We have been able to have the candid exchange of views between the two -- bilateral issues, particularly the importance of our relations in the global context. In other words, from the viewpoint of the European alliance and the world. That is the overriding context of our talk today.

We emphasized and confirmed the importance of closer consultation between the two. The United States remains the most indispensable ally to Japan. And if -- the better our bilateral relations, the easier it would be for us to establish better relations with China and other neighboring countries, and the countries in the world.

There is no such thing as U.S.-Japan relationship too close. Some people maintain that maybe we would pay more attention to other issues, probably it would be better to strengthen the relationship with other countries. I do not side with such views. The U.S.-Japan relationship, the closer, more intimate it is, it is easier for us to behave and establish better relations with China, with South Korea and other nations in Asia. This is my firm conviction on the basis of my thinking. Based upon our past, the importance of our bilateral relationships will not change. That is the basic understanding with which I had a talk with the President, and in which we will seek the future direction in establishing and seeking the prosperity and stability of all our nations.

At the same time, when you look at the issue such as the United Nations reform, the importance of our bilateral relationship looms even larger. We should recognize that. And we have been able to have a candid exchange. The United States expressed strong support to us becoming permanent member of the Security Council, and would like to deepen our cooperation on that issue.

On the issue of terrorism, this is going to be a long-lasting, difficult path we have to follow, and in close cooperation with the international community so that each nation will have a peaceful and stable atmosphere. In Iraq, as well as in Afghanistan, the people themselves should work harder to establish themselves as a nation. And we are pledged to provide our utmost assistance for that goal.

Further, concerning the issue of realignment and transformation of the U.S. forces in Japan and the reduction of burden on the local community, and the beef issue, BSE issue, and other future-oriented issues, such as bird influenza, that is an issue which requires closer collaboration between the two. But fundamentally, the importance of our bilateral relations should be recognized. If we do that, and then I hope that we would be able to continue to act as an ally, as a partner, on its own, autonomous and independent, in fulfilling the responsibility in the international community.

We were able to have very candid exchange of views, and hope that we would like to continue to have similar relationship of trust so that we can perform our obligations and duties, jointly, collaboratively, with the United States, for the benefit of the international community. That is all.

BUSH: Prime Minister, thank you very much for your warm hospitality. Laura and I are so honored to be here in Kyoto, as well as in this beautiful Guest House.

It's no secret in my country that you and I have got a good relationship. I value you as a close friend. I appreciate our candid discussions, just like we had today. Relationships -- or the relationship between the United States and Japan is a vital relationship, and it's a very strong relationship. And a strong relationship enables us to work together to help keep the peace.

I admire the Prime Minister's political courage. I haven't had a chance to publicly congratulate him on winning his election. But he did so, and he did so in a way that confirms the great strength of democracy. He said, I'm going to take my message to the people, and we'll let the people make the decision as to whether or not there ought to be reforms here in Japan. And as a result of your courageous decision, Mr. Prime Minister, you prevailed. And I want to congratulate you for that.

We've got a good friend in Japan when it comes to spreading democracy and freedom. I appreciate the contributions of the Japanese people in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Today, I was able to tell the Prime Minister about important progress that is being made in the Middle East. The international crossing at Rafah will be opened up for the first time, in a while and should be open by the 25th of November. Other crossings will be opened up, as well. The seaport construction will begin. Travel between Gaza and the West Bank will take place. My point is, is that the freedom movement, the democracy movement, has got a very good chance of taking hold in the Middle East, in the Holy Land. And as it does, it is more likely that we'll be able to achieve the peace that we all want.

I also, in international affairs, made it very clear to us -- the United States made it very clear to the Prime Minister that our position has not changed on a permanent seat for Japan in the United Nations Security Council. I hope I'm viewed as the kind of fellow, when I say something, I mean it. I have said that consistently, and I still mean that, Mr. Prime Minister.

We talked about North Korea, and I appreciate the Prime Minister's understanding and willingness to join with five other nations in making it clear to the leader of North Korea that in order for that nation to be accepted in the international community, that it must verifiably dismantle all nuclear weapons programs. And I want to thank you for your strong stand on that, Mr. Prime Minister. We also join you in our concern about the abductee issue in North Korea.

We talked about trade. We both agree that the Doha Round must proceed. We both recognize that we've got work to do. The United States has made a very strong offer about agricultural subsidies. And again, I appreciate your understanding of this very important issue, Mr. Prime Minister.

We also talked about beef. And the Prime Minister and his government has taken a study on the issue, and has confirmed that U.S. beef would be safe. And I appreciate the fact that we're progressing on this issue.

We also talked about the need to continue to coordinate our aid, our development aid, and we've got a mechanism to do just that. Japan has been incredibly generous with taxpayers' money, the taxpayers' dollars to help those who suffer. And so has the United States. And I -- the better we coordinate, the more likely it is we'll be able to work together to solve the problems we all want.

I appreciate you bringing up avian flu. One of the important topics that we'll be discussing in South Korea is the need for us to work together to detect and share information on avian flu, a potential outbreak of avian flu. And so this is an issue of international concern, and the closer we all work together on this issue, the more likely it is we'll be able to do our job of protecting our fellow citizens against a potential pandemic.

Finally, I do want to congratulate the Prime Minister on his reforms. We're an active trading partner, bilateral trading partner with Japan, and it makes it easier to trade when the Japanese economy is growing. And we were reminiscing about my first trip to Tokyo. The newly elected President and the Prime Minister and I talked about the need to make sure our respective economies grew, and he talked about the idea of reforming the economy in order to create growth. And sure enough, it worked. The economic GDP grew at 4.5 percent annual rate in the first half of 2005. And I congratulate you on that, Mr. Prime Minister. That's good news. It's good news for the Japanese people; it's also good news for your trading partners. It's hard to trade with somebody who's broke. It's easier to trade with somebody whose economy is growing.

And so, Mr. Prime Minister, congratulations on your strong leadership. Thank you, very much, for your friendship. I look forward to continuing to work with you throughout my presidency and your term as the Prime Minister.

KOIZUMI: We'd like to move on to the Q&A session. First of all, from the Japanese side, please. Any questions?

QUESTION: I have a question to both of you, Prime Minister Koizumi and President Bush. First of all, transformation. In your consultations, specifically, what kind of views were exchanged? Especially with the interim report after the two-plus-two, there's already objection being raised by the local communities in Okinawa. Prime Minister, how will you be responding as they proceed to the final report? And, President Bush, what are your expectations towards Japan?

KOIZUMI: Now, with regards to the transformation of U.S. forces in Japan, the question just raised, the Foreign Minister, the head of the National Defense Agency, as well as the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense of the United States, have been repeating various detailed discussions. And the interim report was just announced very recently. And Okinawa, where the bases are located, as well as various local communities, are objecting and rebutting.

Thinking back, if you're asked, are you for or against having a base, naturally, one would respond, I am against. I think that's the gut feeling of the Japanese people. However, when we think about peace and security and safety, that is the context in which Japan can achieve economic growth. And in order to be able to benefit from safety and peace, we have to pay a certain cost. And that is what security is all about.

So that in mind, with regards to the local communities that are against the idea, we've been trying to persuade them with regards to the position we are placed in. And they are, in fact, enjoying the security being offered through the U.S.-Japan alliance, and, therefore, we hope that the local communities will rethink that very hard, and take up the issue of transformation very seriously in that context.

The government of Japan will have to make great efforts towards the resolution of this issue. Now, this is an issue that may require some time, but we are hoping that the proposal set forth can be realized, and, therefore, we will remain united as a government and make that the method.

BUSH: My attitude on the issue is that our government negotiated in good faith with the Japanese government, and that Japan being a democracy as it is, will work out the issues according to the leadership of the Prime Minister and the will of the people.

QUESTION: Thank you, sir. Sir, as you probably know, the Senate rejected earlier today measures that would have required a timetable for withdrawal in Iraq, but a Republican resolution was overwhelmingly passed that called for more information from your information to clarify and recommend changes to U.S. policy in Iraq. So is that evidence that your party is increasingly splitting with you, sir, on Iraq? And is it an open challenge to you -- is that open challenge to you embarrassing while you're traveling abroad?

BUSH: I, first of all, appreciated the fact that the Senate, in a bipartisan fashion, rejected an amendment that would have taken our troops out of Iraq before the mission was complete. To me that was a positive step by the United States Senate.

Secondly, the Senate did ask that we report on progress being made in Iraq, which we're more than willing to do. That's to be expected. That's what the Congress expects. They expect us to keep them abreast of a plan that is going to work. It's a plan that we have made very clear to the Senate and the House, and that is the plan that we will train Iraqis, Iraqi troops to be able to take the fight to the enemy. And as I have consistently said, as the Iraqis stand up, we will stand down.

I view this as a -- as an amendment consistent with our strategy, and look forward to continue to work with the Congress. It is important that we succeed in Iraq. A democracy in Iraq will bring peace for generations to come. And we're going to. The Iraqi people want us to succeed. The only reason we won't succeed is if we lose our nerve, and the terrorists are able to drive us out of Iraq by killing innocent lives. But I view this as positive developments on the Hill.

QUESTION: Concerning the dispatch of self-defense forces to Iraq, the 14th of next month is the time limit of the stationing. What kind of explanation did you make to the President about that? And how did President Bush evaluate that-- appreciate Japan's position on this? And what do you expect Japan to do further in Iraq on this issue?

KOIZUMI: Concerning Japan's assistance toward Iraq, including the activities of the self-defense forces, we will want to see that the Iraqi people, themselves, bring democratic and stable nation by the power of the Iraqis, themselves. And they are making efforts toward that goal. Certainly there are political difficulties, but they are making progress.

So, against that background, as a responsible member of the international community, Japan should seriously consider what we could do to help the situation there. That has been our position, and there is no change in our basic stance.

What kind of assistance we are going to make in December? First, toward the reconstruction of Iraq, what we can do -- that, first, we have to think about, and then multilateral forces and other nations are involved in helping reconstruct Iraq. As a member of the international community, we have to join them. And further, on the basis of the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance, we have to take all those things in a comprehensive manner, so that we seriously think what we could do to help the Iraq situation, and we make judgment on that basis.

BUSH: Obviously, the extent to which the Japanese government wants to give reconstruction money to Iraq is up to the Japanese government. And as to the deployment of troops, that's up to the government. That's what happens in democracies -- governments make decisions that they're capable of living with. And that's -- that's what we said, said, do the best you can do; make up your own mind, it's your decision, not mine.

QUESTION: Mr. President, can you elaborate on your advice to China as to how much you want them to emulate Taiwan? Specifically, do you want the People's Republic to copy the governmental structure of Taiwan?

BUSH: I'm going to be giving a speech on this subject here pretty soon. I hope you pay attention to it, George. My message to the region is, is that the region is better off as democracies spread. If you really think about this part of the world at the beginning of World War II, there was two democracies in the entire Pacific region -- Australia and New Zealand. And today there's a variety of democracies, and this is a peaceful part of the world.

I believe that societies are -- become stable and whole societies as they give people more say in the government. And so my message is universal, not necessarily trying to compare one system to another. In other words, you asked me about, should I say to China, you've got to emulate Taiwan. What I say to the Chinese, as well as others, is that a free society is in your interests. To allow people to worship freely, for example, in your society is part of a stable, mature society, and that leadership should not fear freedoms within their society.

As to the Taiwan-China issue, my message has been consistently clear, and that is, is that we support the one China policy, three communiques, and the Taiwan Relations Act, and neither side should unilaterally change the status quo. I will repeat that today; I will repeat it in China, as well, and the reason why it's important for this issue to be solved peacefully, for both sides to reconcile their differences through dialogue. And I'll continue to encourage dialogue on the topic.

KOIZUMI: This concludes this meeting. Thank you.

END .ETX

Survey Shows a Revival of Isolationism in U.S.

By MEG BORTIN

Shaken by the Iraq war and the rise of anti-American sentiment around the world, Americans are turning inward, according to a Pew survey of United States opinion leaders and the general public.

The survey, conducted this fall and released today, found a revival of isolationist feelings among the public similar to the sentiment that followed the Vietnam War in the 1970's and the end of the Cold War in the 1990's.

But at the same time, the survey showed, Americans are feeling less unilateralist than in the past, appearing to indicate a desire for a more modest foreign policy.

Forty-two percent of Americans think that the United States should "mind its own business internationally and let other countries get along the best they can on their own," according to the survey, which was conducted by the Pew Research Center in association with the Council on Foreign Relations.

That is an increase of 12 percentage points since a poll taken in December 2002, before the American-led invasion of Iraq; at that time only 30 percent of Americans said the country should mind its own business internationally.

The result appeared to represent a rejection by the public of President Bush's goal of promoting democracy in other nations, a major plank of his administration's foreign policy.

"We're seeing a backlash against a bumbled foreign policy," said Stephen Van Evera, a political science professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He said Americans were concerned over the failure to make progress on North Korea and Iran, or in the fight against Al Qaeda, but he added, "The American people in particular are looking at Iraq and seeing nothing's working."

The war in Iraq "has had a profound impact on the way opinion leaders, as well as the public, view America's global role, looming international threats, and the Bush administration's stewardship of the nation's foreign policy," Pew said in its analysis of the poll.

The survey also found the following:

? Nearly three-quarters of Americans say the United States should play a shared leadership role, and only 25 percent want the country to be the most active of leading nations.

? Two-thirds of Americans say that there is less international respect for the United States than in the past. When asked why, strong majorities - 71 percent of the public, 88 percent of opinion leaders --cite the war in Iraq.

? Foreign affairs and security experts most often name India as a country likely to become a more important ally of the United States, while opinion leaders generally say France will decline in importance as an American partner. In the survey, Pew questioned 2,006 American adults from the general public and 520 influential Americans in the fields of news media, foreign affairs, security, state and local government, universities and research organizations, religious organizations, science and engineering, and the military.

Conducted from Sept. 5 to Oct. 31, the survey "reflects the major changes in the world that have occurred" since the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks in 2001, Pew said. The margin of error for most questions was plus or minus 2.5 percent.

Asked how Pew chose the opinion leaders, Andrew Kohut, the director of the center, said, "We used the best listings that we could of people in this influential group."

He said the opinion leaders came from rosters of organizations like the Council of Foreign Relations, the International Institute of Strategic Studies, and the National Academy of Sciences, as well as a list of governors and of mayors of American cities with a population of 80,000 or more.

In its analysis of the results, Pew said the Iraq war and continuing terrorism had "dramatically affected the way opinion leaders and the public look at potential threats from other countries."

While China was seen four years ago as representing the greatest threat to the United States, opinion leaders and the public now cite Iraq and North Korea as well as China, Pew said.

Regarding prospects for Iraq, a majority of opinion leaders believe that the United States will fail to establish a stable democracy, while the general public was more optimistic, with 56 percent expecting success.

Gloom was so deep, in fact, among the opinion leaders that at least 40 percent in each category predict that Iraq will split into three countries, representing Shiites, Sunnis and Kurds, Pew said.

On relations with Europe, the American public and opinion leaders agree that a strong partnership should be maintained, the survey found. At least 60 percent of each group of opinion leaders said a stronger European Union was good for the United States. In addition to France, however, some of the influential thinkers pointed to Germany - which also opposed the Iraq war - as becoming a less important ally.

The public lined up with opinion leaders in disapproving of the way President Bush is handling his job. Fifty-two percent of the public expressed disapproval; the figure soared to 87 percent among scientists and engineers.

Moreover, the poll found, "Pluralities in every group of influentials - as well as the public - attribute the fact that there has not been a terrorist attack in the U.S. to luck." Just a third of the respondents from the general public say it is "because the government has done a good job protecting the country."

Regarding the use of torture against terrorist suspects, the overwhelming majority of opinion leaders believe it can rarely if ever be justified. Among the public, however, 46 percent say it is often or sometimes justified.

Full poll results and analysis are available at www.people-press.org.

Brian Knowlton of The International Herald Tribune contributed reporting for this article.

China's Optimism Prosperity Brings Satisfaction - and Hope

About the Survey
Questionnaire

Summary of Findings

Since Deng Xiaoping first embraced economic reform in the late 1970s, China's leaders have coupled continued strict political control with widespread free market reforms that have transformed the Chinese economy and created unprecedented growth. Despite their limited political freedoms, the Chinese people, surveyed in six major cities and surrounding rural areas, are optimistic about the future and confident that the growing opportunities they have experienced in recent years will continue to expand.

China's upbeat outlook is all the more striking when compared with the prevailing mood in Russia, the other of America's two principal former communist adversaries. While the Chinese--along with the citizens of India, another Asian giant with a vigorously expanding economy--look to the next five years with a strong sense of optimism, Russians are far less hopeful about their personal lives, and unhappy with the country's direction.

Climbing the "Ladder of Life"

A May 2005 poll of Chinese citizens, conducted as part of a 17-country Pew Global Attitudes survey, reveals that while most are still not fully satisfied with their personal advancement, they are cognizant of having made substantial progress in recent years.

When asked to place themselves on a "ladder of life," where 0 represents the worst possible life and 10 the best possible life, the majority of Chinese surveyed still say they are on the middle steps of the ladder. Only 29% now place themselves in the "high" (7-10) category, somewhat fewer than the 34% of Indians who do so and well behind the nearly six-in-ten Americans who position themselves on the ladder's top rungs.

But the number of "high" self-raters in China has increased from 23% three years earlier, and only 13% of Chinese now say their lives merit a low (0-3) score. (By contrast, only 16% of Russians place themselves in the high category, while 31% say their current lives merit a low score.)

Even more striking is the Chinese sense of personal advancement. China has the largest percentage of people (50%) who believe they have made progress in their lives over the last five years, up from 42% who said so in 2002.

In this regard, the Chinese outpace even Americans, among whom 47% report personal progress, and far outpace Russians, only 38% of whom feel they have gained ground in recent years.

Still, it is noteworthy that a substantial number of Chinese (31%) believe they have actually lost ground, fully as many as in Russia and more than in India or the United States--a reminder that China's economic growth has not touched everyone.

Surging Optimism

China's outlook toward the future is even rosier. Nearly seven-in-ten (69%) Chinese expect that five years from now they will stand on the top rungs of the ladder of life, an increase of 14 points since 2002. In this respect the Chinese rival Americans whose predominantly sanguine outlook is among their most distinguishing traits. Moreover, merely 4% of Chinese expect to be left behind on the lowest rungs, fewer even than the 7% of Americans who fear this outcome. By contrast, Russians are highly negative in their expectations. Just one-third (34%) of Russians believe they will be in the high category five years from now.

On the other hand, India is even more hopeful than China. Among Indians, fully 75% believe their lives will rate a 7-10 score in five years, up a remarkable 33 points since Pew's 2002 survey. This is in sharp contrast to India's neighbor and rival, Pakistan. Three years ago, Pakistanis were slightly more optimistic than Indians; today, Indians are more than twice as likely as their Pakistani neighbors to predict their lives will merit a 7-10 rating five years hence.

Indeed, China emerges as the world leader in hope for the future on a composite index of optimism. The index--calculated by subtracting a respondent's current position on the ladder of life from his/her expected position five years from now--reveals that more than three-in-four (76%) Chinese expect their personal position to improve over the next five years.

While that proportion is not significantly different from the 75% of Indians who share that view, it is far higher than the optimism registered in America. Slightly fewer than half of Americans (48%) expect to enjoy personal progress, the same number as in Turkey, and scarcely more than the 45% in gloomy Russia--of course, on average, Americans start at a far higher level of satisfaction.

Who's Happiest?

Perhaps not surprisingly, life satisfaction is associated with socioeconomic status. The well-educated and those with higher incomes--precisely the groups best equipped to confront the social and economic upheaval of globalization--tend to rate their lives more positively. China is no exception.

As in the six other countries surveyed on this point, optimism about the future in China is also higher among the wealthier and better-educated. Among those currently in the top income category, 77% predict that they will be on the top rungs of the life ladder five year hence, compared with a still high 61% in the lowest income group. Similarly, 78% of those with the highest levels of education predict a rosy future for themselves.

Also, as in the other countries where these questions were asked, high expectations about personal progress are more common among young people. (Even in downbeat Russia, 59% of 18-29 year-olds believe they will be in the high category five years from now).

In the category of youthful optimism, however, the U.S. still outranks China, with 87% of Americans under age 30 confident that they will have climbed far up life's ladder of possibility come 2010. Only in the over-50 age category do the Chinese exceed Americans' personal expectations for the next five years.

Feeling Good About Their Country Too

The personally upbeat attitude and self-confidence reported by the Chinese people is further reflected in the numbers who feel that their country is well-liked in the world. Nearly 7-in-10 Chinese (68%) say that other countries think positively about China--a far cry from the mere 26% of Americans who think the U.S. is generally liked in the world. Meanwhile, only 42% of the Chinese have a favorable view of the United States, far fewer than the 71% of Indians who view the U.S. favorably. However, more than half of Chinese (53%) do say that America takes the interests of countries like China into account in its foreign policy decisions.

Most strikingly, China heads the list of countries that are, on balance, satisfied with the way things are going at home. More than seven-in-ten Chinese citizens (72%) express satisfaction with their national condition, while fewer than one-in-five (19%) are dissatisfied. These figures represent a sharp improvement from 2002, when only 48% said they were satisfied with their country while 33% were not. On this score, China far outstrips India, where only 41% say they are content with national conditions. And in China, the level of satisfaction is more than three times higher than in Russia, where only 23% are pleased with their country's direction.

In short, China's citizens, unlike those in Russia but much like those in India, are clearly upbeat about the growing opportunities in their rapidly modernizing society. Business Week recently noted that China's economy has expanded by 9.5% a year over the last two decades. The Chinese appear confident that these gains will continue and that they will feel the effects of continued growth in their own lives.

Beijing'sArms and Oil Interests in Africa

By Ian Taylor

If current trends continue, China will become a major player in Africa and one that may both challenge traditional Western interests and offer an alternative reading of democracy and human rights that may not benefit the average African. Growing Chinese activity on the continent thus merits particular attention by the United States and other Western countries.

Certainly, Africa’s economic involvement in Africa is rapidly increasing. Since 2000 more than 40 agreements have been signed between Beijing and African countries, and trade has doubled to more than $20 billion between 2000 and the end of 2004. In fact, according to testimony given before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission in July 2005, by the end of 2005 China is widely expected to emerge as Africa’s third most important trading partner after the United States and France and ahead of the United Kingdom.

This is a remarkable development given the pace and timeframe within which this has occurred.
Beijing’s economic interest in Africa is based on three factors. First, Beijing asserts that the macroeconomic situation in Africa is taking a favorable turn. This analysis is based on the belief that African countries have adopted a set of active measures to push forward the pace of privatization, open to international trade, and reform their economies. China believes this affords great opportunities to Chinese companies.

Second, Chinese manufacturers and shopkeepers believe that the types of goods they produce and sell have immense potential in Africa. They believe that the economy in Africa is not yet as developed as in Western nations and consumers are perceived to be more receptive to the type of inexpensive products that China typically produces. Third, the Chinese government and business look to secure access to Africa’s abundant natural resources, particularly crude oil, nonferrous metals, and fisheries.

Indeed, China’s rapidly developing oil requirements have helped propel Sino-African trade in recent years. In 1993, China became a net importer of oil and China is projected to rely on imports for 45 percent of its oil use by 2010 (Energy Information Administration, U.S. Department of Energy).

As a result, China has been faithfully developing linkages with oil-rich countries in Africa such as Angola, Nigeria and Sudan. Since around 1995 China has begun an “outwardlooking oil economy” policy. This is for primarily economic reasons, as the average production cost of Chinese onshore oil is very expensive compared to African or Middle Eastern oil. As a result, Chinese oil companies now have a presence in places as diverse as Canada, Peru, and Sudan. One way by which this policy has been cemented is to use what China refers to as “special relationships.” Arms sales are one part of this policy and also help offset costs. China’s economic interests in Africa have been manifest through increased joint ventures, Chinese investment, and economic interaction. An emphasis on trade and economic affairs now dominates Sino-African relations and China’s trade with Africa is growing speedily. Traditionally, Sino- African trade has been vastly unbalanced in China’s favor, and although African exports have recently risen (due almost entirely to oil imports from Africa), the trade balance is still
firmly dominated by China. Low-quality cheap household products flood African markets, discouraging indigenous African manufacturing.

This somewhat negative aspect of the relationship is arguably worsened by China’s sale of arms to the continent. China is currently the world’s fifth-largest arms supplier, and the Chinese government hopes to turn the country’s arms industry into a top global player by 2020. This has not only taken on the guise of providing military supplies and weaponry to the continent, but has also involved an active participation in actual conflicts. Remarkably, such involvement has passed with relatively little international attention.

The classic example of Beijing’s weapons exporting policy in Africa is China’s involvement in Sudan’s long-running civil war, which has claimed nearly two million lives so far. China has pursued a policy that is entirely based on narrow economic interests and has been keen to supply the Sudanese government with fighter aircraft and an assortment of weaponry. Apart from the profits accrued from these arms sales, the policy helps consolidate and protect Chinese investment in Sudan’s oil reserves. Reliable reports from Aviation Week & Space Technology say that Sudan has obtained 34 new fighter jets from China, and that the Sudan air force is equipped with $100 million worth of Shenyang fighter planes, including a dozen supersonic F-7 jets [1].

The motivation for such supplies is simple. The state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) owns the largest share (i.e. 40 percent) in Sudan’s largest oil venture. The Sino-Sudanese oilfield project covers 50,000 square miles in the southern non-Muslim region of the country and is expected to produce 15 million tons of crude oil annually.

With proven reserves of 220 million tons, the project is among the largest China has undertaken overseas. At the same time, Sudanese government forces, armed with Chinese weapons, have used Chinese facilities as a base from which to attack and dislodge southerners in the vicinity of the new oil fields.

According to Lam Akol, former Transportation Minister (a southerner who temporarily served in the government during a period of reconciliation), helicopter gunships deployed in attacks on civilians are Chinese-made and are based at airstrips controlled by Chinese oil companies. Such
a statement confirms findings from the charity World Vision who spoke to survivors of such attacks, as well as government military deserters (The Washington Post, December 23, 2004). A Christian Aid report in 2001 noted that CNPC's oil roads and airstrips were used to conduct bombing raids on southern Sudanese villages and hospitals. The charity accused the Chinese, through their activities in Sudan, of being complicit in scorched earth policies. China, for its part, has deployed its “alternative” reading of human rights to block United Nations action against Sudan and has consistently opposed any intervention by the United Nations with regard to Khartoum’s affairs.

China has also provided military training in Equatorial Guinea and Chinese specialists in heavy military equipment have been sent to the country, presumably in order to sell such weapons to Equatorial Guinea in exchange for oil. Equatorial Guinea appears the perfect customer: climbing oil prices have granted the country extra finances and, possibly concerned to defend their oil wells from Nigeria and Cameroon, Malabo has turned to China for military weapons and training.

China provides weapons to other parts of Africa, often during times of conflict. According to the Congressional Research Service, Chinese exports to Africa made up 10 percent of total conventional arms transfers to Africa between 1996 and 2003. While Ethiopia and Eritrea were edging toward war, Chinese corporations transferred a substantial share of US$1 billion in weapons dispatched to both countries between 1998 and 2000.

In 1995 a Chinese ship carrying 152 tons of ammunition and light weapons was refused permission to unload in Tanzania as the cargo was destined for the Tutsi-dominated army of
Burundi (Agence France-Presse, May 3, 1995). And at least thirteen covert shipments of weapons by China were delivered to Dar-es-Salaam, with the final destinations mislabeled and
the weapons disguised as agricultural equipment. These were almost certainly destined for the war-torn Great Lakes region (Overseas Development Institute, May 1998).

More recently, Robert Mugabe’s government in Zimbabwe ordered 12 FC1 fighter jets from China as well as 100 military vehicles in late 2004, China’s most advanced military aircraft
order from an African nation that was worth $200 million.

According to the Commissioner of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, this move enraged South Africa, with many political analysts fearing that such transfers
could spark an arms race in southern Africa (testimony given before House of Representatives Committee on International Relations, July 28, 2005). Previously, it was widely reported
that Chinese small arms were exchanged for eight tons of Zimbabwean elephant ivory in May 2000.

Turning to politics, a key aspect of China’s policies toward the continent that attracts certain African leaders’ support is its stance on “non-interference in domestic affairs.” Beijing consistently casts talk of democracy and human rights as a tool of neo-imperialism and demands that internal matters remain outside the concern of external actors. Central to this is the assertion by China that all countries have the right to choose their own definition of human rights. Beijing has gone so far as to state that good governance conditionalities, which include discussion of democracy and human rights, constitute a violation of the human rights of the receiving country. It is axiomatic that such a stance grants the rulers of each country the right to define their own version of “human rights” and also, how such rights should be protected (or
not, as the case may be). China rarely attaches any political strings to its assistance to Africa. This has opened up space for China to deal quite profitably with some of the more heinous regimes on the continent. It is no coincidence, for example, that Sudan and Zimbabwe now play host to a very large Chinese economic presence. In short, by advancing the theme of non-interference in domestic affairs and promoting a culturally relativist notion of human rights, China has been able to appeal to numerous African leaders. At the same time it secures African support for Beijing whenever China’s own human rights record is put under the spotlight in forums such as the United Nations.

What benefits might Africa expect from Chinese expansion on the continent? Currently, China's somewhat cavalier stance toward arms sales and its disregard for norms surrounding democracy and human rights is troubling. There is a very real danger that Beijing’s supposed “non-political” stance merely masks its bottom line: the chase for profits and oil.

Unmoved by ideological concerns and without fear of political consequences, the Chinese government seems willing to deliver arms to and conduct business with African despots.
Curiously, Beijing does not seem to realize that political instability, a lack of accountability and a continent awash with arms sabotages the long-term possibilities of a sustained Sino-African partnership. For such reasons, the West needs to closely watch China’s expansion into the African continent.

Notes
1. See also Daniel L. Byman and Roger Cliff; China's Arms Sales: Motivations and Implications; The RAND Corporation, 1999.

Ian Taylor is an Associate Professor in the School of International Relations, University of St. Andrews, Scotland, and a Visiting Professor at the University of Stellenbosch, South Africa.

Hu Boosts Power as He Scrambles to Maintain Social Stability

By Willy Lam

Even assuming that recent reports about President Hu Jintao’s intention to “rehabilitate the reputation” of the late Chinese Communist Party (CCP) chief Hu Yaobang are true, this seems yet another instance of the Chinese supremo’s well-disguised Machiavellianism. Evidence abounds that the 62 year-old CCP General Secretary and commander-in-chief is continuing to harass cadres and scholars close to another deceased CCP chieftain, Zhao Ziyang, who, like Hu Yaobang, lost power because of his ultra-liberal ideology. President Hu's apparent plans to burnish the memory of Hu Yaobang, a former mentor of his, are geared toward consolidating his alreadysubstantial hold over the reins of power.

Beijing this past month has been rife with speculation that Hu has approved a public ceremony next month to mark the 90th anniversary of the birth of Hu Yaobang, who played a key role in rectifying many of the ‘leftist’ or Maoist aberrations of the 1960’s and 1970’s. President Hu, who headed the Communist Youth League (CYL) in the mid-1980s, partly owed his rise to the late Hu, an early leader of the League. Given that the latter was fired by late patriarch Deng Xiaoping in January 1987 for displaying excessively "bourgeois-liberal" tendencies, there are also rumors in Beijing that President Hu’s apparent decision to honor his mentor represents a desire to conciliate the CCP’s marginalized ‘rightist’ or liberal faction.

Political sources in the capital said, however, that President Hu might want to heap posthumous praise on Hu Yaobang merely to garner additional support from the vast CYL network. After all, since becoming party boss at the 16th Party Congress of 2002, Hu has promoted tens of ex-CYL officials to senior party and government posts.

The sources added there was no reason to believe that Hu, who has repeatedly eulogized Chairman Mao, wanted to be associated with the liberal and pro-West ideas of either Hu Yaobang or Zhao. They added that the Hu-led Politburo was still adamant about containing the possible impact of the death of Zhao in January this year. Zhao, who took over the party leadership from comrade-in-arms Hu Yaobang in early 1987, was deposed after the Tiannamen Square massacre for showing sympathy to the student demonstrators.

According to a Beijing source close to Zhao’s relatives, state-security and police officers last month delivered tough messages to ten-odd retired cadres and scholars who had worked under Zhao. The Zhao supporters were warned that they must not take part in public events about sensitive issues such as political reform and “Zhao Ziyang’s political legacy,” including holding conferences, publishing books, or giving interviews to the Hong Kong and foreign media.

The source said Hu aides such as Politburo member in charge of security, Luo Gan, are keen to stop the publication of a manuscript reportedly written by Zhao’s old friend and qigong doctor, Zong Fengming. This compilation of a dozen or so conversations between Zhao and Zong on topics including ideological liberalization is deemed by Zhao supporters as the late liberal leader’s “last political legacy.” “Luo suspects that one or more copies of the Zong manuscript may have been smuggled to Hong Kong and abroad,” the source said.

“Luo’s state-security personnel are pulling out the stops to prevent the book’s publication.” It is significant that Zhao’s former associates were warned specifically not to write forewords or other essays to accompany the Zong book. At the same time, security units under Luo and Minister of Public Security Zhou Yongkang have stepped up surveillance over elements of civil society, including NGOs, the mass media, professional groupings, and semiprivate research institutes—especially those that support political reform or have received funding from American and European foundations. Since the spring, state-security and police units have detained or harassed perhaps a dozen lawyers who were active in helping workers, farmers, or small businessmen fight for their labor or property rights.

For example, famous lawyer Zhu Jiuhu, counsel for private investors who owned numerous small oil and natural-gas fields in northern Shaanxi Province, was locked up in early summer. These Shaaxi investors have lost a few billion yuan worth of funds because their oilfields—which had received authorization from the provincial and national authorities in the mid-1990s—were suddenly declared to be state-owned by central government departments last year. As of early this month, more than 100 lawyers and law professors had written a petition to CCP headquarters asking that Zhu be released.

Irrespective of whether Hu is successful in maintaining socio-political stability and in suppressing calls for political liberalization, the wily politician has been largely able to buttress his position as the new core of the 4th Generation Leadership. In just one year after ex-president Jiang Zemin left his last position of power—the chairmanship of the Party Central Military Commission—Hu has been able to exert control over remaining members of the so-called Jiang or Shanghai Faction. Although there are still four Politburo Standing Committee members who used to be loyal to Jiang, they have either crossed over to the Hu camp, or been rendered unable to stage any challenge against the new supremo.

The most clear-cut example is Vice President Zeng Qinghong, a former Shanghai party vice secretary who used to be the right-hand man and top strategist for Jiang. Zeng is supposed to be the head of the Shanghai Faction after Jiang’s retirement in September 2004. Yet it is clear that the vice president no longer holds any important portfolio. He now merely performs routine state functions, such as attending ceremonies or anniversaries. Last month, for example, he was in Xinjiang to observe the 50th anniversary of the establishment of the Xinjiang Autonomous Region Government. He was also due to be in Hong Kong this month to be guest of honor at the opening of the Hong Kong Disneyland. Moreover, while Zeng was also an important adviser to Jiang on military affairs—particularly in regard to the appointment of PLA officers—Hu as new CMC chief has totally cut Zeng out of defense-related matters. Even foreign affairs powers of Zeng, who used to be active in diplomacy relating to Japan and Korea, have been curtailed.

Other close followers of Jiang in the Politburo Standing Committee, such as NPC chairman Wu Bangguo and Executive Vice-Premier Huang Ju, have also crossed over to the dominant camp led by Hu and Premier Wen Jiabao.

It is fair to say that Hu only faces discontents—and some opposition—from PLA officers. Since the spring, there have been several cases of disgruntled PLA officers and soldiers holding demonstrations, mainly to demand better living conditions and better retirement benefits. And the CMC Office last month took the unusual step of issuing a circular forbidding PLA personnel to take part in demonstrations, petitions, or other forms of protest. It is thus clear that as the new commander-in-chief, Hu has to do more to win over the support of both the top brass and the rank and file. The president and commander-in-chief is expected to award the PLA a bigger budget increase in 2006 to pay for development of weapons, purchase of Russian hardware, and improve the livelihood and retirement benefits of PLA personnel.

While it seems certain that Hu's predominant position will remain unchallenged for a long time, the president has been accused by his opponents of spending too much time on grooming and promoting members of his own CYL faction to the top. A number of his recent appointments have drawn criticism, including the transfer of former Henan party secretary Li Keqiang to the major northeastern province of Liaoning, and promotion of former Shandong vice-party secretary Wu Aiying, 54, as Minister of Justice.

A fastrising star, 49 year-old Li, who had worked under Hu in the CYL, was transferred from agricultural Henan to industrial Liaoning as part of a process to groom him for a Politburo position. Yet Li’s performance in Henan was considered lackluster: there were major industrial accidents in the relatively backward province. And even worse, Henan was hit by an alarming spread of AIDS among villagers who had to sell blood to make ends meet. Wu, like Li, is a long-time affiliate of the CYL faction. Yet the female cadre has had no training in the law whatsoever. Her filling such an important post as justice minister has cast doubt on Hu’s commitment of “running the administration according to law.”

Perhaps taking a leaf from Mao’s book, Hu seems intent to play traditional factional politics to his best advantage. Not unlike the Great Helmsman, the relatively young president is adept at using the official media to foster a larger-thanlife persona. Thus, a well-spun public event marking Hu Yaobang’s 90th birthday could help endear Hu to China’s disgruntled intelligentsia. And the president’s public relations specialists have also been asked to use TV footage about his on-going trip to North America to enhance his status as international statesman.

Willy Wo-Lap Lam is a Senior Fellow at The Jamestown Foundation as well as a Hong Kong-based journalist and analyst.

The Military Writings of Liu Yazhou

Liu Yazhou (??洲), a 53 year-old PLA general, erstwhile novelist, and rising political star, has published a series of frequent and provocative essays in China over the last few years to considerable acclaim—and controversy. In a regime where political expression is strictly limited, and where discussion of political issues may be construed as “revealing state secrets,” for someone to speak with establishment credentials and without censorship can be a startling indication of policy
discussion and change.

Liu’s essays violate many taboos and restrictions, covering a wide range of topics such as strategy, geopolitics, the nature of war and conflict, and China’s relations with Taiwan,
Japan, and the United States. His underlying theme is unvarnished distress with corruption and conformity, and a plea for accelerated political reform to remedy China’s ills. While laced with reverent quotations from top Chinese leaders, Liu’s writings can be construed as indirect and direct criticisms of their policies. These arguments have dazzled as well as upset his readers; supporters praise his boldness and insight, and detractors condemn his alleged militarism and
demagoguery.

A son-in-law of the late Chinese president Li Xiannian, Liu is a “princeling” (privileged offspring of a high official) who was promoted quickly and is now Deputy Political Commissar and a Lieutenant General in the PLA Air Force. He has traveled extensively overseas, including a term as a visiting professor at Stanford University, and is one of the few PLA officials to have visited Taiwan.

Liu’s first big splash was an essay on the October 1949 Jinmen battle circulated on the Internet last year, when tensions between China and Taiwan prompted hawks in Beijing to urge a military showdown, putting enormous pressure on the civilian leadership [1]. Liu reviewed the lessons of the Jinmen debacle, in which a PLA invasion was routed by Guomindang forces, with the loss of more than 9,000 troops.

He attributes the devastating loss to complacency, along with poor planning and command.
According to Liu, history threatened to repeat itself in the late 1990s when hardline officials argued that Taiwan must be fought and that victory was certain. Disclosing a previously unseen Jiang Zemin quote—“A war in the Taiwan Strait is inevitable” (“Lessons of the Jinmen Battle”)—without providing the context, he argues that the lessons of Jinmen must be heeded, especially because the Taiwan issue is now internationalized and considerably more complicated.

In an essay entitled “The Grand National Strategy,” likely written in 2001, Liu repudiates the idea of taking advantage of the September 11 aftermath to conquer Taiwan with an overpowering attack [2]. Taiwan should not be the focus of China’s strategy: the more the Chinese fixate on it, he argues, the more they will be manipulated by the U.S. and Taiwan. This obsession has provided Washington with undue leverage over Beijing for the last half century.
In the same essay, Liu privileges diplomacy over fighting, and suggests that China can effectively engage Taiwan by exploiting Taiwan’s multi-party system. China can deal with not only with the Democratic Progressive Party, but also with other political forces, a view that may have contributed to Hu Jintao’s decision to invite Guomindang leader Lin Chan and James Soong of the People First Party to visit China in April/May of this year.

His appeals for moderation notwithstanding, Liu’s discourses on strategy reveal that he is a nationalist as well as a realist. His ‘dream’ is to have a strong army and country. “The sole purpose of power is to pursue even greater power,” and “national interest should forever be the highest principle of our action,” he writes in “Faith and Morality.” [3] Balanceof- power and divide-and-rule tactics seem to be his guiding principles.

The projection of Chinese influence in international affairs should be specifically calibrated to the West in general and United States in particular, Liu argues. Citing Huntington’s thesis on the clash of civilizations, Liu views the alleged clash between the West and the Muslim world as a great opportunity. He argues in “The Grand National Strategy” that China’s improved relations with Muslim countries are an excellent move, since China “should do what the West fears.” In a moment of great exuberance, Liu maintains that China should have an outlet to the Indian Ocean, what he terms “China’s new boundary.”

Liu is more ambivalent about Sino-U.S. relations. While he acknowledges that the United States, as the world’s dominant power, will inevitably pursue policies that antagonize China, he believes America realizes that the forces for bilateral cooperation are greater than conflict. U.S. leaders would never instigate a full-fledged military confrontation. The United States is to be regarded as neither a wholesale enemy nor an ally.

Militarily, he urges Chinese leaders to learn from U.S. innovations in the military and its recruitment system. China’s military strategy is obsolete, he says in “Faith and Morality,” as its experts today still strategize of a “people’s war” of “luring the enemy into a trap.” It is a ‘tragedy’ that in China, from the top to the bottom, “those who are intelligent do not make policy, those who make policy are not intelligent.”

Indeed, as a Lieutenant General with a primarily civilian background, Liu emphasizes the important role of the military. Intervention during the Tiananmen crisis of 1989 stabilized the regime, he asserts in “Faith and Morality,” and the Sino-Vietnam war of 1979 contributed greatly to reforms.

Deng Xiaoping used the war to consolidate his authority vis?-vis the leftist remnants in the party. In the same article,Liu contends that China, by invading Vietnam, signaled the abandonment of “phoney” socialism, and also “avenged and vindicated” (chuqi) the U.S. experience in Southeast Asia.

In return, China’s reforms benefited from subsequent U.S. investment and economic, military, scientific, and technological assistance in a decade-long “honeymoon,” thus ensuring that China would stand firm, even after the worldwide collapse of communism. As in other developing countries, the Chinese military is a force for reform, and modernization without the participation of the military is inconceivable, although Liu does not explain why this should be so.

Toward the Japanese Liu is a nationalist. While his essayspaint Japan as a “fierce” neighbor, he argues that a strong, independent Japan apart from an alliance with the United States would be easier to deal with. In such a case, Japan could act as a buffer, and to that end China would do well to support Japan’s membership as a permanent member of the UN Security Council.

Last April, however, Liu was angered by Japan’s announcement to begin drilling for oil in disputed areas of the East China Sea. His attempt to convene a conference on Sino-Japanese relations was reportedly prohibited by Hu Jintao. Liu then published an angry manifesto on the Internet, “Military Forum,” co-signed by nine military colleagues bluntly denouncing the Japanese for being haughty, provocative, and bullying [4]. It urged annulment of all treaties that renounced reparations—using a referendum if necessary—and immediate reopening of talks for reparations covering issues such as war crimes, the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, and the textbook and Yasakuni shrine controversies (“Military Forum”).

Liu’s most daring ideas are those championing political reform and decrying corruption, censorship, and China’s “backward” political system. The strategic threat to national security, he argues in “The Grand National Strategy,” comes from within rather than from without. To strengthen the country, it is imperative that China’s leaders introduce political reform, especially when the dynamism of economic growth begins to slow. In an apparent dig at ruling elites, he warns that upholding stability as a primary goal and maintaining the status quo was the root cause of Soviet dissolution. Political reform for Liu requires a democratic yielding of power, a transformation of the people as their own masters, and rigorous methods to make the country prosperous, although, bowing to official orthodoxy, he is careful to concede that reform should include the “consolidation of the CCP’s ruling position” as well.

Democracy, he argues in “Conversation with a Secretary of a County Party Committee,” is a demand, a way of expression, an exchange process, and a way to resolve problems [5]. Rules, fairness, and citizen consciousness, the prerequisites of democracy, all have to be cultivated. Rampant corruption is the greatest political challenge and a dictatorial system based on the monopoly of power is itself fertile ground for corruption. In contrast to Asia’s other rising power, Liu notes that China’s poor are not only deprived of adequate food and clothing but they do not even have the vote.

The oppressed peasantry, Liu continues, which poses the greatest challenge to communist orthodoxy, must be thoroughly liberated and turned into citizens able to engage in active political participation. If political reform is further delayed, revolution from below may occur, he warns in “Conversation.” As a military officer Liu Yazhou’s free airing of provocative views on both foreign and domestic issues, especially his calls for political reform and the freedom of expression, is unprecedented. Though a realist, a nationalist and a hardliner against Japan, Liu’s moderate views contrast sharply with those who still preach “people’s war” or the use of nuclear
weapons. In his calls for new thinking and introspection, Liu represents military young Turks dissatisfied with the civilian leadership’s inability to deal with corruption and social crises. Fears of praetorian intervention in civilian politics may be exaggerated, but the issues Liu raises are
real indeed.

Alfred L. Chan is an associate professor of political science at Huron University College, University of Western Ontario, Canada. He thanks Don Hickerson for editing the manuscript.

Notes

1. Liu Yazhou, “Jinmen zhanyi jiantao” (Lessons of the
Jinmen Battle), April 2004,
http://www.yannan.cn/data/detail.php?id=2882.

2. Liu Yazhou, “Da guoce” (The Grand National Strategy),”
n.d., http://www.yannan.cn/data/detail.php?id=2884.

3. Liu Yazhou, Xinnian yu daode” (Faith and Morality),
January 2, 2005, http://www.yannan.cn/data/detail.
php?id=5840.

4. Liu Yazhou, Peng Guangqian, Liu Hongji, et al., “Junfang
yantaohui: yuren zunwo, bixian zizun: ribenren weihe duiwo
changkuang” (Military Forum: If one expects respect, one
must respect oneself: Why are the Japanese so recklessly
provocative?), April 14, 2005, http://www.qian-ming.net/
gb/viewarticle_gb.aspx?vID=818.

5. Liu Yazhou, “Yu yiwei xianwei shuji de tanhua”
(Conversation with a Secretary of a County Party
Committee), December, 2004, http://www.bjsjs.net/news/
news.php?intNewsId=1304.

China Shuts 2 Web Sites In Internet Crackdown

Associated Press
October 4, 2005 6:02 a.m.

BEIJING -- Chinese authorities have shut down an online discussion forum that reported on anticorruption protests in a village in the country's south as well as a Web site serving ethnic Mongolians, overseas monitors said Tuesday.

China routinely shuts down or blocks Web sites that operate outside of government control, but the issue has received heightened international attention in recent weeks with the publication of new rules aimed at stifling online dissent.

Radio Free Asia, a U.S.-based broadcaster, said an online forum that covered protests in the village of Taishi has been closed. It said the site had been popular among academics, journalists and rights activists.

Residents of Taishi, which is near the manufacturing hub of Guangzhou, had demanded that their village chief be removed from office and investigated for allegations of embezzlement and fraud.

Several villagers were reportedly injured in a clash with police last month when they tried to prevent police from seizing accounting ledgers that they said contained evidence of corruption. Police and local authorities have refused to comment.

The Taishi protest came amid a series of increasingly bold actions by villagers around China to bring attention to grievances ranging from pollution to corruption and illegal land seizures.

Meanwhile, the Paris-based group Reporters Without Borders said China had shut down an online forum for ethnic Mongolian students, called www.ehoron.com, for allegedly hosting separatist content. Attempts Tuesday to view the page called up a message that said: "You are not authorized to view this page." The press group said Beijing's controls on ethnic minorities were more restrictive than for the rest of China's population.

It said the government also temporarily closed the Web site of a law firm in China's Inner Mongolia region, called www.monhgal.com. That site could be accessed Tuesday.

China last month issued new rules banning Internet news services from inciting illegal assemblies, marches and demonstrations as well as prohibiting activities on behalf of unauthorized civil groups.

不說日本「打壓」，還出賣主權─從許文龍、台灣漁民到原住民歸還祖靈

台灣日本綜合研究所總編輯 (http://www.japanresearch.org.tw)
李中邦

近來中台、中日、台日這三角關係之間正逢多事之秋，中台間因統獨、「反分裂國家法」、愛台賣台說、連宋訪問大 陸而熱鬧，中日間因日本首相參拜靖國神社、釣魚台主權、東海油氣田也喧嚷數年、關係低迷。可是，原本因台灣政府屈從日本──不爭釣魚台、不爭經濟海域而狀 似“相安無事”的台日關係，也由於宜蘭漁民屢遭日本船艦驅趕、逮捕，台灣討海人認為日方欺人太甚、政府又無能，忍無可忍，遂激揚起反日情緒，再加上立委高 金素梅的迎祖靈活動被日警方攔阻，台灣人民對日的觀感迭起波瀾，當然，台灣「親日派」也會替日本說話，在這交互的糾結中，台灣人民、「親日派」、政府、日 本對台態度等等的真面貌便浮出檯面，正可以讓台灣民眾好好看清楚、好好思量。

　　日本毫不手軟的拿台灣開刀，一般都認為始於捕魚權，其實，如果上溯，許文龍的奇美也該算上一筆。

為何不講許文龍被日本打壓而覺醒？

　 　許文龍3月26日在政府及民進黨、台聯黨、獨派上街遊行抗議大陸制定「反分裂國家法」的同一天，發表震驚社會，支持「一中」、「反分裂國家法」的「退休 感言」，數天後的29日奇美電子即向投審會申請赴大陸設立負責採購液晶電視零組件──背光模組、電源供應器之類的物流公司。看起來許文龍的確好像是為了要 照顧、拓展在大陸鎮江廠等的投資而改變立場。

　　因此，李登輝說，同情許文龍的立場，謂許是為了奇美在中國幾十萬員工的生計才會說出這樣的話。呂副總統認為，那是「他白書」，不是「自白書」。台獨大 老辜寬敏表示失望。民進黨台南縣立委李俊毅罵說，為了企業成長短視近利。日本親台學者慶應大學的小島朋之教授則表示驚訝，說許承認一中「等於對中國豎了白 旗」。

　　許文龍發表「退休感言」後很長一段時間斷絕對外聯繫，真實的原因不明。於是李登輝等人及媒體都圍繞著許的投資大陸作文章。沒別的因素嗎？

　　04年12月初，研發薄型顯示器的日本半導體能源研究所（SEL，神奈川縣厚木市）向東京地方法院申請對西友和音響製造商iriver Japan（アイリバ??ジャパン，東京，千代田區）從10月起開始銷售、裝配了台灣奇美電子（CMO）所製造液晶面板的液晶電視「DURA」27型禁止 進口的假處分，而且於當月15日正式控告西友，謂液晶電視「DURA」27型裡面，奇美電子產製的TFT（薄膜トランジスタ）液晶面板顯示部分的保護電路 侵犯了專利，西友馬上從當天停止銷售，並撤掉遭指控的所有液晶電視。雖然日本半導體能源研究所針對的是西友，但真正打擊到的卻是奇美，無疑的，這對奇美過 去在日本辛苦建立的商譽和企業形象，殺傷力非常大。奇美短期內恐怕極難重返日本市場。

　　過去許文龍在台灣、日本最著名的“標記”就是「親日企業家」和「大力支持台獨企業家」。「親日企業家」──他愛用日語、妻女長住日本，小林善紀的『台 灣論』漫畫出版，許文龍替他辯護：台灣從軍慰安婦是為了「出人頭地」，否定強行擄走、誘騙之說，而且肯定日本的殖民統治台灣。「大力支持台獨企業家」── 台灣很多獨派議員參選，他是幕後的大金主；鄒景雯所撰寫『李登輝執政實錄』曾提到，2000年3月總統大選前夕，許文龍決定支持陳水扁，並以日文寫了一封 長信給李登輝表明心跡，且問李登輝何時要把中華民國變成台灣共和國？

　　結果，大家的注意力都在「大力支持台獨企業家」轉折的後半段。以許文龍在南台灣企業龍頭的地位，替日本殖民時期壓迫台灣人民，不人道、不平對待的種種 措施辯護，這是“無價的”、“極難得的”，可是日本機構卻公事公辦膺懲許文龍這位「親日企業家」一手創立的奇美。從許的角度來看，會不會覺得寒心？

　　今年2月，許文龍在奇美集團的運動會場上即公開表示，因為有大陸市場需求的興起，奇美才能成為全球最大的ABS工廠，大陸人與台灣人都是同一種人。許 文龍將奇美的成功歸功於大陸，並希望未來強化兩岸的合作關係，跟以往的表現完全不同。大陸是只要不是搞台獨的綠色台商都一概歡迎，中國和日本兩相對照，自 然會有「一推（日本）一拉（中國）」的作用，不是嗎？

　　前述李登輝那些人對許的投資大陸、「退休感言」，爭相發言，同情也好、失望也罷，但對日本機構的修理奇美怎麼不說話呢？

出賣釣魚台主權等於出賣經濟海域、捕魚權等資源

　 　自從6月8日宜蘭縣有5艘漁船遭日本水產廳船艦驅離，引起台灣漁民群起抗議，到6月21日立法院長王金平偕同國防部長李傑及14位立委搭海軍鳳陽艦出海 宣示「護魚」、「釣魚台是我們的」，這事件“初步”是有了一點點效果，不過接下來和日本談「漁權」乃至釣魚台問題，政府是玩真的還是虛晃一招、安撫漁民， 真正棘手的考驗才開始呢。

　　然而，我們還是要說，漁民「一出家門就被日本水產廳或海上保安廳驅趕、扣押、罰錢」的悶氣和日本擴張經濟海域深入台灣近海的事實，是早就存在的。像 03年2月中旬，基隆地區的漁船在釣魚台附近作業，迭遭日本巡防艦（噴水柱等）驅趕或取締拘留，今年2月22日上午，蘇澳籍漁船金福漁66號在琉球群島西 北方，屬於中（中國大陸）日漁業協定議定的「暫定措施水域」作業時，被日本水產廳巡防艇以無登記許可證而在日本專屬經濟區域作業的名義扣押。當時媒體也有 報導，只是「數量少、聲音小」，政府吭都沒吭一聲，還有點怪罪漁民亂闖、惹事的味道，這回若非受害漁民多，全卯火了，恐怕也會落得同樣無聲無息的命運。

　　政府說，台、日重疊的經濟海域，台灣屢屢向日本要求恢復資源共享，已經談判了14次，尚無結果。所謂「尚無結果」，講白了就是日本不甩台灣、不顧台灣 漁民在近海水域捕魚的權利。漁民普遍表示，過去台灣周邊海域魚業資源豐富，鮮少受到日本刁難，去（04）年開始，日本加強取締，台灣漁民的生存空間就越縮 越小了。

　　這不禁令人要問，日本為什麼如此鴨霸？其實答案很簡單，因為台灣政府採取的戰略是要聯合日本對付中國。去（04）年7月下旬，台灣國安會秘書長邱義仁 率領外交、軍事高層及學者（外交部次長高英茂、海基會副秘書長顏萬進、前陸委會副主委陳明通、台灣智庫董事長陳博志、國安諮詢委員陳忠信和林成蔚、民進黨 立委蕭美琴等）前往日本箱根與日方安全情報方面的官員進行秘密且密集的會談，建立情報合作。9月上旬，國安諮詢委員林成蔚又跑了一趟日本，繼續進行安保戰 略對話。顯然的，日本看準台灣需要日本相挺，於是牽扯到台日之間的矛盾或權益，諸如釣魚台、大陸架、漁民漁業權等問題，日本就無視台灣的存在了，連帶的漁 民也遭殃。

　　由於台灣與日本西南列島的諸小島距離不遠，日本用這些小小島嶼作延伸，主張200海浬的專屬經濟區域將台灣全島及附近的海域全都囊刮在內，雖然台灣畫 的200海浬專屬經濟區也將琉球群島的部分畫進來，雙方有頗大的區域是重疊的，看起來似乎彼此都沒吃虧。然而，農委會漁業署提供給漁民參考用的一幅「台日 周邊水域圖」，台日重疊的經濟海域中間有一條日本自行主張的中間線，台灣漁民均認為「太靠近我方，非常不公平」（日本跟中國大陸爭議東海油氣田時，也是片 面主張這種表面上看似公平、其實是佔便宜的中間線）。日本主張中間線以東，不准台灣漁民進入，台灣北面中（大陸）日漁業協定議定的「暫定措施水域」裡，超 出台灣所畫經濟海域的部分，台灣漁民也不可以捕魚，作業空間被壓縮得很小，漁民親身感受「日本根本沒把台灣200海浬經濟海域放在眼裡」。台灣政治領袖常 誇稱台日關係如何如何好，相信涉及權益、生計的漁民們絲毫不會有這種感覺。

　　更有甚者，李登輝所領導的政治勢力欲以出賣釣魚台主權來換跟日本政府“好商量”捕魚權（李登輝02年9月24日接受『沖繩時報』專訪和10月20日在 一項研討會上，接連兩次公開說「釣魚台是日本的領土，台灣只有漁業權」），但出賣了釣魚台，就等於出賣了經濟海域、出賣了漁民的捕魚權和傳統漁場，更遑論 尚待探勘的釣魚台海域豐富的石油、天然氣資源。現在日方好不容易答應願與台灣在7月29日進行第15次漁權談判，陳水扁總統立刻指示，主權和漁權“分開處 理”，這種論調跟李登輝有什麼差別呢？

　　台灣的獨派很喜歡強調台灣是“海洋國家”，以刻意跟中國的“大陸國家”作區隔（忽視大陸海岸線比台灣海岸線還要長、漁民比台灣還要多），既然是“海洋 國家”，為何又不學日本拼命去搶小島、珊瑚礁，擴大經濟海域、大陸架，反而是一遇到日本就棄甲曳兵，連自己政府主張的釣魚台主權、經濟海域都不敢伸張，還 倒過來去附和日本？

與日右翼合作的公視可進靖國，高金素梅迎祖靈不行！

　 　最後一項驚動國際視聽的原住民立委高金素梅率領「高砂義勇隊」遺族前往日本靖國神社，要求迎回祖靈的活動，情形也是雷同。率隊的立委高金素梅一宣布，日 本右翼威脅對她不利的恐嚇信就來了，過程中，政府漠視，駐日單位、特別是東京辦事處是幫日警勸阻，李登輝罵她「頭殼壞去」。整個事件呈現的景象，簡單地說 就是：最正港、最早期的台灣人──原住民遭到部分從大陸來的漢族台灣人結合日本右翼封殺。

　　6月14日在高金素梅一行人車隊到達靖國神社之前就被日本警方攔下，隨行記者也被堵在車內，不准下車採訪、攝影，理由是“日本右翼團體已在靖國神社守 候，避免發生事端”。此間的電視、報紙媒體已多所報導，勿須贅述。這裡姑且不論日警搞錯對象，該防止滋事的對象應是凶悍的右翼團體，卻反過來阻擋高金素梅 一行人；也姑且不論日本是號稱有言論自由、信仰自由的先進國家，竟發生這種剝奪台灣原住民言論、信仰自由的作為。倒是有件對照起高金素梅迎回祖靈團所受待 遇極為諷刺事情，值得大家了解。

　　6月12日──高金素梅迎回祖靈團6月13日出發的前一天，靖國神社裡的靖國會館，有一場由台灣公共電視台、原住民節目企劃的錄影順利完成。

　　出席人士有日本右翼團體曙會（あけぼの?）會長門?朝秀，台灣中央研究院民族學研究所研究助理黃智慧，靖國神社權宮司山口建史，前參議院議員堀江正 夫，報答英靈會經營委員長倉林和男，曙會人員、陸士４８期高橋正二，曙會人員、陸士５7期植田弘，曙會人員、柳澤軍醫夫人柳澤照子，曙會人員鈴木一正等共 9個人。

　　該錄影是以記者會的方式進行，黃智慧負責主持及口譯，公共電視台的記者娃丹（泰雅族）則以中文詢問，由出席人士回答。而娃丹在開場白說：「關於高金素 梅的靖國神社訴訟問題，在台灣有各種報導，內容都很偏頗，因此想要做公正的報導，在高金素梅來日本之際，想聽聽日本方面各位的意見」。

　　訪談中，管理靖國神社的高級職員山口權宮司就高金素梅欲前往靖國神社穿著原住民的服裝、以原住民的儀式祭拜一事表示，「靖國神社是神道，好端端的供奉 著祭祀的英靈」，如果高金素梅當面要求進行5分鐘帶回祖靈魂魄的祭祀儀式，他基於以下理由會峻拒。

　　1. 給（其他）參拜者帶來麻煩。──還沒做怎麼知道會給其他人帶來麻煩，5分鐘而已。

　　2. 妨害靖國神社的信仰。──不准原住民迎祖靈、不准進行原住民儀式難道不是妨害原住民的信仰。

　　3. 帶來這麼多媒體，那只不過是作秀。──日本小泉首相及諸多政界高官前往參拜，有更龐大的媒體跟著則不是作秀、表態？

　　4. 官司訴訟期間，原告向被告抗議是不對的。──如果日本沒有未經遺族同意就逕自供奉高砂義勇隊犧牲者的靈位，就不會多此一樁糾紛。

　　他還強硬地表示，「出身台灣的英靈完全跟日本人一樣被祭祀，以後靖國神社的態度也不會改變」。　

　　而前參議員、戰時為日本第28軍參謀的堀江正夫則是大加介紹高砂義勇軍在新幾內亞多麼善戰，而他似乎忘了日軍使用毒氣殺害原住民的「霧社事件」，也忘 了是因日軍不諳叢林戰，才將「高砂義勇隊」推向最前線為日軍打頭陣。

　　令人不解的是，公視記者娃丹說，台灣的報導內容都偏向一邊，但是該節目請來1914年在朝鮮出生、戰前大阪大學支那語科畢業（即中文系，支那是歧視用 語）、長年自己出錢推動和台灣高砂族的交流活動（邀請少數幾位認同日本的高砂義勇隊員、遺族訪日等）、目前也是日本李登輝之友會理事的門?朝秀及諸多曙會 會員來訪談，立場就公正了嗎？

　　此一錄影的消息，日本『e-mail雜誌』曾做報導，標題為「靖國神社：神社不是作秀的地方」，隻字不提高金素梅迎祖靈團的原由、主張和理念，一味地 說她是來作秀，又暗指高金素梅跟北京有聯繫。很明顯的，該錄影被利用為反制高金素梅的上選題材，也難怪隔兩天日本右翼能嚴陣以待，並迫使日警出手阻擾迎祖 靈活動。

　　原來，和日本右翼合作、讓右翼發聲就可以舒舒服服在靖國會館進行訪談，高金素梅的迎回祖靈則是大門都進不了。

　　許文龍的奇美被日本阻斷市場、台灣漁民被日本阻斷捕漁權、高金素梅的迎祖靈也被日警阻斷等，性質上難道不是一種「打壓」？可以很肯定的說，類似的事， 如果是中國大陸做的話，就是「打壓」，是日本做的，就「不是打壓」──為何台灣媒體、輿論的標準這麼多重？

Asian Countries Gear Up to Tackle Bird-Flu Threat

By NICHOLAS ZAMISKA Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

October 3, 2005; Page A15

Across Asia, governments are slowly gearing up to battle a potential bird-flu outbreak among humans, and their preparedness -- more so than any measures in the West -- could prove critical to preventing a global pandemic.

While dozens of Western countries have been stockpiling antiviral drugs for months now, many countries in Asia have only just begun to seriously wrestle with the threat, even though most experts agree that any pandemic will likely begin in Asia.

In the U.S., the Bush administration is preparing to ask Congress to spend somewhere between $6 billion and $10 billion on vaccines and antiviral medicines, according to officials in Congress and the administration. But some experts say much of that could prove useless should an outbreak originate in Asia.

"If we don't stop the fire and put it out, the Tamiflu stocks anybody has -- that Roche could produce in an emergency -- would be futile," said Peter Cordingley, a spokesman for the World Health Organization in Manila.

The United Nations health agency, based in Geneva, estimates that it would have three weeks to swoop into the site of a nascent Asian outbreak and distribute hundreds, maybe thousands, of packets of Tamiflu, produced by Roche Holding AG of Switzerland, to try to slow or stem the spread of the disease.

Still, that plan relies on the ability of local health officials across the region to spot the disease and report it quickly -- a huge challenge given problems with health care and a reluctance to disclose information in many countries. The Philippine government, for instance, has no stockpile; China has covered up disease outbreaks in the past; and many countries in the region have scarcely begun planning beyond the first stage of a pandemic.

"What if the bodies are building up at the back of the hospital?" asked Mr. Cordingley. "How do you get the food from the market to the town?"

The deadly strain of avian influenza, known as H5N1, has killed some 60 people in Vietnam, Thailand, Cambodia and Indonesia since late 2003. While the vast majority of those cases were likely the result of direct contact with infected poultry, scientists have been warning for years that the virus could mutate into a form that passes easily among humans, unleashing a global pandemic that would kill millions.

In Indonesia, where dozens of suspected bird-flu cases in humans and six confirmed deaths from the disease have caught the government off guard, Australia announced it was donating funding for at least 400,000 tablets of Tamiflu to the country. At 10 tablets per person, Health Minister Siti Fadilah Supari said that "currently we have enough supply of medicine" to treat 40,000 people. Indonesian health officials have been reluctant to kill large swaths of infected flocks, despite the WHO's urging to do just that, because the government says it doesn't have enough money to compensate farmers for their birds.

William L. Aldis, the WHO's chief representative in Thailand, said the Thai government is working on what he called a "radical" plan to stockpile a number of bird-flu drugs in preparation for a possible pandemic that would be offered to neighboring countries if an outbreak occurred.
"In that way, even a small, poor country like Laos or Cambodia would have the benefit of a massive supply of drugs to stamp out the epidemic at the source," he said.

In China, the Ministry of Health released a bird-flu preparedness plan last week, and southern Guangdong province -- where severe acute respiratory syndrome, or SARS, first broke out a few years ago -- has already stockpiled 10,000 packets of antiviral drugs, according to a health official, who referred to the pharmaceuticals as "miracle drugs."

The province's health department has also begun organizing supplies of Chinese herbal medicines as a backup. "If the flu did hit Guangdong, the miracle drugs are surely not enough, so we have to rely on traditional medicines too," he said.

Singapore has stockpiled enough Tamiflu for the city-state's health-care workers. And in neighboring Malaysia, a national avian-flu committee has been set up to take measures such as stocking up on antiviral medication, vaccinations and protective gear to tackle a possible outbreak, which the country's health minister estimated would cost 500 million ringgit ($133 million).

The Malaysian government has also directed inspections be stepped up at border checkpoints to stop the smuggling of chickens from neighboring countries to prevent the spread of the disease.
In Japan, the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare has a plan to stockpile enough doses of Tamiflu for as many as five million people over the next five years, according to health officials in Tokyo, who also said the health ministry has dispatched quarantine experts to Vietnam and Indonesia.

The Japanese government has been quick to cull flocks of birds that may have been exposed to the virus. In June, for instance, an outbreak of bird flu on 31 farms northeast of Tokyo prompted officials to cull some 1.6 million birds. Health inspectors throughout the country regularly test chicken farms for the disease.


1 FURTHER READING • Bush Seeks Funds for Avian-Flu Virus
2 PREVENTING A PANDEMIC See complete coverage
3 of avian flu, including an interactive graphic on the science of the virus
4 and a look back at major flu epidemics

A Closer Look at Avian Flu

By JENNIFER STERLING THE WALL STREET JOURNAL ONLINE

September 30, 2005 6:57 a.m.

President Bush in September announced the creation of an international partnership aimed at preventing a global outbreak of avian flu, an influenza virus that has jumped from birds to humans and killed about 60 people in Asia. While millions of birds have been killed by the virus or slaughtered by authorities to stem the contagion in Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia, China, Russia and elsewhere, the extent of human infection has been limited by the virus's inability thus far to easily jump from human to human. The World Health Organization classes the current avian flu, specifically the H5N1 strain, in Phase 3 of its six-phase Pandemic Watch. That means the virus is a new subtype but hasn't yet evolved to the point where it could set off a true human pandemic. But U.N. and U.S. health officials warn that bird flu could mutate and spread from person to person, which could lead to a global pandemic that could kill millions. Niranjan Bhat, an epidemiologist at the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, says: "It's not a question of if, but when."

Here are answers to some common questions about avian flu and its effects:

Why are health officials warning about an avian-flu pandemic?

The H5N1 strain of the virus already has two of the three pandemic criteria: It can jump from birds to humans, and then can produce a severe, even fatal, illness in humans. If H5N1 becomes highly contagious among humans -- the third pandemic characteristic -- then a world-wide outbreak could become a reality.

Pandemics can traverse the globe in a matter of weeks and last several months, and the CDC's preliminary predictions figure an avian-flu pandemic could kill between 89,000 and 207,000 Americans. Although the CDC says it can't predict when a pandemic might occur, historically, global flu epidemics occur once a generation. It has been almost 40 years since the last one. (See related infographic.)

Most people who have contracted the virus so far were in direct contact with infected birds. Health officials say there have been only a few instances of probable human-to-human transmission, and in all of those cases the virus didn't spread beyond the second person. At this point, Americans don't appear to be at risk unless they go to a country affected by poultry outbreaks and visit a farm or market with infected fowl.

How does avian flu compare with the normal flu?

Bird-flu symptoms in humans so far have included those typically associated with the flu -- fever, cough, sore throat and muscle aches -- but can also be much worse. The victims in Asia have experienced eye infections, pneumonia, severe respiratory diseases that injure the lungs, other life-threatening complications and death. The symptoms may depend on which bird-flu strain a victim is exposed to, but the mortality rate appears to be strong: Of the 115 cases of human infection confirmed by the WHO since 2003, 59 have resulted in death as of Sept. 22, the most recent figure available.

The CDC says it doesn't yet know which sections of the population would be most at risk, but past pandemics have claimed many victims among young, healthy adults, a demographic that ranges beyond the usual candidates of the flu season's most vulnerable: children and the elderly.

Is it safe to keep eating poultry?

The WHO doesn't consider bird flu a food-borne disease, and people probably aren't infected from eating poultry. The danger is for people who handle infected poultry. Eggs and processed poultry products -- refrigerated or frozen carcasses and the products they go into -- shouldn't pose a risk, the WHO says.

What vaccines and drugs are available?

Currently, there is no publicly available vaccine for H5N1. Avian-flu vaccines are undergoing preliminary testing by the U.S. government, and the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases says a Sanofi Pasteur vaccine has shown "safety and ability to generate an immune response" in early trials. But it isn't clear when the testing will be completed. And while Sanofi Pasteur, the vaccine unit of Sanofi-Aventis SA, says it plans to have the needed ingredients ready by the end of the year, the government will still have to decide on how many doses a person needs. Then the vaccine would still have to be licensed and the individual doses filled.

Chiron Corp., meanwhile, plans to deliver its vaccine for H5N1 to the government for evaluation by year end. If global health authorities declare an avian-flu pandemic to be in progress, vaccine manufacturers would ramp up production. To ensure a rapid response at the start of a pandemic, the WHO and some governments are creating stockpiles of antiviral drugs used to treat infections. Among the drugs being stored up in the U.S. is Tamiflu, which is already used to treat the seasonal flu viruses. Studies suggest Tamiflu, made by Roche Holdings AG, works against bird flu, the CDC says.

How can I prepare for an outbreak?

The CDC suggests that people get the traditional flu vaccine manufactured each year ahead of the flu season, even though it doesn't offer immunity to H5N1. In part, that's because it is in a person who contracts bird flu when he or she already is infected with a normal flu strain that the avian virus could mutate into one able to leap from human to human. The best measure to protect against the regular flu is hand washing, health officials say. If you're sick, stay at home.

If a pandemic occurs, check the CDC Web site (www.cdc.org) to find out the most recent information. In past epidemics, people rushed to buy face masks but the CDC says there has been no scientific data supporting the theory that these masks decrease the risk of transmission or infection of avian flu.

I'm traveling to a country where there have been reported outbreaks. What precautions should I take?

If you're traveling to countries where there have been cases of bird flu, avoid poultry farms, contact with animals in food markets and any surfaces that appear contaminated with feces from poultry or other animals. Clean your hands often with soap and water or waterless alcohol-based hand-rubs. All foods from poultry, including eggs, should be thoroughly cooked. Tamiflu may not be readily available overseas, and the State Department encourages Americans traveling or living abroad who are interested in obtaining this medication to consult their physician.

If you've traveled to an affected area and think you have avian flu, first off, don't panic. Avian flu hasn't appeared in humans in the U.S. or in Europe. But if you're suffering from a respiratory illness accompanied by a fever and have recently returned from one of the countries affected, then seek medical attention and explain where you have been.

For the most up-to-date travel advisories, visit the CDC's travel site at www.cdc.gov/travel.

PREVENTING A PANDEMICSee complete coverage of avian flu, including an interactive graphic on the science of the virus and a look back at major flu epidemics.

China to Tackle GapBetween Rich, Poor

Next 'Five-Year Blueprint' Will Boost Social Services, Address Growing Inequities

By KATHY CHEN Staff Reporter of THE WALL STREET JOURNALSeptember 30, 2005; Page A9

BEIJING -- China's Communist Party leaders are set to meet soon to approve a national economic-policy blueprint for the next five years aimed at smoothing uneven development that has fueled unrest around the country.

Members of the party's powerful Central Committee will convene in Beijing from Oct. 8 to Oct. 11, the official Xinhua news agency said. Besides giving the green light to China's next five-year plan covering 2006 to 2010, the meeting may result in some personnel changes that reflect President and party chief Hu Jintao's continued push to consolidate power, according to people familiar with the situation.

Traditionally, China's five-year plans, modeled after the former Soviet Union's, have set specific goals for everything from economic growth to steel production to livestock numbers.

Details of the coming plan haven't been publicly announced. But for the first time, it is being dubbed a "five-year blueprint" instead of a "five-year plan" to reflect the government's step-back approach to managing the economy under a market system. Economists say a main focus of the plan will be to address the growing inequities between China's prosperous coastal regions and its poorer inland and rural regions, where the majority of China's 1.3 billion people live. The plan is expected to shift the emphasis from strong economic-growth rates to the strengthening of social services, like education and health care.

Whether Mr. Hu's government can meet these goals in coming years could be critical for the country to maintain the overall stability that has for the past decade helped it attract record levels of foreign investment, exceeding an estimated $66 billion this year. China's growth rate is expected to surpass 9% this year.

For years, many economists and Chinese officials saw the key to stability simply as maintaining a high-enough growth rate to generate jobs and opportunities; some Chinese could get rich first and others could catch up later. But the increasing numbers of large-scale, violent protests around the country over the past year or two have sparked concern at the top levels of government that more must be done to address the growing wealth gap and surging discontent over such issues as corruption, environmental degradation and soaring educational and health-care costs.

"China has just undergone another cycle of fast economic development," said Fan Jianping, a vice director of the State Information Center, a Beijing-based think tank. "If we do a lot of wrong things amid such fast development, the contradictions will just get bigger."

Economists said a main theme of the five-year blueprint will be a "scientific approach to development" -- focusing on improving people's livelihoods, not just growth; seeking efficient and sustainable development, not blind growth; and ensuring that the benefits of growth are divided among the people, such as through higher taxation of wealthier areas.

After approval by party leaders, the 11th five-year blueprint would require passage by the National People's Congress, China's largely rubber-stamp legislature, during its annual meeting in March.

High-level personnel changes also are in the works, as Mr. Hu continues to consolidate power after taking over from former party head Jiang Zemin three years ago, people familiar with the situation said. It remained unclear, however, whether these changes would be implemented this year or next, when the Communist Party is scheduled to convene a major meeting where personnel changes traditionally would be announced.

One official who could possibly be replaced is Shanghai's Communist Party chief, Chen Liangyu, an ally of Mr. Jiang who is thought to have angered Mr. Hu and Premier Wen Jiabao for failing to toe the line on the central government's effort to cool the sizzling property market, said people familiar with the situation. A district government officer in Shanghai said recent internal meetings in the district government suggested that Mr. Chen would leave in the near term. An official in the general duty office of the Shanghai City government said Thursday, "I have no idea about this matter." The city's party committee news office couldn't be reached Thursday evening.

Candidates who could succeed Mr. Chen are said to include Liu Yandong, a woman who heads the United Front Work Department, the party's arm in charge of coordinating with China's other political parties, ethnic minorities and Taiwan, which Beijing views as part of China; and Zhang Gaoli, the progressive party chief of the northeastern province of Shandong.

The blueprint is expected to promote the development of regional economies around urban centers. Ma Kai, head of the National Development and Reform Commission, which is overseeing the drafting of the plan, told local media in mid-September that such regions could include the Yangtze River Delta, the Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei area, the northeastern industrial belt and Chengdu-Chongqing cities in the southwest.

Chen Dongqi, deputy director of the commission's macroeconomy division, has estimated that China's economy would grow 8% to 8.5% most years between 2006 and 2010, but that some quarters might see a lower rate, even around 7%. He said the 2008 Olympics to be held in Beijing would fuel investment and consumption, revving national growth in the years leading up to the event, but warned that Beijing should prepare fiscal policies to prevent the economy from sliding afterward.

Some officials and economists have criticized the "scientific approach to development" as lacking implementation details, noting that the concept was introduced in 2003 but hasn't yielded much progress so far.

DeLay's Influence Transcends His Title

By Jeffrey H. Birnbaum and Jim VandeHeiWashington Post Staff WritersMonday, October 3, 2005; A01

For the indefinite future, Washington will remain Tom DeLay's capital. Dislodged by a criminal indictment last week from his post as House majority leader, DeLay in his decade of steering the Republican caucus dramatically -- and in many cases inalterably -- changed how power is amassed and used on Capitol Hill and well beyond.

Proteges of the wounded Texan still hold virtually every position of influence in the House, including the office of speaker. DeLay's former staff members are securely in the lobbying offices for many of the largest corporations and business advocacy groups.

But even more than people, DeLay's lasting influence is an ethos. He stood for a view of Washington as a battlefield on which two sides struggle relentlessly, moderates and voices of compromise are pushed to the margins, and the winners presume they have earned the right to punish dissenters and reward their own side with financial and policy favors.

His take-no-prisoners style of fundraising -- in which the classic unstated bargain of access for contributions is made explicitly and without apology -- has been adopted by both parties in Congress, according to lawmakers, lobbyists and congressional scholars. Democrats, likewise, increasingly are trying to emulate DeLay-perfected methods for enforcing caucus discipline -- rewarding lawmakers who follow the dictums of party leaders and seeking retribution against those who do not.

Most of all, DeLay stood for a blurring of the line between lawmakers and lobbyists so that lobbyists are now considered partners of politicians and not merely pleaders -- especially if they once worked for Republicans on Capitol Hill. Lawmakers-turned-corporate lobbyists such as Bill Paxon (R-N.Y.) and aides such as Ed Buckham, DeLay's former chief of staff, remain among the most influential figures on Capitol Hill -- often more involved than lawmakers in writing policy and plotting political strategy.

For a vivid sign of how what was once considered controversial has gone mainstream, consider the K Street Project. That was the name for a DeLay-inspired campaign -- for which he was chastised by the House ethics committee -- to demand that lobbying firms seeking access hire loyal Republicans. Rather than going underground, the project has gone unabashedly public, with a Web site, http://www.kstreetproject.com , providing news about the latest lobbying vacancies.

"People who have worked for Mr. DeLay become, like other senior Republican staffers, members in good standing of a club and are accepted back by many members [of Congress] and staffers," said Andrew M. Shore, chief of staff of the House Republican Conference. "The idea is that we are a team. What's good for one is good for all; anything to cultivate that team mentality is seen in a positive light."

Usually, staffers-turned-lobbyists lose their cachet when their former bosses retire or lose their jobs. But the DeLay fraternity -- so large that it is called DeLay Inc. -- does not look as if it will suffer the same fate. "Has the value of these people diminished? I would say no," Shore said. "As they transition into the private sector, the benefits are shared by the [Republican] conference. There's a symbiosis between the former staffers and many members of the conference."

None of the tactics used so effectively by DeLay and his allies were invented by them. The Texan's innovation was to systematically institutionalize them within the GOP. It's possible his zeal in these methods could ultimately bring about his downfall.

Texas prosecutor Ronnie Earle won a grand jury indictment of DeLay on a charge of conspiring to illegally evade fundraising restrictions. DeLay, still in Congress, has vowed to return to his leadership post after clearing his name at trial -- though his future is shadowed by a tall stack of other legal and political problems. But scholars say his methods are imprinted on Washington like a tattoo. "Even if Boss DeLay leaves, his legacy stays," said James A. Thurber, director of congressional studies at American University.

Part of the reason for this is that DeLay's temporary replacement, Rep. Roy Blunt (R-Mo.), is a DeLay protege whose rapid rise was spawned by the Texas Republican. So were the careers of almost everyone else in the House Republican leadership, including Rep. Eric I. Cantor of Virginia and Thomas M. Reynolds of New York. They are all social conservatives who support such pro-business policies as deregulation and tax cuts.

The DeLay network is just as formidable in downtown Washington. Former DeLay aides Buckham, Tony Rudy and Karl Gallant form the core of one of Washington's largest and fastest-growing lobbying firms, Alexander Strategy Group. Susan Hirschmann, a former DeLay chief of staff, is a senior member of Williams & Jensen, another major lobbying firm. Congressional aides said that these and other DeLay alumni are part of their "team" and will be welcome in their offices no matter what happens to their old boss.

Speaking of Hirschmann, Mike Stokke, deputy chief of staff to House Speaker J. Dennis Hastert (R-Ill.), said, "Having DeLay in her background is a strength; having worked for Tom brings credibility."

There has been no sign that DeLay personally has been active in the K Street Project since he was admonished by the House ethics committee for pressuring the Electronics Industries Alliance to hire a Republican as its president seven years ago. Nonetheless, the project is still going strong; other lawmakers and lobbyists have taken up the cause. Job listings on K Street are still distributed in regularly scheduled meetings held by other GOP lawmakers, including Sen. Rick Santorum (Pa.). Lobbying executives report that former Republican aides and lawmakers have telephoned them to suggest that their top openings should be filled with loyalists. The K Street Project Web site is run by well-connected conservative Grover Norquist of Americans for Tax Reform.

In the House, DeLay enhanced the leadership's role by ending the practice of automatically promoting the most senior lawmakers to committee chairmanships and, instead, choosing loyalists to fill the powerful slots. Rep. Christopher H. Smith (R-N.J.) was booted from the chairmanship of the Veterans Affairs Committee at the beginning of the current Congress because he repeatedly bucked DeLay and other GOP leaders on key votes. DeLay also arranged to have the chairmen elected by the committees themselves, whose members he also selected and was thus better able to control.

The same technique is now used in the Senate by Majority Leader Bill Frist (R-Tenn.), who won the authority to select committee members after the 2004 elections increased his majority to 55 seats. "There is only one reason for that change, and it is to punish people," Sen. Olympia Snowe (R-Maine) told the newspaper Roll Call in November.

Even House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.), an outspoken DeLay critic, has started to crack down on her own members with DeLay-like tactics. After this summer's vote on free trade with Central American nations -- a plan that several House Democrats supported despite her strong objections -- Pelosi summoned Democratic lawmakers to a private meeting and threatened to take away their committee assignments if they did not start voting with party leaders, according to participants.

DeLay's fundraising focus has also permeated Washington. Over the years, DeLay has raised tens of millions of dollars for Republicans through nearly a dozen fundraising entities. Today, no leader of either party or lawmaker with leadership ambitions would even consider not forming at least two such fundraising committees. "DeLay set a new benchmark for fundraising and that's not going to go away," said Larry Noble, executive director of the Center for Responsive Politics, a nonpartisan watchdog group.

DeLay established as common practice the requirement that House GOP incumbents with safe seats collect at least some money for the party as a whole. Chairmen of committees were particularly on the line to raise large sums, Republican aides said. Unless they paid up, their chairmanships were in danger.

In late June, Pelosi adopted a similar tack. She sent a letter warning that Democratic lawmakers who did not raise money for the House campaign committee would be deprived of everything from financial resources to telephone access. "If you are on the team, you have to" pay up, a House Democratic aide said.

Meanwhile, anyone looking for signs of the ongoing influence of DeLay Inc. will find another one today. It's the starting date for Time Warner Inc.'s new vice president for global public policy. The new executive is Tim Berry, former chief of staff to Tom DeLay.

America's conservatives take another blow

Sep 30th 2005

From The Economist print edition

The indictment of Tom DeLay, majority leader of the House of Representatives, may not be the start of a conservative crack-up; but a realignment of the movement that has come to dominate American politics could be in the works

AFP

TOM DELAY is no stranger to excitement. He claims nearly to have been killed during a bout of revolutionary violence in Venezuela, where he lived in his teens. He was asked to leave the first university he attended, and he made a living exterminating bugs before he entered politics. But “the Hammer” has not been able to swat away the swarm of investigators buzzing around him.

On Wednesday September 28th, Mr DeLay was indicted by a grand jury in Texas for alleged breaches of campaign-finance law, and forced to resign, at least temporarily, his position as Republican majority leader in the House of Representatives, America’s lower parliamentary chamber. There was much whooping among Democrats, for whom Mr DeLay was a hate figure even before he played a crucial part in the impeachment of Bill Clinton. “I hope his cell is full of cockroaches,” was one of the gentler postings on one leftish blogsite.

Washington, DC, is now engulfed in two debates. The first revolves around how bad a mess Mr DeLay is in; the second is about the extent of the fissures within the conservative movement that currently dominates American politics.

The case against Mr DeLay is less easy to understand than the perjury-about-fellatio charge against Mr Clinton. Along with two political associates, John Colyandro and Jim Ellis, he is accused of conspiracy to violate the election code in his home state of Texas. Mr DeLay has a political action committee called Texans for a Republican Majority (TRMPAC). Prosecutors allege that it accepted $155,000 from various companies, and then wrote a cheque for $190,000 to an arm of the Republican National Committee, with instructions to distribute chunks of the stash to individual candidates in Texas. In effect, the indictment argues, TRMPAC enabled the party to get around the ban on corporate donations to individual candidates.

If convicted, Mr DeLay faces up to two years in jail and a fine of up to $10,000. But that is far from certain. He has denounced the charges as “one of the weakest, most baseless indictments in American history”, adding that the district attorney behind the case, Ronnie Earle, was “an unabashed partisan zealot with a well-documented history of launching baseless investigations and indictments against his political enemies”.

Mr Earle is a liberal Democrat who, in 1993, indicted Kay Bailey Hutchison, now the state’s senior Republican senator, on what “The Almanac of American Politics” called “flimsy charges he was forced to drop the first day the case came to court”. Against that, Mr Earle has prosecuted four times as many Democrats as Republicans.

Mr DeLay said that his defence “will not be technical or legalistic; it will be categorical and absolute. I am innocent. Mr Earle and his staff know it. And I will prove it.” He then promised that Republicans would not be deflected from their “bold and aggressive agenda” to do something about petrol prices, state pensions, illegal immigration and fiscal responsibility—issues he vowed would all be tackled in the next few weeks.

That may be a bit optimistic. For one thing, the Republicans will miss Mr DeLay’s vote-whipping skills. He has a startling record of assembling hair-thin majorities for ticklish pieces of legislation, such as on Medicare prescription-drug benefit in 2003. In other words, he is adept at offering the necessary inducements to just enough waverers, but no more.

His case will probably not come to trial for several months, and in the meantime he remains a member of the House of Representatives. His duties as majority leader are to be assumed, for now, by Roy Blunt of Missouri, the House Republican whip, with assistance from David Dreier, a representative from California, and Eric Cantor of Virginia. None is likely to be as forceful as the Hammer.

Mr DeLay’s indictment is not the only ethical problem hampering the Republicans. Bill Frist, the Senate majority leader, is being investigated about a stock sale he insists involved no inside information. Karl Rove, President George Bush’s chief strategist, is fighting accusations that he leaked the name of Valerie Plame, an undercover CIA agent (see Rove profile). On Thursday, the vice-president's influential chief of staff, Lewis “Scooter” Libby, was revealed also to have told a reporter that Ms Plame worked for the CIA. And Mr DeLay’s problems are not limited to Texas: a lobbyist chum of his, Jack Abramoff, has been accused of a variety of dodgy doings involving Indian casinos and influence-peddling.

This accumulation of sleaze has made it harder for the Republicans to push through their agenda, reckons Thomas Mann of the Brookings Institution, a liberal think-tank. Other pundits are not so sure. Norman Ornstein of the American Enterprise Institute, a conservative think-tank, says Mr DeLay’s indictment will “not have a huge impact” on the Republican legislative programme, “mostly because it was in tatters before”.

That might sound odd. After all, only last November conservatives were preening themselves like peacocks, having won their seventh presidential election in ten contests. Mr Bush ran for his second term on a conservative platform of tax cuts, family values and American power. Marshalled by Mr Rove, millions of activists—anti-tax people, gun people, social conservatives, neo-conservatives and many more—comprehensively outfought their liberal equivalents. Mr Bush won more votes than any candidate in history.

Today the conservative movement is in turmoil. Different types of conservatives are at each other’s throats. Everybody is hurling opprobrium at the president. David Brooks, a conservative columnist on the New York Times, recently declared that he sometimes wonders whether Mr Bush is a Manchurian candidate—sent to discredit conservatism.

The loudest howls are coming from small-government conservatives who are furious with Mr Bush’s loose spending. But business conservatives are furious about his love-affair with the religious right and traditional conservatives are furious about his commitment of blood and treasure to the Iraq war.

These rows are particularly dangerous because they reflect long-standing tensions within the conservative movement:

• Small-government conservatives v big-government conservatives. Mr Bush has embraced all sorts of big-government programmes (from supercharging the Department of Education to creating the huge new Medicare drug entitlement) while trying to keep small-government conservatives on side with tax cuts. But this was a formula for fiscal disaster. It also failed to placate purists who believe that the federal government has no business running schools or pushing pills to pensioners.

• Conservatives of faith v conservatives of doubt. Doubters don’t think that the federal government should interfere in people’s private lives. They don’t want Washington meddling in states’ rights to legalise euthanasia or medical marijuana. Conservatives of faith believe that the federal government should encourage civic virtue. Under Mr Bush they have had the upper hand. The Justice Department has been aggressive in imposing its views on the states. The poster-child of the conservative movement on Capitol Hill at the moment is Senator Rick Santorum, a staunch advocate of family values.

• Insurgent conservatives v establishment conservatives. The conservative movement, rooted in the south and west, has been deeply hostile to Washington. But electoral success has created a Washington-based Republican establishment, which spends its time doling out goodies to its buddies and expanding federal power. Mr Bush has managed this relationship by presenting himself as an anti-Washington Washingtonian: the son of a president who prefers to spend his time in Texas. The insurgent wing seems increasingly unconvinced.

• Business conservatives v religious conservatives. The latter are waiting keenly to see whom Mr Bush appoints next to the Supreme Court. Business conservatives are worried that religious people have already got too much. Mr Bush’s stance on stem-cell research will cost America its competitive edge in biotechnology. Add to this their concerns about Mr Bush’s reckless fiscal policy and you have the making of a business revolt.

• Neo-conservatives v traditional conservatives. The former have an expansive vision of America’s role in the world—a vision that has come to include not just nation-building in Afghanistan and Iraq but also the transformation of the Middle East. But traditionalists balk at the hubris of this vision. How can conservatives who believe that government power is fallible rally to the idea of transforming an entire region?

This sort of criticism was once limited to mavericks such as Pat Buchanan. But it is now mainstream. William Buckley, one of the movement’s founders, has declared that the Iraq war was probably a mistake. Before the election, one senior White House figure confided that his biggest worry was not the anti-war left (which always sings the same song) but the possibility that the conservative intellectual elite would turn against the war. The rive droite seems to be turning.

Getty ImagesCan Rove turn it around again?

How bad is this? All successful political parties contain tensions. Look at Britain’s Labour Party—a party of pacifist trade unionists led by a hawkish fan of capitalism. The bigger a political party gets, the bigger the tensions. Politics is the art of managing these tensions—something Mr Bush’s team did brilliantly until this year.

The loss of touch began before Hurricane Katrina. Bungling in Iraq provoked a drumbeat of discontent, with neo-conservatives calling for more troops and traditional conservatives calling for an exit strategy. And the Valerie Plame affair demoralised the White House. It not only threatened Mr Rove’s political career, and is now putting Mr Libby in the spotlight; it also demonstrated how far Mr Bush’s pursuit of the war had alienated much of the Washington establishment (including the CIA and the State Department).

Katrina has been a disaster. Mr Bush’s slow response to the hurricane (it did not help that Mr Rove was in hospital) spoiled his claim to be a can-do president and it unleashed a previously quiescent press.

The Bush machine’s ruthless media management infuriates journalists, but while he was on top they played the game on his terms. Now they are out for revenge. Earlier this year, Newsweek fawned about the “hands-on and detail oriented” president who wants to hear the bad news first. After Katrina it presented a picture of a man who surrounds himself with toadies who are too terrified to warn him of brewing disaster.

Surviving Watergate and Bill Clinton

Predictions of the demise of American conservatism are almost as old as the movement. It survived both Watergate and Bill Clinton. Emmett Tyrell, the editor of the American Spectator, published “The Conservative Crack-up” in 1992. So much of the right’s power lies outside the administration and Congress—in its domination of the intellectual agenda for instance—that it is seldom down for long.

The Democrats show few signs that they have the wind in their sails. Their handling of John Roberts’s nomination to the Supreme Court has been dismal. Neither Harry Reid, the minority leader in the Senate, nor Nancy Pelosi, the minority leader in the House, is likely to set the world on fire. Moveon.org types want to drag the party to the left; Clintonistas want to pull it to the centre. America has two dysfunctional parties.

But Mr Bush’s recent problems do raise one important possibility: that of a realignment on the right. The fact that the Bush machine is running out of steam makes it much less likely that he will be able to determine his successor. This creates opportunities for very different sorts of conservatives who are waiting in the wings.

One possibility is Rudy Giuliani, former mayor of New York, who combines managerial toughness with social liberalism. But an even more likely one is John McCain. Up until now Mr McCain, a senator, has been popular in the country at large (he wins all head-to-head competitions with Hillary Clinton) but unpopular with the conservative movement. But the right is beginning to warm to him. He has spent his career campaigning against the sort of pork-barrel spending that conservatives are now railing against. And he is soundly conservative on both foreign and fiscal policy. A conservative crack-up may be going too far; but a conservative realignment is definitely in the works.

Lexington: The times they are a changin'. Really

Believe it or not, America is beginning to escape its groundhog decade

Sep 29th 2005 From The Economist print edition

WE'RE told on good authority that history repeats itself, but this is getting ridiculous. The past week has been a giant flashback to the 1960s. On Saturday 100,000 anti-war demonstrators descended on Washington, DC, to chant peacenik slogans and listen to Joan Baez sing “Where have all the flowers gone?” The only thing missing was Abbie Hoffman trying to levitate the Pentagon. And that's not all. PBS broadcast Martin Scorsese's lengthy homage to Bob Dylan, alongside a week of tributes to “the years that shaped a generation” (including a special edition of “Antiques Roadshow”). Both the Rolling Stones and Jane Fonda have dragged their aged limbs on tour.

There have been a few attempts to update things. This time, some anti-war protesters wore T-shirts that read “make levees not war”, while Sir Michael Jagger has penned a song about the evils of neo-conservatism. But for the most part, everybody seems happiest with golden oldies.

Why are the 1960s so difficult to escape? One reason is the sheer size of the baby-boom generation. Giant arboreal slums of boomers now sit at the top of every establishment tree, not least the media. And like all ageing geezers they continue to see the world through the prism of their youths. Listen to Charles Rangel, a black congressman from New York, comparing George Bush to Bull Connor (the notorious white police boss in Birmingham, Alabama); or Jesse Jackson likening the peace protesters to the civil-rights heroine, Rosa Parks; or just about every pundit doing the “Iraq war as Vietnam quagmire” routine.

The other reason why the 1960s are so hard to shake off is that the decade split America down the middle, launching the culture wars that still haunt American politics and redefining America's two great parties. The Democrats became the party of people who regarded the 1960s as an unmitigated good (particularly feminists, blacks and social liberals) while the Republicans regarded the 1960s as an unmitigated evil (particularly white southerners and other “conservatives of the heart”).

This has made for “Groundhog Day” politics. Every election the same arguments appear about draft dodging, the permissive society and so on. Last year, while Iraq burned, American politics fixated on which Swift Boat veteran did what 40 years ago.

Is there really no escape? In fact, last year's election looks like the last hurrah for 1960s politics. John Kerry presumably thought that turning the 2004 election into a referendum on his war service in Vietnam was a slam-dunk, given that he fought heroically while Mr Bush skulked at home. But many voters were less obsessed by the Mekong Delta, and others remembered him as a war protester, not a war hero.

The future of both parties is in the hands of people who want to jettison their 1960s baggage. On the Democrat side, before Mr Kerry reintroduced Vietnam, the Clintonites had spent much of the 1990s distancing themselves from Eugene McCarthy. They demonised black radicals such as Sister Souljah, embraced tough policies on crime and welfare, supported school uniforms and V-chips, and sent American bombers into Bosnia. In her preparation for 2008, Hillary Clinton has taken positions on military force and abortion rights that would have scandalised her younger self. Barack Obama, a possible running mate, is very different from the older black leaders. On the relative merits of liberal and conservative solutions to black poverty—spending more money versus changing the behaviour of the poor—he says: “It's not either/or. It's both/and.”

For their part, the Republicans have been trying to get beyond Richard Nixon's “southern strategy”. Mr Bush has appointed blacks to more senior positions in his administration than any previous president and lavished more attention on wooing black voters. The reason why black Democrats seized on the catastrophe in New Orleans to demonise Mr Bush is not because they really think that he is Bull Connor reincarnated, but because they worry that his strategy of creating a multicultural Republican Party might get somewhere.

The old road is rapidly ageing

More broadly, American society is beginning to make its peace with that divisive decade: it is becoming neither a pro-1960s culture nor an anti-1960s culture but a post-1960s culture. Polls show only 5% of voters objecting to the civil-rights revolution. For all the rage of the culture warriors, most Americans—particularly young ones—put a high premium on “tolerance”. At the same time, they also think that the counter-culture went too far. Very few people decry the nuclear family or urge people to tune in, turn on and drop out.

Society is in a process of repairing itself after the big dislocations of the 1960s, when rates of crime, pre-marital sex and family breakdown began to surge. (The annual number of divorces, for example, more than doubled between the mid-1960s and the mid-1970s.) The figures for teenage pregnancy and abortion are both declining. Crime is down (America now has fewer burglaries per head than Canada), and divorce is beginning to drop, particularly among the college-educated, as the children of divorced parents re-embrace the nuclear family. Most young Americans say they believe in God and love their country.

Mr Dylan remains such an iconic figure not because he embodied the 1960s but because, unlike many of his acolytes, he refused to be defined by the decade. Mr Scorsese makes great play about the way the folk protester infuriated his hard-core fans by going electric. But this was only one of the bard's changes. He distanced himself from his protest songs. He got God in a big way. And in his recent memoirs he boasts that his dream was a “nine-to-five existence, a house on a tree-lined block with a white picket fence, pink roses in the backyard.” That's where the flowers went, Joan.

The cauldron boils

A rise in mass action worries the party, prompting more intolerant measures

Sep 29th 2005 | BEIJING
From The Economist print edition

AP

THE Chinese government is getting increasingly twitchy about what officials say is a rapid growth in the number and scale of public protests. In its latest bid to quash them, this week it announced a sweeping ban on internet material that incites “illegal demonstrations”. Does China face serious instability? Probably not, for now at least. But in the longer term there are reasons to worry.

Quashing unrest has ever been a priority for the Communist Party. But over the past year or so it has put even more emphasis on tackling “mass incidents” as it calls the protests. These include a wide range of activity, from quiet sit-ins by a handful of people to all-in riots involving thousands. Almost always, they are sparked by local grievances, rather than antipathy to the party's rule. Yet China's most senior police official, Zhou Yongkang, has said that “actively preventing and properly handling” mass incidents was the main task for his Ministry of Public Security this year.

According to Mr Zhou, there were some 74,000 protests last year, involving more than 3.7m people; up from 10,000 in 1994 and 58,000 in 2003. Sun Liping, a Chinese academic, has calculated that demonstrations involving more than 100 people occurred in 337 cities and 1,955 counties in the first 10 months of last year. This amounted to between 120 and 250 such protests daily in urban areas, and 90 to 160 in villages. These figures are likely to be conservative. Chinese officials often try to cover up disturbances in their areas to avoid trouble with their superiors.

Under Mr Zhou's orders, police forces around the country this year have been merging existing anti-riot and counter-terrorist units into new “special police” tasked with responding rapidly to any mass protests that turn “highly confrontational”. Police officials say the existing units were too sluggish, too poorly trained and ill-coordinated to handle the upsurge in disturbances. The special police are to form small “assault squads” to tackle incidents involving violence or terrorism.

Only a few years ago, news of specific incidents seldom filtered out to foreign journalists. Now, thanks partly to a freer flow of information helped by the internet, by mobile telephony and, more rarely, by a slightly less constrained domestic press, hardly a week goes by without some protest coming to light. In June, thousands of people rioted in the town of Chizhou, in the eastern province of Anhui, after an altercation between a wealthy businessman and a cyclist over a minor traffic accident. In August, hundreds clashed with police in a land-related dispute that still simmers in the village of Taishi, in the southern province of Guangdong. Last month, the police in Shanghai detained dozens of people protesting against being evicted from their homes.

In some ways, this unrest makes China look a lot more like a normal developing country than the rigidly controlled system it was until the early 1990s. It is becoming increasingly common to encounter small-scale protests in Chinese cities that only a few years ago would have horrified order-obsessed cadres. An apartment block near your correspondent's home in Beijing has for weeks been scrawled with slogans protesting against the adjacent construction of a petrol station. “We want human rights,” says one. Residents say the police have not interfered, save to warn them not to protest during a big political gathering in the city.

Chinese officials often say that greater social unrest is normal in developing countries with a per capita GDP between $1,000 and $3,000. China's GDP per head surpassed $1,000 in 2003. But this appears to be little consolation. In August last year, President Hu Jintao appointed a high-level team, headed by Mr Zhou, to supervise the handling of protests and petitions. Official sources say Mr Hu dwelt on protests in a speech to party leaders in September 2004 and at the party's annual economic planning meeting in December. Late last year the party issued a document to senior officials telling them how to deal with unrest.

According to these sources, Mr Zhou's speeches are laced with warnings that political dissidents might try to manipulate local protests to put pressure on the party itself. This fear explains why the party has further squeezed non-governmental groups and dissidents in recent months. China Development Brief, a newsletter on Chinese civil society developments, reported that in recent weeks China's secret police had been interviewing staff of Chinese NGOs that receive foreign funding, as well as Chinese staff of foreign NGOs in China, about the purpose of their work. The government has suspended the registration of new international NGOs pending the outcome of these inquiries.

The party's dilemma is that much of the unrest is a product of the rapid economic growth that it is so keen to maintain. The outlook of many urban Chinese has changed profoundly since the 1990s as a result of the privatisation of hitherto heavily state-subsidised housing. Anxious to protect their new assets, property owners have increasingly clashed with developers, and their government backers, who have been trying to cash in on the resulting boom by erecting shopping malls and luxury housing. The expansion of cities has fuelled clashes with peasants whose land is needed for construction.

Some argue that these mostly isolated protests, if handled sensitively, could help China maintain overall stability by providing people with a way of venting frustrations. But Mao Shoulong, at Renmin University of China in Beijing, says the unrest is a sign that China lacks channels for people to air discontent in a more orderly fashion. Widespread corruption and an increasingly conspicuous wealth gap fuel a contempt for officialdom that can easily erupt into the kind of class-based rioting that occurred in Anhui in June.

And should the economy falter, urban China could be faced with the twin dangers of an angry middle class saddled with big mortgage commitments and declining property prices (a problem China has not yet had to face), as well as a big increase in the number of unemployed, who, along with unpaid pensioners, are the main participants in protests in those parts of the country left behind by the current boom. Widespread middle-class discontent, combined with blue-collar dissatisfaction, would be a much bigger threat to stability than China now faces.

Koizumi gets his way

Sep 15th 2005 | TOKYO
From The Economist print edition

The prime minister's landslide victory will solve only some of Japan's problems. But a new Japan is clearly emerging, and there seems to be no turning back

IN A country that so often settles for mixed messages, the stunning victory of Junichiro Koizumi this week is a clear signal from Japan's voters. They are ready and eager to break with outworn special interests and modernise the ties between their government and the economy. The public may not know quite how to go about it; but having given their champion a clear mandate, and with economic recovery at last gathering force, the Japanese have more cause to be optimistic than they have had for a very long time.

Since he took over as prime minister in 2001, Mr Koizumi has complained loudly about the conservative “forces of resistance” that riddle his own Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), which has governed Japan almost continuously for the past half-century. For four years, however, he has had to temper those complaints with compromise, as his opponents in the LDP have blocked or diluted his efforts to shrink Japan's overweening state. A month ago, fed up, he decided to risk his career and plans publicly, with an election. On September 11th voters emphatically backed his message, rewarding his coalition with a two-thirds majority in parliament.

Japan's election Sep 15th 2005 Tokyo Japan Japan's economy

During the campaign, Mr Koizumi told the public repeatedly that he wanted the election to be about one issue: his plans to privatise the post office, which not only delivers the mail but is also the world's largest financial institution. Japan Post uses its network of 24,700 branches to collect state-subsidised bank deposits and life-insurance premiums from tens of millions of Japanese citizens, and thus controls a staggering ¥330 trillion ($3 trillion) in household financial assets. Mr Koizumi wants to liberate that wealth from state hands, both to cut off the flow of funds to special interests and to let the market find better uses for Japan's massive pool of savings.

When rejectionist members of his own party helped to defeat his plan in parliament, Mr Koizumi dissolved the lower house, called an election and refused to support the campaigns of the 37 lower-house LDP members who had opposed it. He then recruited a team of high-profile candidates—dubbed “assassins” by Japan's media—to challenge the LDP rebels in their home districts and campaign for postal privatisation. The result: Mr Koizumi's purged LDP won 296 of parliament's 480 seats, its biggest haul since 1986; the LDP and its coalition partner, the Buddhist-backed New Komeito, now hold a two-thirds majority that can overturn any upper-house vetoes; and 20 of the LDP rebels are no longer in office. As for Mr Koizumi himself, he is so popular that when he was found to have served Mimolette cheese, a pricey French import, to a colleague in his office, Japan's biggest online shop sold out of the stuff.

Mr Koizumi's victory looks even more encouraging in light of the economic news. Japanese companies have been making bumper profits since 2002, helped by strong global demand and heavy Japanese investment in China. As those profits have worked their way through the economy, the country has begun to shake off the burdens that weighed it down after its asset-price bubble burst in 1990. Japan's banks, which played a central role in its long stagnation, are healthier than they have been in over a decade. And the overall economy is stringing together an increasingly reassuring record of growth. On September 12th, revised figures showed that GDP grew at a 3.3% annual rate in the second quarter.

More important, this gathering momentum is starting to feed through to Japan's labour market. Full-time employment has risen sharply this year. As the evidence of a jobs recovery has mounted over the past couple of months, it has fed hopes that higher wages and confident workers will spur consumer spending. Growing domestic demand will allow Japan's economy at last to begin rising of its own accord, without relying so much on a strong tailwind from exports and the global economy.

It will also mean something else. Within a few months—perhaps by the time Japanese families are buying two-storey rice cakes for their New Year gatherings—Japan will be celebrating the return of inflation. In most other countries, that would hardly seem cause for cheer. But in Japan, where average prices—and wages—have been falling for nearly a decade, the deflationary spiral has done extensive damage to the economy. It has distorted markets, depressed revenues and delayed vital changes, while making the real burden of Japan's huge public debts—now 160% of GDP—seem all the more daunting. So it is great news indeed that those deflationary pressures are gradually easing, and should soon give way to rising prices.

The DPJ's usefulness

Between Mr Koizumi's winning campaign and the economy's growing strength, it is little wonder that investors are pleased. In the five weeks since the prime minister decided to dissolve parliament, Japan's stockmarket has risen by 10%. Yet some doubters are grumbling. Voters, they think, may have done more harm than good by handing Mr Koizumi's LDP such a huge victory. They also complain that his reform agenda, beyond postal privatisation, is fairly limited.

These criticisms stem from the LDP's dominance of Japanese politics. It has been in government for all but ten months since 1955, and has often acted less like a political party than like a club that allows the powerful to take turns in office. Many reformists have been counting on the emergence of two-party politics to spice up Japan's democracy. They point out that the main opposition party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), has tried to make politicians more accountable by publishing clear manifestos that outline its national plans.

Those plans, moreover, call for reforms that are often more sweeping than anything Mr Koizumi has proposed. The DPJ wants to merge disparate pension schemes, to make them fairer and simpler, and to overhaul the health-care system and its finances, something that the LDP has helped the doctors' association to oppose. The opposition party has also campaigned to transfer more power from central bureaucrats to local governments; to cut public-works spending even more than Mr Koizumi has; and to slash the government's civil-service payroll by 20%.

In short, the DPJ has been a handy opposition party to have around during the past few years, and could perhaps do Japan some good if it were to win power. Yet it lost more than one-third of its 177 seats this week, and must now try to hold itself together. As a result, Mr Koizumi's detractors argue, he has merely given a new lease to the LDP system that has held Japan back for so long.

These worries probably give too little weight to Mr Koizumi's own reformist message, and thus to the political importance of the resounding victory that he has just won. He has, after all, consistently pointed out the flaws in his own party, and has even threatened to destroy the LDP if necessary. He clearly wants to change the party, and has just helped a swathe of new LDP members to win office—many of them with urban constituents, who have different and broader interests from those of the old, rural-based LDP. And his mandate from the voters is resounding.

The prime minister's first act will be to privatise Japan Post. The immediate impact will be small, spread over the course of a decade beginning in 2007. But it will complement the “big bang” financial reforms enacted under Ryutaro Hashimoto in 1997, which deregulated some financial services and introduced more competition into Japan's capital markets.

Mr Koizumi also hopes to follow this with reforms to the nine other public financial institutions that the government operates. These channel state-backed loans to a range of special interests, from small businesses to farmers to infrastructure projects. Mr Koizumi has already forced one of these institutions, the Housing Loan Corporation, to get out of the direct-lending business. Over the past few years, private banks have rushed in to fill the gap by supplying viable borrowers with mortgage loans.

The prime minister will be lucky to accomplish much more than that during the next year. After that, LDP term limits require him to step down, and Mr Koizumi insists that he has no wish to amend those rules and stay in office.

Steadily improving numbers

The economy is now in such good shape, however, that it can probably keep expanding on its own momentum, even if Mr Koizumi and his successors do little else by way of reform. Since the bursting of the bubble in 1990, Japan has had several economic upswings; each time, they have failed to take hold. This time looks different because it has begun to solve the underlying problems that have frustrated a lasting recovery.

These structural flaws are invisible to those who have watched Japan's stagnation from a distance. Infrequent visitors to Tokyo invariably mention how contented and well-dressed the shoppers look as they walk along the capital's clean, safe streets. Much of the pain has been spread out across the countryside, where jobs have been lost, small firms have gone under and suicide rates have risen.

Even without a visit to Tokyo, many outsiders cannot understand how a country with so much impressive technology, which it continues to export in quantity, could be in such trouble. Toyota and Honda, for example, continue to build new factories in North America, and are raking in profits there even as local firms such as Ford and General Motors struggle. But exports are only 10-12% of Japan's economy, and domestic demand has been moribund throughout the country's “lost decade”. While Toyota was taking over the world, car sales in Japan fell by 16% between 1990 and 2001.

Although other countries have seen bubbles collapse, Japan had two particular disadvantages. First, it was saddled with masochistic central bankers who insisted that deflation would be good for Japan, much as bleeding was once considered the best treatment for the sick. Second, the country's business leaders, bankers, regulators and politicians conspired to ignore the true scale of Japan's bad debts in the wake of the bubble's collapse. Instead of using taxpayers' money to recapitalise banks, so that they could write off the loans to their worst borrowers, they looked the other way and hoped that it would somehow, some day, work out for the best.

This led to huge misallocation of resources, as banks lent good money after bad in order to keep their deadbeat borrowers on life support a little longer. Anil Kashyap, an economist at the University of Chicago's business school, points out that in many sectors, such as construction and retailing, Japan was consistently channelling its resources towards the least efficient companies during the 1990s.

In a deflationary environment, and with these insolvent companies undercutting them at every turn, even many of Japan's healthy companies could not turn their businesses round. Many of them cut costs heroically. But when everyone is slashing payrolls, then workers' pay, confidence and spending are all under pressure too, which makes it hard for anyone to boost revenues.

Japan's setbacks were often blamed on other factors, such as an ill-advised increase in consumption taxes in 1997 and the global collapse of the information-technology sector in 2000. Those were not the real problem, however. With prices falling and the banking sector dysfunctional, Japan was simply too weak to withstand any downdrafts that it encountered.

A Chinese wind

That dreadful situation has at last begun to resolve itself over the past three years, as a helpful wind from China has finally stayed strong enough, for long enough. Japanese companies have been boosting their spending on new plants and equipment, as makers of cars, electronics and other goods began ramping up their investments in China and other overseas markets. Those companies then began buying more Japanese components and materials for their overseas factories. The resulting demand began to boost revenues; and because Japanese firms had already cut costs sharply, their profit margins began rising sharply too (see chart 1).

Those higher profits, which Japan has now sustained for three years, have changed everything. As they continued to rise, spreading from big manufacturers to small ones, and then to many services companies, a whole swathe of corporate Japan is now able to pay its debts. The longer this profit boom has continued, the better life has become for Japan's lenders. The banks' bad loans have fallen dramatically, from ¥28.4 trillion (8.7% of the total) in March 2002 to ¥7.6 trillion (2.9%) now (see chart 2). And since their balance sheets are stronger, they have been able to cut off loans to the worst companies, which can no longer suck the life from their healthy competitors.

The firms that have survived this process are thus much fitter, on the whole, than they have been in years, and are confident enough to begin betting on Japan again. Jesper Koll, an economist at Merrill Lynch in Tokyo, points out that besides building factories in China, Japanese firms such as Canon and Toshiba are investing in new plants in Japan again as well.

Companies are also hiring again. The unemployment rate has fallen from 5.4% at its peak to 4.4%. The ratio of job offers per applicant is at its highest level since 1992 (see chart 3). And after a couple of years of expanding using temporary and part-time workers, Japanese firms have begun to take on more full-time staff. Wages are starting to rise, and reliably higher spending does not seem far behind. Toyota, though still keen on exports and overseas factories, is now selling its luxury Lexus cars in its home market for the first time.

In short, Japan is entering a new phase of sustainable economic growth, regardless of what Mr Koizumi does or fails to do. This does not mean that politics is irrelevant, however. Even as Japan begins to look more like a normal advanced economy, it will still have the same problems as other rich countries.

Indeed, Japan's challenges will remain, in many ways, tougher. Not only will it face a demographic crunch sooner—its population will begin shrinking by 2007, and may already have begun to do so—but it is burdened with the leftover costs of its go-slow approach to the bursting bubble.

One of these is a young workforce that is still largely untested. A generation of young Japanese has grown up with part-time jobs, temporary work and a breakdown of vertical authority, in a system that long relied on stable employment and seniority to give workers the training they needed. If this cohort of workers emerges with weaker skills than previous ones, it will be harder to boost productivity and hence long-term growth. Nor can Japan rely on imported labour for a jolt, since it is still squeamish about immigrants.

Still, the news for this generation is hardly all bad. They value creativity more, and have more choices open to them, than their predecessors. Women still have far fewer opportunities than their counterparts in western democracies, but their situation is also improving. Every week, the Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Japan's biggest business daily, carries a “working woman” section filled with career and investment advice. Young women no longer have to leave the country to shine.

The other challenging set of hangovers relates to Japan's public debt, and that is why Mr Koizumi's emphatic victory this week is so welcome. If he indeed steps down next September, he will scarcely be able to touch the problem before he passes the torch. Fortunately, however, many of the changes that have accelerated on his watch are starting to look irreversible. His main contribution to Japan has been to build on changes in the political system that were already under way, and to show future politicians how powerful those new tools can be if used well.

Mr Koizumi has done this by building on the gradual reforms of his predecessors. These have laid the groundwork for more powerful cabinets, which should make it easier for future prime ministers to set their own agendas. He has also brought a lot of fresh blood into the LDP, and given its leaders more authority. Perhaps most important, Mr Koizumi has used this election to demonstrate to everyone, including the voters themselves, just how much the electorate has changed, and matured, over the course of Japan's dismal decade.

Hu's Policy Shift and the Tuanpai's Coming-of-Age

Li Cheng

The promotion of leaders with Chinese Communist Youth League backgrounds (known as tuanpai) to ministerial and top provincial posts has been widely reported. Less noticed, but perhaps even more important, is how the rapid rise to power of these leaders correlates with Hu Jintao's new mandate emphasizing social fairness and social justice over GDP growth. This article analyzes the background of all 22 tuanpai officials currently serving as ministers or provincial chiefs from the perspective of two parallel developments—Hu's appeal for a "harmonious society" and the tuanpai's coming-of-age. The analysis reveals both the strengths and weaknesses of this emerging elite group and illuminates Hu's leadership style, political power, and policy orientation.

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Hu Jintao and the Central Party Apparatus

Party Affairs — H. Lyman Miller

Nearly three years into his tenure as the top leader of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Hu Jintao has yet to make substantial progress in consolidating his power over the key organs of the central party apparatus. Hu's predecessor Jiang Zemin also moved cautiously and with limited success to place political subordinates into these posts at a comparable point in his tenure. Soon after consolidating his position at the top of the PRC political order, however, Jiang moved more quickly to promote his associates in the central party apparatus. Now that Hu has completed a comparable transition, he may move more assertively to do the same, especially as 2007 approaches, bringing with it the 17th Party Congress.

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Bush to Focus on Vision for Reconstruction in Speech

New York Times, September 15, 2005

By ELISABETH BUMILLER
and RICHARD W. STEVENSON

WASHINGTON, Sept. 14 - President Bush is to pledge in an address to the nation from New Orleans on Thursday night that the federal government will provide housing assistance to victims of Hurricane Katrina and also help reimburse the states for costs they have absorbed in taking in evacuees, a White House official said Wednesday.

The commitments are part of a series of initiatives that the president is expected to announce as he tries to recover from the political fallout over the government's handling of the storm.

The initiatives will encompass education, health care and other social services, with specific housing and job assistance for people who return to New Orleans to live. White House officials said the president would not call for any set-asides or quotas for minorities in reconstruction contracts.

The proposals were still in the planning stages on Wednesday night, and officials said the 9 p.m. address, the president's first major speech on the hurricane, would not be a State of the Union "laundry list" of proposals. Instead, they said, it would focus more generally on Mr. Bush's vision for the reconstruction of New Orleans and the Gulf Coast, with the federal government playing a supportive role to what White House officials are calling a "home-grown" plan that must be created by city and state authorities.

"We're in the beginning of the rebuilding at this point, and there are a lot of ideas that people are expressing," Scott McClellan, the White House press secretary, told reporters on Air Force One on Wednesday. "The president wants people to think big."

Mr. McClellan indicated that Mr. Bush would not use the speech to name a "reconstruction czar" to oversee the effort. A number of White House officials have advised the president to name such a czar, with Gen. Tommy Franks, commander of forces in the 2001 war in Afghanistan, being a favorite of Republicans who are pushing the idea.

White House officials also played down the notion that Mr. Bush would offer a "Marshall Plan" for New Orleans and the Gulf Coast, as the Senate Republican leadership called for in a letter to the president on Wednesday. "We stand ready to work with you to lay out a comprehensive approach to the coordination of relief and development efforts through a 'Marshall Plan' for the Gulf Coast as soon as possible," said the letter, signed by Senator Bill Frist, the majority leader, and others.

Instead, administration officials and a Republican close to the White House said Mr. Bush would offer some general principles about "building a better New Orleans" with stricter construction standards to try to avoid a replay of the recent catastrophe. Republicans said Mr. Bush would not mention a price tag, in large part because of budget and political pressures from House Republicans and other supporters angry about administration spending.

Republicans said Karl Rove, the White House deputy chief of staff and Mr. Bush's chief political adviser, was in charge of the reconstruction effort, which reaches across many agencies of government and includes the direct involvement of Alphonso R. Jackson, secretary of housing and urban development.

As of Wednesday, few if any members of Congress had been informed by the administration of the president's plans. But Congressional leaders nonetheless offered Mr. Bush advice on his speech.

"I want him to reassure the people that the big part of this fight is ahead of us, and he's going to make sure that the federal government does a better job, does its part," Senator Trent Lott, Republican of Mississippi, said in an interview on MSNBC on Wednesday night. "We're all to blame to a degree." Mr. Lott added that Congress should never have passed legislation, as the White House wanted, that made the Federal Emergency Management Agency part of the Department of Homeland Security.

"We went along with that, and I guess we'll have to go back and try to rewrite the history, but that should be an independent agency reporting only to the president of the United States," Mr. Lott said.

Who's Who in the White House

Updated: June 22, 2005

Short profiles and key stories about President George W. Bush's top advisers in the White House. The Top Two: Cheney | Rove
Senior Advisers: Bartlett | Card | Gerson | Hadley
Other Key Aides: Allen | Devenish | Hagin | Hubbard | Libby | McClellan | Miers | Wolff

About This List These profiles were compiled by Dan Froomkin. Some Web sites linked to from this page may require registration to use. For information on members of Bush's cabinet, see washingtonpost.com's Bush Administration page. Official biographies (including phone numbers) of more White House staffers can be found on results.gov.

The Top Two

Richard B. Cheney
Vice president
Date of birth: Jan. 30, 1941
Behind the curtain stands Dick Cheney, easily the most influential vice president in U.S. history. Cheney is a secretive and remorseless strategist, and the administration's foremost advocate of the unstinting exercise of power at both the international and domestic level. For instance, he was unwavering in his desire to go to war in Iraq. And his aggressive moves to restore power to the presidency lost since in the Vietnam War and Watergate eras have been hugely successful. In the second term, Cheney has even further expanded his own personal influence by putting his loyalists in key positions throughout the White House. Cheney himself does not poll well; he survived a slew of dump-Cheney rumors in the run-up to the 2004 election. Ironically, he is now constantly batting down rumors that he'll run for president in 2008. During the 2004 campaign, Cheney did not join in his boss's call for a constitutional amendment to ban gay marriage. One of his daughters - the one who is not a senior State Department official - is a lesbian. But aside from that issue, Cheney and Bush have been eerily in synch since Day One. The only question is, behind closed doors, who synchs to who.
• Weaned on Politics, Cheney Daughters Find a Place at the Table, New York Times, May 31, 2005
• Hill to See More of Cheney Treatment, Washington Post, Jan. 20, 2005
• Cheney Upholds Power of the Presidency, Washington Post, January 20, 2005
• Cheney Exercising Muscle on Domestic Policies, New York Times, January 18, 2005
• Cheney energizes loyal base -- and foes, Chicago Tribune, July 2, 2004
• Cheney Was Unwavering in Desire to Go to War, Washington Post, April 20, 2004
• The Strong, Silent Type, Washington Post, Jan. 18, 2004
• How Dick Cheney Sold the War, Newsweek, Nov. 19, 2003
• Official Bio and Speeches

Karl Rove
Senior adviser and deputy chief of staff
Date of birth: Dec. 25, 1950
Karl Rove is a man of many nicknames. He is the "Architect" of Bush's victories; he is "Bush's Brain." The president alternately calls him "Boy Genius" or "Turd Blossom," a Texas phrase describing a flower that grows in manure. He is the mastermind of the White House, the instigator-in-chief responsible for a series of policies and political maneuvers aimed first at getting his boss re-elected, and now at creating a permanent Republican majority. In the first term, Rove was Bush's senior political adviser, officially in charge of strategic planning and political affairs. In early 2005, Bush also made him deputy chief of staff, so he now officially coordinates the policies of the National Security Council, the Domestic Policy Council, the National Economic Council and the Homeland Security Council. The result is that Rove is the poster child for how politics and policy have merged in the Bush White House. Traditionally, governing is a considerably different matter than running for office, where winning is everything. Not so with Rove. If he eventually starts losing, he could end up taking the blame for creating a divisive presidency, aimed more at achieving partisan goals than the common good. But if he keeps winning, he will be a kingmaker even as his boss becomes a lame duck -- and his legacy could be a GOP that is indeed the ruling party for decades to come.
• The Architect, PBS's Frontline, April 2005 (Includes priceless video, at the 4:45 mark, of a young Karl Rove lecturing Dan Rather about the importance of voter registration in the 1972 Nixon campaign.)
• With Bush Re-elected, Rove Turns to Policy, New York Times, March 28, 2005
• The Karl Rove Ascension, washingtonpost.com, Feb. 9, 2005
• Barbara Walters's Most Fascinating People, ABC News, Dec. 8, 2004
• The Many Faces of Karl Rove, washingtonpost.com, Nov. 8, 2004
• The Controller, New Yorker, May 12, 2003
• Rove's Way, New York Times Magazine, Oct. 20, 2002
• Official Bio

Senior Advisers
Dan Bartlett
Counselor
Bush's longest-serving aide, the ever-cheerful 34-year-old Bartlett started working for Bush during his first campaign for governor in Texas in fall 1993. During Bush's first term as president, Bartlett was communications director. He now occupies the post that was left vacant when Bush confidant Karen Hughes returned to Texas in 2002. Officially, the job puts him in charge of strategic communications planning. But unofficially, he's the explainer-in-chief. And he's got big shoes to fill. Hughes was considered uniquely capable of channeling Bush's thinking - and she was one of Washington's finest spinners ever.
• Profile: Presidential Counselor Dan Bartlett, ABC News, January 18, 2005
• Official Bio
Andrew H. Card Jr.
Chief of staff
Date of birth: May 10, 1947
The iron man of the White House, Card is the longest-serving White House chief of staff since the Eisenhower administration. And he runs the most buttoned-down, leak-proof, on-task, on-time, on-message White House in history. Indefatigable, and possessing an astounding memory, Card aggressively monitors -- and limits -- the information flow to the president. "The president has to have time to eat, sleep and be merry, or he'll make angry, grumpy decisions," Card said in a radio interview described in this column. "So I have to make sure he has time to eat, sleep and be merry. But I also have to make sure he has the right time to do the right thing for the country, and that he gets the right information in time, rather than too late." During the George H.W. Bush administration, Card was deputy chief of staff and transportation secretary. In the interregnum, he was the automotive industry's chief lobbyist. He is considered a potential candidate for governor in Massachusetts.
• White House suits Card just fine; Says he won't run if Romney decides against second term, Quincy Patriot Ledger, May 13, 2005
• Pressure Cooker; Andrew Card Has the Recipe for Chief of Staff Down Pat, Washington Post, January 5, 2005
• Andrew Card gets another chance as Bush's chief of staff, Knight Ridder Newspapers, Nov. 12, 2004
• A Powerful Player in the White House; Behind the Scenes, Chief of Staff Andy Card Rules With a Firm Hand, Philadelphia Inquirer, Jan. 26, 2004
• Official Bio

Michael J. Gerson
Policy and strategy adviser
As Bush's chief speechwriter in the first term, Gerson gets credit for soaring oratory that often transcended its pedestrian delivery. As an evangelical Christian, Gerson also gets credit for the injection of Christian themes, imagery and language into the White House communications strategy. Promoted in the second term to the position of policy adviser - and moved to a new office just around the corner from the Oval - fellow staffers call him the conscience of the White House.
• Soul of a Conservative, National Journal, May 14, 2005
• Bush Gets a New Voice for Second Term, Newsweek.com, January 5, 2005
• Bush's References to God Defended by Speechwriter, Washington Post, December 12, 2004
• For Bush's Speechwriter, Job Grows Beyond Words, Washington Post, October 11, 2002
• Official bio

Steve Hadley
National security adviser
Date of Birth: February 13, 1947
Easily the most low key and self-effacing national security adviser in recent history, Hadley is the smiling face of the hawkish policies advocated less charmingly by his mentor, Vice President Cheney. After four years of devoted service as deputy to Condoleezza Rice, Hadley moved across the hall into the big office in the second term. He's deeply loyal to Bush, unfailingly polite and widely liked -- but Hadley's job isn't just to formulate and promulgate policies. It's also to tell Bush things the president doesn't necessarily want to hear.
• So, What's Not to Like About Amiable Advisor?, Los Angeles Times, June 6, 2005
• Stephen Hadley walks out of the shadows and into the spotlight, Cleveland Plain Dealer, April 24, 2005
• Bush's Clark Kent, David Ignatius in The Washington Post, February 11, 2005
• Official bio

Other Key Aides

Claude A. Allen
Domestic policy adviser
Allen's most recent job before coming to the White House was as deputy secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services. His first job in politics was working for former Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) - an unusual choice for an African-American. Bush nominated Allen to a seat on the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in 2003, but Democrats blocked his nomination.
• White House adviser is loathed by some, but adored by others, Knight Ridder Newspapers, May 16, 2005
• Bush's Domestic Adviser Is 'a Jack of All Trades', Washington Post, March 29, 2005
• Official Bio


Nicolle Devenish
Communications director
After great success as chief spokesman for Bush's re-election campaign, the 33-year-old Devenish was hired as the White House's chief message communicator in January. Devenish was famously fired from a previous job, a long time ago, for being too cozy with reporters. But that's no longer a danger.
• New Aide Aims to Defrost the Press Room, New York Times, Jan. 10, 2005
• Californian gets out the White House message, Sacramento Bee, March 6, 2005
• Official Bio

Joseph Hagin
Deputy chief of staff
Date of birth: January 6, 1956
A former vice president at Chiquita Brands International, Hagin is in charge of the daily operations of the White House. He was deputy campaign manager in George W. Bush's 2000 presidential campaign.
• When the President Needs Someone He Can Trust, He Turns to Big Joe, Cincinnati Enquirer, Jan. 20, 2003

Allan Hubbard
National Economic Council director
Running Bush's National Economic Council is a particularly demanding job. But Hubbard, the third person to hold that position, is an old Bush friend and fundraiser. He went to Harvard Business School with Bush and raised more than $300,000 for Bush's presidential campaigns. The president of Indianapolis-based E&A Industries, Hubbard built a fortune making and selling Car Brite car wax. During the George H.W. Bush administration, he worked for Vice President Dan Quayle on his deregulatory campaign.
• Bush Picks Supporter as Economic Council Chief, Washington Post, January 11, 2005
• Bush Names Longtime Friend to Head Economic Council, New York Times, January 11, 2005
• Bush Pioneer Profile, washingtonpost.com
• Official Bio

I. Lewis "Scooter" Libby
Vice President Cheney's chief of staff
Sometimes called "Dick Cheney's Dick Cheney," Libby is an important foreign policy adviser inside the White House. He's also the author of a highly-praised novel, "The Apprentice".
• Interview with Larry King, CNN, February 16, 2002
• Official Bio

Scott McClellan
Press secretary
The second most public face of the White House, Scott McClellan's job is to deliver the president's predetermined message to a room full of reporters who are often looking for something else. As time has passed - McClellan took over from Ari Fleischer in the summer of 2003 - he has gotten less and less subtle about simply repeating his talking points over again. Tensions sometimes run high when McClellan is fending off frustrated reporters trying to knock him off message. But pretty much every time, it's the guy with the podium who wins. McClellan's family is a political powerhouse; his brother, Mark McClellan, is the administrator of Medicare and Medicaid, and their mother is Texas Comptroller Carole Keeton Strayhorn, who is running for governor.
• Blogger Hits the Wall, washingtonpostcom, April 5, 2005
• Official Bio
• Press Briefings

Harriet Miers
White House counsel
Date of birth: August 10, 1945
Miers was Bush's personal and campaign attorney back in Texas, where he also appointed her to head the Texas Lottery Commission. At the White House, she has been promoted twice, from staff secretary to deputy chief of staff for policy, and then to legal counsel. Bush once called her as a "pit bull in size 6 shoes."
• Quiet but Ambitious White House Counsel Makes Life of Law, Washington Post, June 21, 2005
• Miers' trek: from council to counsel, Dallas Morning News, March 3, 2005
• Bush Promotes Miers From Staff to Counsel; Aide Lauded for Integrity, Intelligence, Washington Post, November 18, 2004
• Official Bio

Candida "Candi" Wolff
Chief lobbyist
Date of birth: June 9, 1964
A former Cheney aide, Wolff spent a year on K Street as a corporate lobbyist before heading back to the White House to lead the president's uphill legislative charge.
• Official Bio


Useful Background Information:
• Who's Who in the White House
• West Wing Floor Plan
• White House Staff List and Salaries
• White House Correspondents

Who's in Charge? Karl Rove!

By Dan Froomkin
Special to washingtonpost.com
Thursday, September 15, 2005; 12:00 PM

All you really need to know about the White House's post-Katrina strategy -- and Bush's carefully choreographed address on national television tonight -- is this little tidbit from the ninth paragraph of Elisabeth Bumiller and Richard W. Stevenson's story in the New York Times this morning:

"Republicans said Karl Rove, the White House deputy chief of staff and Mr. Bush's chief political adviser, was in charge of the reconstruction effort."

Rove's leadership role suggests quite strikingly that any and all White House decisions and pronouncements regarding the recovery from the storm are being made with their political consequences as the primary consideration. More specifically: With an eye toward increasing the likelihood of Republican political victories in the future, pursuing long-cherished conservative goals, and bolstering Bush's image.

That is Rove's hallmark.

Rove, Bush's long-time political adviser and the "architect" of Bush's ascendancy, was rewarded after the 2004 election with a position at the White House with overt policy responsibilities. But whereas in some previous White Houses, governance took precedence over campaigning once the election was safely over, Rove has shown no sign of ever putting policy goals above political ones. (See my Rove profile.)

Tonight's speech promises two classic features of the Rove approach.

Bush will take advantage of powerful imagery -- the Associated Press reports the speech will be held in historic Jackson Square, with the famous St. Louis Cathedral as a backdrop -- and he won't risk having anyone around who might disagree with him or ask an impertinent question. In fact, the AP says, there won't be a live audience at all. (And even the journalists covering the event are being told they won't be allowed to stray from their press vans.)

As for the speech itself, it will inevitably seek to answer any naysaying about Bush by recasting him in the heroic, leadership role he played after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks -- while advocating a range of measures that are dear to the conservative political agenda.

It will, on the other hand, feature one very unRovian tactic. Typically, it is the Democrats who are blamed for wanting to solve problems by throwing money at them. But tonight, Bush will be the one throwing the money around.

Will it work? Rove has an astonishing track record of success. But at the same time, Bush finds himself today a deeply unpopular president according to the opinion polls, particularly damaged by his lackluster response to the protracted, televised suffering in New Orleans.

And Rove himself has not been at his best of late. Unlike many of Bush's advisers, who have plausible deniability for his initial under-reaction because they weren't with him on vacation, Rove was tagging along with the president, blithely touring the West Coast even as the Gulf Coast drowned. Rove is haunted by the possibility of indictment by a federal grand jury investigating the leak of a CIA agent. And according to Time magazine, he was briefly hospitalized last week with painful kidney stones.

Even many of the president's traditional allies say Bush -- and by extension, Rove -- have been off their political game. We'll know better by tomorrow morning whether that continues to be the case.

借中國威脅論 爭取民主？

伍瑞瑜
2005-09-07

曾 慶紅即將訪港，誠心相信民主發展有利中港社會穩定的中間人士，憑什麼向 中央要求加快香港民主步伐？在中國威脅論熱潮下，《經濟學人》(Economist)兩篇將胡錦濤稱為 conservativeauthoritarian(保守威權主義者)的報道，以及《金融時報》(FinancialTimes)一篇指摘中國崛起分化 亞洲的評論，不知會否被用作借題發揮？

上周《經濟學人》刊出兩篇專題報道，指胡錦濤的意識形態十分保守，更發起「保先」運動(藉學習及檢討「保持共產黨員先進性」，提高黨性)、加強打壓知識分子、指蘇聯的失敗是「新自由主義」的禍害、要求國企改革以馬克思主義為原則等。

另一報道又指出，中國對開放部分新聞自由十分後悔，於是再次加強監控，明令禁止「異地監督」(一個省的傳媒，避免挑戰本省領導，對本省負面新聞甚少報道， 但對外省的卻積極報道)，又發生程翔及美國《紐約時報》北京辦事處助理趙岩被捕等事件，甚至香港《蘋果日報》投訴被抽廣告也入了胡錦濤數。

在國際輿論上，胡溫新政蜜月期早已完結，上述內容早已散見歐美各大媒體，但在胡錦濤原定訪美之際(如今訪問已押後)卻被舊事重提。如果民主派向中央游說，適度增加香港及內地的民主人權，這種「妖魔化」言論也許會減少，內地會否聽得入耳？

獨裁統治 獨裁對待鄰邦？

此外，曾任美國共和黨參議員麥凱恩(JohnMcCain)政策顧問的DanielTwining，8月22日亦在《金融時報》撰文，指摘中國的崛起，只 會分化亞洲。麥凱恩是著名強硬派政客，曾公開表示美國要拉攏其他亞洲國家制衡中國，2000年曾與布殊競逐總統提名，DanielTwining當時出任 其外交政策顧問及演辭撰稿人。

文章指出，中國軍力及經濟力量不斷增強，區內政治影響不斷膨脹，令亞洲各國起疑心，泰國、菲律賓、新加坡、印尼及澳洲均加強與美國的聯繫，以平衡中國的影 響力。文章又指中國沒有民主選舉，每次政權轉移都是黑箱作業，雖然估計中國會在50年後成為全球最大經濟體，但難以令人相信未來50年中國政局都能保持穩 定。

最後，文章指出若中國沒有民主，難以令亞洲各國心服口服真心支持中國成為區內領導，因為若中國沒有民主，以獨裁統治國民，拒絕尊重國民人權法治，難保中國會在崛起後，不會同樣以獨裁方式對待鄰國。

上述論據你也許不同意，但卻代表了不少西方人士所想，相信不少負責貿易談判的中方官員，都親身感受到這股日益增加的反華壓力。如果香港能與中方溝通的中間 人士，向中方說明，若對香港政改採取稍為寬鬆的態度，也許可以紓緩這股中國威脅論，對中國「和平崛起」反會有幫助，內地的看法會如何？

中共害怕公民社會

林和立
蘋果日報

最 近北京接二連三打壓甚至無理拘留「維權」律師，使人對胡錦濤與溫家寶有關推崇法治與依法治國的承諾十分懷疑；另外，胡總以「防止和平演變」與「顏色革命」 為由，在未來一兩年間還會加大力氣監控和壓抑大陸「公民社會」的活躍分子，包括非政府組織（NGO）、專業團體、以及和歐美有聯繫的社團與民間學術研究單 位等等。

按 照西方有關民主發展進程的論述，一 個國家發展到擁有一定規模的中產階級，尤其是假如勇於捍?社會公義的NGO和專業團體大量湧現的話，此國家有望在中、短期孕育出起碼的民主機制。中國共產 黨一直對公民社會步步為營，視為可能挑戰一黨專政的洪水猛獸。而負責登記非官方社團與其他NGO單位的民政部，對私人團體素來限制多多。

整頓社會團體

最近北京又發放了更嚴厲的法規，進一步整頓和控制非附屬於黨政部門的社團和研究機構，同時情治部門開始二十四小時監控某些與西方、尤其是與美國有交往的NGO。但隨?經濟與教育水平的提升，愈來愈多知識分子與專業人士表現出強烈的正義感與回饋弱勢團體的決心。

在 公民社會中走在最前線的，是一批有理想與無畏精神的律師。許多在九十年代法學院畢業的律師，已成為維護低下層工人、農民、和弱勢民營資本家的「英雄」。新 世紀開始以來，普羅大眾慘被「新權貴階層」、即官商勾結的暴發戶集團欺負與魚肉的最常見例子，是城市與農村居民被財雄勢大的發展商迫遷出舊房子和農地，但 得不到應有的賠償。

另外，隨?能源價格屢創新高，新權貴集團在全國各地大量開發石油、煤礦與水電，受影響地區的老百姓不止分享不到甜頭，很多時還要搬離家園，不少農民更被迫淪為城市的黑市勞工。

大舉拘捕律師

今 年最轟烈的維權事件，要算赤手空拳面對國家機器的朱久虎律師。他就是轟動海內外的陝北油田案的主角之一。自九十年代中期，一千多個陝西民營企業，獲陝西政 府與相關的國家油公司批准開採當地的石油與天然氣。但到了二○○三年中，由於油價暴漲，中央決定收回私營油公司的勘採權。當時，已有大概六萬多名「私營老 闆」投放了七十多億元資產，但有關部門只同意給他們十多億元的賠償。投資者曾多次上訪北京，但毫無結果。

朱 久虎是國內著名的維權律師，他去年中接過此官司後，曾請多位有影響力的法律、經濟與能源專家到陝北考查，準備與陝西和中央部門對簿法庭。但今年五月，朱竟 被公安以「非法集會」等莫須有罪名拘捕；和朱一齊工作的律師也受到恐嚇。更離譜的是，帶頭爭取合理補償的好幾個老闆與投資者也被追捕，導致原告大逃亡的司 法醜聞。到目前為止，內地已有近百著名律師與法學教授連署，要求中央部門馬上放人和舉行公平的審訊。

據 外國人權組織估計，過去幾年被公安與安全部門警告、監視甚至拘留的護法維權律師與法學教師超過一百位。除了替異議人士打官司的法律人士外，受迫害的還包括 代表被迫遷居民討公道的律師。後者當中最有名的，是揭露「上海首富」周正毅與當地貪官勾結、非法炒賣地皮的正義律師鄭恩寵。鄭因得罪上海權貴，在二○○三 年竟被判三年徒刑，罪名是「洩露國家機密」。

替 鄭 辯護的另一位人權律師郭國汀也不斷受到公安滋擾。據說○三年胡溫處理周案時，曾受到「上海幫」的阻礙，所以後來周只輕判三年了事。有可能因為上海幫頭頭江 澤民已於去年九月全退，所以最近北京就重判和「周首富」關係密切的前中國銀行大班劉金寶「死緩」。但問題是，甚麼時候才可以平反鄭律師的冤案？

壓抑維權組織

不幸的是，尤其是最近好幾個中亞國家爆發了以各種顏色命名的「人民權力革命」後，胡總和黨內高層對催化民主的公民社會組織，包括善於據法力爭的維權律師與律師團體，實在怕得要命。

據 西方外交界消息，在吉爾吉斯坦三月的「鬱金香革命」後，中共領導曾派十多個考查團，到曾經發生過民主運動的中亞與前蘇聯國家，目的是要找出方法避免類似的 「變天」在中國發生。胡總顧問的建議是，一定要壓抑NGO、維權組織、和其他公民社會單位的發展，不然這些民主政治前哨兵在「海外反華敵對分子」的煽動與 秘密援助下，很可能會顛覆中共的政權。

可悲的是，第四代領導人在誓死捍?中共「長治久安」這方面，和以前所謂保守派老同志差不了多少：在確保政權的大前提下，抽象的法律、人權問題變得太微不足道了！

小泉繼續鷹派外交

蘋果日報
林和立 2005-09-16

小 泉純一郎領導的自民黨在九一一國會選舉中大勝，被認為是日本政治的分水嶺。但北京的反應一如所料的冷淡，因為小泉很可能會挾民意而在外交，尤其是對中國和 周邊國家方面，採取更強硬的政策。當選晚上，小泉在被問到會否參拜靖國神社時，只例牌地說會做出「審慎而適當」的判斷。

無可置疑，這次選舉的議題雖然是國內改革問題，而不是外交，但選民的支援，會促使小泉更果斷地推行他一貫的「鷹派」國防與外事政策。

改革之路未見暢通

小 泉與他的主要內閣成員以及自民黨重量級人物，包括分管外交與國防的町村信孝與大野功統，以至自民黨前幹事長安倍晉三都被稱為強硬派，主張把日本蛻變為一個 不受「和平憲法」約束的「正常國家」。他們強烈希望把日本從一個「準經濟超級大國」，拓展為一個兼為世界一流的軍事與外交強國。

小泉內閣在過去一年，已啟動修改憲法與擴充自?隊的工作；東京又大力拉攏美國，希望通過與美國協防，防止中國崛起或至少減慢中國坐大的速度。在國際層面，則極力爭取成為聯合國安理會的常任國，與美、英、法、俄和中國平起平坐。

這 次選舉的重點，雖說是日本龐大的郵政系統改革，以至整個經濟私有化問題。但自民黨頭頭都知道，小泉雖然贏了此一役，但正因為郵政系統和其他國有或半國有企 業與日本政客︱︱和他們的選區︱︱都有千絲萬縷的利益關係；要大刀闊斧改革談何容易。小泉這次的「世紀政治豪賭」雖然勝出，但並不表示其改革之路會很暢 通。的確，小泉前幾個月在國會提出的郵政修改方案，已比他原先強調私有化的激烈方案溫和得多。

或與中國周旋到底

小 泉以改革經濟與官僚體制起家，但他在改革郵政等問題上還是遇到重重阻力；然則，十分關心個人「歷史地位」的小泉，可能會把國民注意力轉移到國家安全與外交 方面。假如小泉成功把日本提升為政治大國，他在國民心目中，還不失為戰後的傑出政治家。從這個角度看，東京今後與北京的摩擦可能會加劇。除了靖國神社與歷 史問題外，有關東海油與天然氣開採權的爭端已不斷升溫。

最近雙方已更頻繁地派先進的艦艇甚至潛艇到該區「示威」；小泉內閣在民意高漲的背景下，很可能自覺有政治本錢與中國周旋到底。

錯誤解讀小泉現象

這 次選舉的另一個關注點，是小泉的任期。小泉已多次表明他將按照慣例，只當五年的自民黨總裁；換句話說，明年九月，他便得辭去黨魁與首相的職務。但東京的政 界已開始討論，自民黨極缺乏有魅力的政客；而星期天的歷史性大捷，被廣泛形容是「小泉騷」、「小泉劇場」的功勞。目前已有耳語要求小泉起碼多幹兩年，以穩 住自民黨來之不易的大好形勢。當然，中國與亞洲地區包括韓國，是絕不願意小泉破例幹多過五年的。

平心而論，中國的日本專家一向缺乏對「小泉現象」的全面理解，尤其是不明白小泉深受選民支持的原因，以至過去一兩年，中南海的決策者對日本首相開重炮時，往往把一般日本民眾也得罪了；年中吳儀副總理臨時取消會見小泉便是一例。

新華社與其他官方媒體在評論日本大選時，指小泉狡猾地為「選民洗腦」，並且掌握了資訊時代譁眾取寵的伎倆，才「奇?」地獲勝。看來，北京需要先了解日本新一代政客與選民的背景與訴求，才可以有效地打擊日本右派以至軍國主義的復甦。

林和立﹕中國聯歐制美到此為止﹖

　【明報專訊】本月初中國與歐盟在北京舉行高峰會 兼慶祝雙方建交30年。總理溫家寶在會見歐盟輪值主席英國首相貝理雅時，表示有信心中歐之間可以進一步發展「全面戰略伙伴關係」。中歐高層簽了一份26項 的聯合聲明，同意在政治經貿、科技文化方面加強合作。但無可否認的是，以胡錦濤為首的第四代領導班子過去兩年多極力炮製的「聯歐制美」策略最近受到一定的 障礙與挑戰。

　 畢竟中歐美微妙的三角關係在不斷變化。03年在反對布殊總統 攻打伊拉克時，法德兩大國曾經與中國跟俄國並肩抵制華盛頓的「單邊主義」。但到了今年，歐盟反美情緒已普遍減弱。尤其是去年歐盟擴充到25個成員國，而且 新加盟的大部分是曾經給蘇聯欺負甚至蹂躪的東歐小國，如波蘭、捷克等等。在蘇聯集團解體後，這些國家都接受了美國大量的經濟與軍事援助。可以說所謂「新歐 盟成員國」一般是親美的，而只有以法德為首的「舊歐盟」個別領導還希望與中國或俄國聯手來制衡華盛頓的「新霸權主義」。

　 但從今年開始，法德的內外政策都發生巨變。首先是和布殊唱對台戲唱得最勁的法國總統希拉克在其選民於5月以大比數否決歐盟新憲法後，已變成跛腳鴨﹔72高 齡且身體欠佳的希拉克很可能一年內就要交班，而其繼承人人選中沒有一個像他這麼反美。但最關鍵的是本月18日的德國大選。一般民意調查顯示反對黨基督民主 聯盟可能獲勝，而其女黨魁默克爾（Merkel）有機會打敗希拉克的老友施羅德，成為德國第一任女總理。在東德長大的默克爾一直有親美傾向。

　歐盟反